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ABSTRACT !!
CAN CULTURE BE CONSIDERED IN CONTINUITY WITH NATURAL EVOLUTION? 
SUSAN BLACKMORE’S MEMETIC APPROACH AND ITS CRITIQUES 
 
Vehbi Metin DEMİR 
M.A. in Cultural Studies 
Supervisor: Prof. Mahmut Mutman 
May, 2012 
 
 
This work is about cultural evolution. Memetics and particularly Susan Blackmore’s 
memetic approach is examined as an example of a Darwinian Theory of cultural 
evolution. It is questioned whether Susan Blackmore’s account of cultural evolution has 
original insights and whether this account is sufficient for explaining the phenomenon of 
culture. Her account is examined theoretically and conceptually. This dissertation 
consists of four main parts. In the first part, the forerunners and the background of Susan 
Blackmore are outlined. In the second part, key points of Susan Blackmore’s memetic 
approach are summarized. The third part is devoted to criticisms of Susan Blackmore’s 
memetic approach from within the memetics and some of the shortcomings of it are 
reviewed. Finally, coherency of this memetic approach is evaluated in the perspective of 
social sciences and its implications for cultural studies are discussed. It is concluded that 
Blackmore’s theory of cultural evolution that takes gene-based evolution as a model has 
a number of shortcomings to shed a proper light on the matter of culture. 
Key words: Evolution, cultural evolution, memetics, Susan Blackmore, culture, 
imitation, genes, memes. 
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Vehbi Metin DEMİR 
İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi 
Kültürel Çalışmalar Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
Danışman: Prof. Mahmut Mutman 
Mayıs, 2012!!!
KÜLTÜR DOĞAL EVRİMLE SÜREKLİLİK İÇERİSİNDE ELE ALINABİLİR Mİ?  
SUSAN BLACKMORE’UN MEMETİK YAKLAŞIMI VE ELEŞTİRİLERİ !
 
Bu çalışma kültürel evrimle ilgilidir. Bu tezde, bir Darwinci kültür teorisi olarak 
memetik ve özelde Susan Blackmore’un memetik yaklaşımı incelenmektedir. Susan 
Blackmore’un kültürel evrimci açıklamasının yeni kavrayışlar getirip getirmediği ve bu 
yaklaşımın kültür olgusunu açıklamadaki yeterliliği sorgulanmıştır. Onun yaklaşımı 
teorik ve kavramsal olarak incelenmiştir. Bu tez dört bölümden oluşmaktadır. Susan 
Blackmore’un halefleri ve memetik yaklaşımının arkaplanı özetlenmiştir. İkinci 
bölümde, Susan Blackmore’un memetik yaklaşımının ana hatları özetlenmiştir. Üçüncü 
bölüm Susan Blackmore’un memetik yaklaşımının eksikliklerine ve memetik alanı 
içerisinde ona yapılan eleştirilere hasredilmiştir. Son olarak bu memetik yaklaşımın 
tutarlığı sosyal bilim perspektifinden değerlendirilmiş ve kültürel çalışmalar açısından 
sonuçları tartışılmıştır. Blackmore’un gen-merkezli evrim modelini temel alan kültürel 
evrim teorisinin kültür sorununa ışık tutamayacak kadar çok eksiklikleri olduğu sonucu 
çıkarılmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Evrim, Kültürel Evrim, Susan Blackmore, Kültür, Taklit, Genler, 
Memler. !!!!!!
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This world we live in is a unity that consists of the two elements: what we describe 
as culture and nature. Human beings also are considered as a unity that consists of on 
one side given oe pre-existing natural things and on the other side the properties that are 
acquired trough social life. In Western culture these two notions, nature and culture, are 
generally treated as though they are in opposition. The notion of culture brings to our 
mind those phenomena, which are not natural, and likewise the concept of nature is seen 
as a pure area where any human invention is not included. These two interwoven 
concepts interestingly negate each other.  
 Culture is considered a skill peculiar to human beings and in this sense, human 
beings become uniquely different from all other living and non-living beings in nature. 
As culture is the distinguishing hallmark of humans, the uniqueness of humans in the 
universe can be understood by examining culture. To understand the essence of culture 
is to understand the essence of being human.  
 According to Giambattista Vico (1725/1948), since cultural artifacts are created by 
human consciousness and since the human mind is same both in the past and today, 
humans are capable of knowing cultural phenomena in ways that are not possible with 
respect to natural things. Indeed, phenomena created by us must be more understandable 
than natural things, which we do not create. We can understand our products. It seems 
very plausible, but when we attempt to explain the notion of culture this pure vision 
becomes blurred. The questions, such as where we can find pure nature which is not 
defiled by human invention, is culture really unique to human beings, can we understand 
culture inside the culture taking into account that we necessarily think through the lens 
of culture, is the concept of culture the same at all times and for all societies, restrain us 
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from easily capturing the essence of culture.  
 However, what Vico highlighted, nature and culture are different realities and we 
need different sciences. Whenever two interdependent concepts emerge, then the 
dialectical process begins to operate in which the two poles always exist by negating the 
other and in the end one pole of the dichotomy dominates the other pole.  Today, this 
kind of oppositional struggle can be seen in academia. 
 One side of dichotomy will eventually dominate the other. Some thinkers assert 
that culture creates the notion of nature, others claim culture is a product of nature. 
There are two camps. One reduces culture to nature; the other reduces nature to culture. 
Today, we can see various examples of the two camps. There is a biologist reductionist 
camp, which gets inspiration from Darwin and increases its influence through the 
acceleration of researches of new sciences such as zoology, socio-biology, genetics, 
cybernetics etc. For them, culture is nothing but a property that serves only the survival 
of human kind in the course of evolutionary progress. Everything that seems to be 
transcendent can be explained by means of natural processes. Within this direction, 
socio-biology seeks to find some sorts of human behavior, such as social division of 
labor, altruism, parentage, aggression, in the behaviors of some animal communities and 
our ape ancestors. As such, bio-semioticians assert, in the aspect of semiotics, human 
kind’s communicative ability is just a broader and more complex version of animal 
communications. Biologists treat culture, which was developed by humans who have the 
most sophisticated cerebral cortex, as a natural continuity in the process of evolution. 
Naturalist cognitive scientists lodge humans in nature because of the fact that human 
acts totally stem from some basic impulse-reaction processes and a set of physico-
chemical reactions.  
 On the other side, there exists a social constructivist camp, which reduces nature to 
culture. Social constructivism, especially triggering by post-structuralism, has become 
an unchecked trend in the social sciences, which tries to cast doubt all phenomena that 
are regarded as given, biological, or natural.  For them there is nothing to be taken as a 
given thing, all that we see is created or determined by what is social. Thinking that all 
the things are a construction of the human mind, prevents us from common sense 
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thinking, and tries to dismantle the opposition in favor of culture. This perspective 
produces a new noumenal domain, that is, it implicitly says that even if there is 
something beyond the realm of language or social conventions we can never capture it.  
Hence, what is the main arbiter of human behaviors? Which side drives us? It is 
still an open-ended question but in this work, I especially focus on the biologist 
reductionist camp, its suggestions and shortcomings.  
 
As Dobszhansky (1973) said “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light 
of evolution” (p. 125). Indeed, today still the Darwinian theory of evolution is the 
dominant paradigm in the life sciences. What is important in Darwin’s theory, in terms 
of nature-culture opposition, is its attack on human’s privileged position in nature. 
Humans, as a species, are not created by an intelligent designer and also have no 
different way of development dissimilar to any other living beings. Human kind is not 
the target of evolution, but rather it is a contingent station in millions years evolutionary 
process. This revolutionary insight affects our understanding of the surrounding nature 
and ourselves. From the date when Origin of Species published until today, a Darwinian 
industry has developed. Evolutionary sociology, evolutionary aesthetics, evolutionary 
psychology, evolutionary linguistics and even evolutionary cosmology have come on to 
academic scene. Evolutionary ideas are also applied in medical biology and 
immunology. Computer sciences have developed theories in which programs evolve 
through Darwinian notions such as variation, mutation, selection etc. Darwinian theory 
is moving towards becoming a theory of everything, a universally applicable theory. 
Blackmore calls this circumstance, Universal Darwinism.  
 
After the Second World War, two evolutionary theories arose for explaining 
cultural phenomena. Evolutionary psychology and sociobiology gained popularity in a 
couple of decades. These two disciplines made efforts toward explaining human 
behaviors in terms of natural evolutions. For them, our body had formed though million 
years according to basic biological needs and the ways that would be advantageous to 
genes. However, these two discipline always seek biological advantages in the human 
brain and when facts, such as abortion or birth control are taken into account, they 
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evaluate these cultural facts as deviations because these are hazardous to our genes’ 
survival. For them a cultural phenomenon must essentially sustain biological 
adaptability and gene survival. Thus, they reduce culture to nature as we can see various 
forms in history. 
 
However, memetics, as a Darwinian theory, resists these kinds of reductionist 
approaches. It develops a new theory. Memetics, ushered in by Dawkins, claims that 
human behaviors are not only the upshot of genetic survival, but also the survival of 
memes. A meme is a gene-like cultural unit leaping from brain to brain, or brain to 
artifacts, which is the cause of culture. All living beings have DNA, a unit of biological 
heritage, which was the first replicator on earth. According to Richard Dawkins gene-
based theory, the ambition of genes for survival, lead them to replicate themselves 
relentlessly and also make proteins and bodies in order to protect themselves. Individual 
living being are the outcome of this struggle for the survival of genes. But at a certain 
time in evolutionary process a second replicator came into being, which called a meme, 
a unit of cultural heredity. The interaction of these units gives rise to the cultural world. 
Memetics is the discipline that seeks to define a unit of meme, to find the existence of 
memes, and to explain the mechanisms of memes interaction.  
 
The seeds the discipline of memetics were sowed by Richard Dawkins in 1976. 
Up until now, memetics did not manage to demonstrate its expected success. If we 
simply search Google for the term memetics, we find 504,000 results. This simple 
experiment shows that memetics has gained popularity especially among laypersons. But 
also there is an Internet publishing journal for the discussion of memetics academically. 
Hence, memetics deserves academic attention. Here, we focus on the meaning and the 
implications of memetics. The reason to choose this topic is not to study memetics per 
se, but rather to study it as a sample of contemporary approaches of nature-culture 
oppositions. Since, memetics has a slightly different position from other theories that 
attempt to account for culture in terms of natural evolution, this work would like to look 
at how memetics deals with this dichotomy, whether it makes a coherent theory or not, 
and the question can memetics be a cure for the problem of culture.  
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Since, memetics is a work in progress, there is no single, unified theory of 
memetics. For this reason, I limit this work to only Susan Blackmore’s memetic 
approach, because she is the most popular writer among all memeticists, and it can be 
said that her book The Meme Machine made memetics a universally known theory.  
 
This dissertation is about Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach and its critiques. 
In order to do that, firstly Blackmore’s background and her theory are given. Then in the 
second part some of the criticisms from within and from outside the discipline of 
memetics is researched. The final aim of this dissertation is to explain Susan 
Blackmore’s memetic approach and evaluate it in terms of coherence in itself and also 
its implications for cultural studies. To realize this aim, we handle the issue in four 
chapters.  
 
In the first chapter, Susan Blackmore’s background, namely the history and the 
development of memetics are given. Since, it is essentially a Darwinian theory, first of 
all Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is considered briefly. Then, Richard 
Dawkins’s, as a founder of memetics, theory of the selfish gene is described and related 
to theory; the concept of meme is introduced. After giving the initial description of 
meme theory, another important figure in memetics, Daniel Dennett is discussed. These 
two figures provide a base for Susan Blackmore, so their theories and insights are 
described. 
 
In the second chapter, Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach is explained. Her 
theories and claims in various articles and in her famous book The Meme Machine are 
examined. The key point of her approach is succinctly explained in order to clarify her 
understanding of memetics and prepare for further criticisms.  
 
In the third chapter, some of the criticisms from within memetics are presented. 
Although there are diverse points that have questioned Blackmore’s approach, they are 
categorizes here in five basic sections. Some of the cited claims do not directly target on 
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Blackmore, but they are mentioned because these are indirectly corresponding to 
Blackmore’s shortcomings. In the first two sections, some of the mentalist and 
behaviorist criticisms are reviewed to show that Blackmore’s indifference on the issue of 
determining the real place in which memes reside gives way to an epistemological crisis 
in her theory. In the third section, criticisms on the notion of imitation, which is 
positioned at the center of Blackmore’s explanations, are tackled. It is notable to point 
out that her notion of imitation is self contradictory to some extent, and also insufficient 
in terms of accounting for all cultural transmissions. The fourth section is devoted to a 
Blackmore claim that says what makes humans different is their capacity to imitate. This 
assertion is examined and it is argued that this claim has no scientific basis. Finally, 
some methodological issues are handled such as the lack of a dependable philosophy of 
science, the necessity of stratification of the means of cultural transmission, and so on. 
Hence, in this chapter, the coherency and power of Blackmore’s memetic approach are 
examined in the context of memeticists debates.  
 
In the final chapter, this memetics approach is questioned in terms of the 
concerns of cultural studies such as anthropology, politics, history of philosophy, power 
relations, and so on. Although Susan Blackmore’s memetics has many points that are 
debatable for cultural studies or other social sciences, such as the essence and the 
meaning of language, the notion of self, the explanation of altruism etc., it is particularly 
focused on her general initiative assumptions. In the first section, this work focuses on 
the matter of culture to which memetics allegedly offers a solution. It is shown that 
memetics has no well-defined notion of culture, let alone a solution. In the second 
section, the logical fallacies of Blackmore are explored. Some of the presumptions are 
made at the very beginning of the theory lead it to rhetorical and metaphysical fashion, 
rather than science. The third section is devoted to analyzing the discourse of memetics. 
The questions such as which world-view memetics uses and in which discourse it talks 
are questioned. Memetics is defined a member of the Third Culture and we discuss the 
intricate relationship between cultural studies and the Third Culture. Finally, a generally 
accepted claim that Darwinism is pulled down Platonism and its essentialism is 
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examined. While at first glance, memetics seems to destruct Platonic essentialism, it is 
argued that memetics conjures up the specter of Plato with new scientific terms.  
CHAPTER 1 
THE FORERUNNERS OF SUSAN BLACKMORE’S MEMETIC 
APPROACH 
 This chapter is devoted to the outline of the basic theories on which Susan 
Blackmore depends. As memetics is essentially a Darwinian theory, recalling what 
Darwin said is necessary. After that, Richard Dawkins’s and Daniel Dennett’s 
consideration of memetics will be recapitulated here since Blackmore develops her own 
approach on these thinkers’ ideas. The purpose here is to give the background of Susan 
Blackmore’s memetics  
1.1. Memetics: A Darwinian Theory on Culture 
 Memetics is essentially a Darwinian theory on how the mind works and how social 
complexity evolved. So before talking about memetics, it is important to remember what 
Darwin said. His book On The Origin of Species is one of the most influential books in 
western modern thought. Below, I give a brief summary of his ideas. 
 The book is essentially on the theory of descent with variation by means of 
natural selection, which is mostly known today as evolution. It depends on two main 
themes: the variation of species and struggle for life among individuals. The main 
mediator of these two themes and the common principle in the organic world is natural 
selection. Darwin (1859/2008) explain natural selection in his introduction:  
 
As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and 
as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows 
that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under 
the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of 
! 15!
surviving, and thus be naturally selected (p. 7). 
  This is a succinct summary of Darwin’s own work. For Darwin, those individuals who 
win the fight for survival would become dominant in the population of the species, “and, 
if that population is isolated from other populations of the same species, it will begin to 
diverge from them and may eventually form an entirely new species”(Price, 2008, p. 
31). Darwin’s general ideas can be summarized as such. What follows is, a brief outline 
of the book, The Origin of The Species. 
 The book starts with examination of a pigeon’s variations under domestic 
conditions. Darwin, in the first chapter, shows that domestic pigeons vary in man-made 
conditions and thus, there is a man-made, artificial selection. He also shows that a great 
deal of hereditary modification is at least possible. Therefore, “species are mutable or 
subjected to change”, so, they have no essence (Stefoff, 1996, p. 75). Although this 
claim is extremely revolutionary with regard to the traditional Aristotelian and Platonic 
philosophy of nature which regard that species should have primordial essence, the idea 
of variability did not begin with Darwin, because Lamarck and the grandfather of 
Darwin, Erasmus Darwin especially has propounded this idea before Darwin. But 
actually, “the question to which Darwin was trying to find an answer was not whether or 
not species could change, but how they changed” (Price, 2008, p. 49). So, Darwin shows 
again, to same extent, a known idea of the changeability of species under some 
circumstances. 
 Then in second chapter Darwin asks a crucial question: Is there such a variability 
of species in (the state of) nature? Darwin tackles here variation in nature by providing 
plenty of examples of the variety within species across their geographical ranges. His 
samples picked up in the Galapagos showed variations occur when a population is 
isolated from its parent’s species. Organismic life has been changing with subtle variety, 
and their newly acquired characteristics are inherited by their offspring. 
 After that he describes what he calls “the struggle for existence” which means that 
organism have excessive capacity for reproduction. When most individuals of a species 
produce a great deal more offspring than can possibly survive, then they compete with 
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one another for the available resources. This conception came from political economist 
Thomas Malthus and Darwin (1859/2008) expresses it: 
The struggle for existence among all organic beings throughout the world, which 
inevitably follows from the high geometrical ratio of their increase, will be 
considered. This is the doctrine of Malthus, applied to the whole animal and 
vegetable kingdoms (p. 7). 
 In the fourth chapter, Darwin puts together the concepts of variations and natural 
selection; leading him to the concept of the survival of the fittest. “Variations that help 
organisms survive and adapt are passed on, and eventually new species evolve through 
natural selection” (Stefoff, 1996, p. 75). According to Darwin natural selection is a 
process for “the preservation of favorable variations and the rejection of injurious 
variations”. He continues: 
It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the 
world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving 
and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and 
wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation 
to its organic and inorganic conditions of life. We see nothing of these slow 
changes in progress, until the hand of time has marked the long lapse of ages, and 
then so imperfect is our view into long past geological ages, that we only see that 
the forms of life are now different from what they formerly were (Darwin, 
1859/2008, p. 66). 
 This is the general framework of On the Origin. Much of the rest of the book is 
given over to providing illustrations of natural selection, explaining particular points in 
more detail and describing several problems with the theory in anticipation of likely 
criticisms, such as difficulties of transition or how a single organ can be changed into an 
elaborately constructed entity, the subject of instinct, hybridism, the problem of 
imperfection of geological records, details about geological succession and distribution 
and so on (Darwin, 1859/2008). “Many of the examples he uses come from oceanic 
islands, particularly those with which Darwin was personally familiar, having visited 
! 17!
them on board the Beagle” (Price, 2008, p. 34). 
 
 Another important book of Darwin is Descent Of Man, which can be seen as an 
integral part of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Here Darwin applies his 
evolutionary theory to human evolution and to details of his theory of sexual selection. 
Darwin (1871/2009) states his aim as such: 
 
The sole object of this work is to consider, firstly, whether man, like every other 
species, is descended from some pre-existing form; secondly, the manner of his 
development; and thirdly, the value of the differences between the so-called races 
of man (p. 2-3). 
 The book consists of two parts. In the first part Darwin occupies himself with the 
origin of human beings. For him, man is not a special kind of animal on the Earth, 
instead humankind is just another product of the evolutionary process. He states: “Man 
is the co-descendent with other species of some ancient, lower and extinct form” 
(Darwin, 1871/2009, p. 3). 
 
 Darwin argues, against the mind-body distinction, that both physical and cultural 
evolution of humans is a natural process; they evolve from primitive to complex. Human 
being’s characteristic traits and their mental capacities are inherited the same as physical 
characteristics. (This claim may probably be the main inspiration for memetics and 
sociobiology). Darwin also handles such problems the roots of the mind, individuality, 
self-consciousness, which is regarded as unique features of human beings, and asserts 
that the differences between human and animal are not substantial. He puts it as follows: 
 
There can be no doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest man and 
that of the highest animal is immense...Nevertheless the difference in mind 
between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and 
not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and 
faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc. of 
which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-
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developed condition, in the lower animals. If it be maintained that certain powers, 
such as self-consciousness, abstraction, etc. are peculiar to man, it may well be that 
these are the incidental results of other highly-advanced intellectual faculties; and 
these again are mainly the result of the continued use of a highly developed 
language (Darwin, 1871/2009, p.105). 
 Then, Darwin claims that the weakness of the human species, which may have 
come from chimpanzee rather than stronger orangutans, leads to individuals to become a 
social animal due to the necessity of survival. In Chapter V, Darwin seeks to show that 
intellectual and moral faculties of our civilized world descend from barbarian forms. To 
convince us that “all civilized nations are the descendants of the barbarians” (Darwin, 
1871/2009, p. 181), he adduces proofs from anthropology and biology. He then turns to 
the problems of the human race, namely, the problem of whether the different races of 
human beings are of the same species or not. For him, there are some visible differences 
among races, yet all races are essentially in the same species. He concludes: 
Although the existing races of man differ in many respects, as in color, hair, shape 
of skull, proportions of the body, etc., yet if their whole organization be taken into 
consideration they are found to resemble each other closely in a multitude of 
points (Darwin, 1871/2009, p. 232). 
 The second part of this book is about sexual selection that developed as a 
contribution to natural selection. Some members of the group have advantages over 
others, in exclusive relation to reproduction. “In such cases sexual selection must have 
come into action, for the males have acquired their present structure, not from being 
better fitted to survive in the struggle for existence, but from having gained an advantage 
over other males, and from having transmitted this advantage to their male offspring 
alone” (Darwin, 1871/2009, p. 257). Darwin points out that this struggle for mating 
leads creatures to produce secondary sexual organs, like tails of peacocks, and this 
eventually affects their life and survival. For Darwin, sexual selection is another force 
that formed the species. 
 The heritage of Darwin has become a source of inspiration in the past centuries. 
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From Bergsonian creative evolution to natural theology, from Weismann’s mathematical 
contribution to the other theories of synthetic evolution, Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection remains in the intellectual arena. But the synthesis of Darwin and 
Mendel led to the birth of Neo-Darwinism. The genetic view brought considerable 
insights to the theory of evolution and rescues it from a large number of unanswered 
questions. This association also paved the way for the disciplines such as sociobiology, 
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary genetics, and finally memetics. Memetics, 
founded by Richard Dawkins is now a quasi-science that attempts to account for culture 
including complex modern culture with terms of Darwinian evolution. The following 
sections will be devoted to a brief history of the development of memetics and key ideas 
of predecessors of Susan Blackmore. 
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1.2. The Father of Memetics: Richard Dawkins 
 Richard Dawkins, a British ethologist and evolutionary biologist, had considerable 
effect on evolutionary theory. Dawkins became popular with his 1976-printed book 
Selfish Gene in which he brings new initiatives to evolutionary theory and introduces the 
concept of the meme. 
 Dawkins negates the existing selection theories in Selfish Gene. Most biologist 
agree upon biological evolution by natural selection, which is Charles Darwin’s main 
idea, but there were several different positions about how this natural selection works.  
“For Darwin and most evolutionists since 1859 the individual organism was the object 
of selection. The individual is the entity which survives or not, which reproduces 
successfully or not” (Mayr, 1997, p. 2091). Wyne Edward (1962) put forward that some 
certain features of evolution could only be understood by focusing on the group’s 
survival rather than individuals. George C. Williams (1966) has a group selectionist 
model that asserts that an evolutionary unit becomes fixed or spread in a population 
because of the benefit it provides to the group. Thus main focus of his approach is 
groups. John Maynard Smith (1976) also takes position in the group selectionist camp. 
Stephen J. Gould and Neil Eldredge (1977) developed a different theory of speciation, 
which called “punctuated equilibria”, that depends on sudden changes in species, 
eruption and extinction of species. Besides these, there are heated debates on the issue of 
choosing species as a selection unit among Vrba, Edredge and Gould (Lloyd, 1989). Leo 
Buss (1987) also develops a cell-centered view of evolution. Against these positions 
Dawkins (1976/2006) propose a new way for understanding: gene-based natural 
selection: 
I shall argue that the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is 
not the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the 
unit of heredity (Dawkins; 1976/2006, p. 11). 
 For Dawkins the basic unit that should be taken into account is the gene. But what 
is a gene? There are controversies about what can be defined as a gene in genetics, but 
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here we put aside this elusiveness, and take the concept of a gene as Dawkins defined it. 
For him in evolutionary history “a particularly remarkable molecule was formed by 
accident called a replicator” (p. 15). A replicator is an entity that has property of being 
able to create copies of itself. The generation of organismic life stems from this 
replicative property.  All animals, plants, fungi, bacteria, and viruses have the same kind 
of replicator-molecules called DNA. 
DNA molecules do two important things. Firstly they replicate, that is to say they 
make copies of themselves… At every division the DNA plans were faithfully 
copied, with scarcely any mistakes. This brings me to the second important thing 
DNA does. It indirectly supervises the manufacture of a different kind of 
molecule-protein. The coded message of the DNA, written in the four-letter 
nucleotide alphabet, is translated in a simple mechanical way into another 
alphabet. This is the alphabet of amino acids, which spells out protein molecules. 
Genes do indirectly control the manufacture of bodies (Dawkins; 1976/2006, 23). 
 Thus, a gene is a unit that contains DNA that is a replicative unit and provides 
instructions for the manufacturing of bodies through protein synthesis. He was aware 
that there is no agreed upon definition of a gene, so frequently he explain his own 
concept of a gene. Here Dawkins’ (1976/2006) other definitions: 
One gene maybe regarded as a unit that survives through a large number of 
successive individual bodies (p. 25). 
A gene is defined as any portion of chromosomal material that potentially lasts for 
enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection. In the words of the 
previous chapter, a gene is a replicator with high copying-fidelity (p. 28). 
I am using the word gene to mean a genetic unit that is small enough to last for a 
large number of generations and to be distributed around in the form of many 
copies. Defining a gene as a little bit of chromosome, which potentially lasts for 
many generations (p. 32). 
 To recapitulate; for Dawkins a gene is a part of chromosome that includes DNA 
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which is basically a replicator, a replicator with high fidelity that replicates itself in 
bodies and can survive through a large number of individuals’ successive bodies. Genes 
are producers of our bodies and all other animals and plants. Genes provide a program, 
in all living things, that direct all creatures. 
The genes are master programmers, and they are programming for their lives. 
They are judged according to the success of their programs in coping with all the 
hazards that life throws at their survival machines, and the judge is the ruthless 
judge of the court of survival (Dawkins; 1976/2006, p. 62). 
 As a basic unit in evolution each gene tries to survive for the sake of itself. In 
order to survive genes create proteins and ultimately proteins create the body. In this 
manner, bodies that are constituted of proteins are just the protectors of genes. Dawkins 
(1976/2006) sharply puts this point: 
I call the book The Selfish Gene. I said that I preferred to think of the gene as the 
fundamental unit of natural selection, and therefore the fundamental unit of self-
interest. (p. 35). We are survival machines-robot vehicles blindly programmed to 
preserve the selfish molecules known as genes (p.  xxi). 
 All creatures including human beings are nothing but survival machines created by 
genes. Genes produce the bodies they reside in and use bodies as a safe shelter for their 
own purposes. The individual, as a selfish machine, is programmed to do whatever is 
best for its genes as a whole. The word purpose is figurative here, because genes have no 
telos, they are only programmed to survive and copy themselves. As Dawkins notes, 
“genes have no foresight. They do not plan ahead” (p. 24). Nobody programs them; 
these selfish entities are just the product of relentless and blind natural selection.  
 A gene wants to survive and is trying to get more numerous in the gene pool ahead 
of other genes. If genes are the basic unit of selection, some genes must succeed and 
some others have to fail. A successful gene, namely those that increasingly spread into 
gene pool, must be a sound replicator. A replicator should have three main qualities: 
longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity. This means a replicator should preserve itself 
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in the long run of evolution by leaping from one individual to another, and also it should 
create more and more copies of itself, but these copies must be highly similar to or even 
the same as the original. A gene, which has an abundance of these three qualities will 
win the evolutionary competition and survive for a long time, thus get the chance to 
make more copies and spread all over the world.  
 Dawkins explains many controversial themes in evolutionary theory, such as 
family planning, aggression, altruism, sexual selection, cooperation, childcare, social life 
etc. by means of the selection of selfish genes. Although his gene-based natural selection 
model offers remarkable insights into the biological area, at the end of his book he 
expands his evolutionary theory to the social sphere and creates an original concept: the 
meme, to explain cultural evolution by Darwinian theory. 
 Dawkins (1976/2006) begins with a naturalist presumption that “cultural 
transmission is analogous to genetic transmission” (p.189). He acknowledges that he is 
not unique in that kind of analogy, before him especially by Sir Karl Popper, “the 
geneticist L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, the anthropologist F. T. Cloak, and the ethologist J. M. 
Cullen made an analogy between scientific progress and genetic evolution by natural 
selection” (p. 190).  
 All cultural evolutionist accounts agree on human products such as fashions in 
dress and diet, rituals, ceremonies and habits, crafts and arts, engineering and technology 
are outcomes of natural selection but they always try to look for biological advantages in 
various attributes of human civilization. Dawkins gives an example; “tribal religion has 
been seen as a mechanism for solidifying group identity, valuable for a pack-hunting 
species whose individuals rely on cooperation to catch large and fast prey” (p. 191). This 
explanation may be reasonable but not sufficient for Dawkins. 
 
These ideas are plausible as far as they go, but I find that they do not begin to 
square up to the formidable challenge of explaining culture, cultural evolution, and 
the immense differences between human cultures around the world, from the utter 
selfishness of the Ik of Uganda, as described by Colin Turnbull, to the gentle 
altruism of Margaret Mead's Arapesh (p. 191). 
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 Although he develops a gene-based account of Darwinian theory, at the end of the 
book he decides to go beyond the gene eye view and draw an evolutionary schema for 
understanding culture and cultural diversity. This is the law that all life evolves by the 
differential survival of replicating entities. The gene, the DNA molecule, happens to be 
the replicating entity that prevails on our own planet. Dawkins (1976/2006) has a 
science-fictional assertion that apart from DNA or genes, a second, new kind of 
replicator emerged on this planet. He puts this second replicators name as meme.  
 
We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of 
cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. “Mimeme” comes from a suitable 
Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like “gene”. I hope my 
classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. If it is any 
consolation, it could alternatively be thought of as being related to “memory”, or 
to the French word meme. It should be pronounced to rhyme with “cream” (p. 
192). 
 A gene, the basic unit of natural selection, is the first replicator that is responsible 
for creating bodies and the second replicator came into existence in the atmosphere that 
was created by genes. The task of this second replicator, the basic unit of culture, is 
production of ideas and behaviors by spreading across the human brains. Roughly genes 
are responsible for bodies or organic life and memes are responsible for ideas or cultural 
life. For Dawkins (1976/2006),  
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch phrases, clothes fashions, and ways of 
making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene 
pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate 
themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process, which, 
in the broad sense, can be called imitation. Imitation, in the broad sense, is how 
memes can replicate. (p. 192) 
 Dawkins says DNA was the first replicator on the earth for more than millions 
years, but at a certain time new conditions arose in which a new kind of replicator can 
make copies of itself, the new replicators came into the scene and a new kind of 
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evolution started. “Once self-copying memes had arisen, faster, kind of evolution took 
off. We biologists have assimilated the idea of genetic evolution so deeply that we tend 
to forget that it is only one of many possible kinds of evolution” (p. 194). 
 A meme is an idea or a behavior that is capable of transmission from one brain to 
another. “The meme of Darwin's theory is therefore that essential basis of the idea which 
is held in common by all brains that understand the theory” (p. 196). Memes reside in 
the brain.  A meme seeks to make itself more room in the brain, so it struggles with its 
rival memes.  Other than brains, memes also fight for dominating the attention in the 
mediums such as television, radios, newspapers, book, in short wherever they can reach 
the host’s brain. Memes compete for getting a home for itself in the brain, and the 
principles of this rivalry for home is just as the same principle for first replicator, that is 
longevity, fecundity and fidelity. 
 Memes interact with each other in order to preserve themselves. For example, the 
God meme could be regarded as an organized meme, associated with church, with its 
architecture, rituals, laws, music, art, and the written tradition becomes a co-adapted 
stable set of mutually-assisting memes. 
 “Memes and genes may often reinforce each other, but they sometimes come into 
opposition” (p. 199). For example a priest’s meme-driven behavior of celibacy is 
disadvantageous for genes but this manner is due to the meme’s own desire of survival. 
Celibacy memes try to spread from brains to brains even if this is disadvantageous for 
genes. This point has crucial importance, because memes have their own agenda, it is a 
replicator free from gene’s boundaries, it works for its own sake; so this point is what 
detaches Dawkins from other evolutionary explanation such as sociobiology, 
evolutionary psychology, genetics, and biology. 
 Dawkins asserts that human beings are just a vehicle for memes and genes. Two 
replicators work for their own sake, they sometimes cooperate and sometimes not. Each 
of them are subject to Darwinian natural selection. We are at the service of selfish, blind, 
unconscious replicators but Dawkins (1976/2006) interestingly claims that human 
agency may alter this case. He heralds that: 
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We are built as gene machines and cultured as meme machines, but we have the 
power to turn against our creators. We, alone on earth, can rebel against the 
tyranny of the selfish replicators by means of human’s conscious foresight (p. 201) 
 Selfish Gene is the first book that mentions memes and from that time on a quasi-
science of memetics has gradually evolved. Richard Dawkins (1982) also elucidates his 
ideas in some of his other books; The Extended Phonotype in which he distinguishes 
between replicator and its phenotypic effects. “The phenotypic effects of a gene are the 
tools by which it leverages itself into the next generation and tools may ‘extend’ far 
outside the body in which gene sits, even reaching deep into nervous systems of other 
organisms”(p. vi). For example, bodies are the product of genes and our physical 
appearance is phenotypic effect of genes, and also our homes that were built to preserve 
our bodies can be seen as an extended phenotypic effect of genes.  
 Dawkins uses these concepts with his meme theory. After years he became aware 
that there should be drawn a distinctive line between memes as replicator and the 
phenotypic effects as meme products. American anthropologist F.T. Cloak, who 
suggested that culture is acquired in tiny, unrelated snippets, which he called “corpuscles 
of culture” or “cultural instructions”, inspired him. And he defined the i-culture as the 
instructions in people's heads, and the m-culture as the features of people's behavior, 
their technology and social organization (Cloak, 1975). Cloak explicitly likened his i-
culture to the genotype and m-culture to the phenotype. Dawkins too drew a sharp line:  
A meme should be regarded as a unit of information residing in a brain (Cloak's “i-
culture”). It has a definite structure, realized in whatever physical medium the 
brain uses for storing information. Memes reside in brains and their phenotypic 
effects are its consequences in the outside world (Cloak’s m-culture) (Dawkins, 
1982, p. 109). 
 In the following passage Dawkins explicitly introduces what are phenotypic 
effects of a meme:   
The phenotypic effects of a meme may be in the form of words, music, visual 
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images, styles of clothes, facial or hand gestures, skills such as opening milk 
bottles in tits, or panning wheat in Japanese macaques. They are the outward and 
visible (audible, etc.) manifestations of the memes within the brain. They may be 
perceived by the sense organs of other individuals, and they may so imprint 
themselves on the brains of the receiving individuals that a copy (not necessarily 
exact) of the original meme is graven in the receiving brain. The new copy of the 
meme is then in a position to broadcast its phenotypic effects, with the result that 
further copies of itself may be made in yet other brains (Dawkins, 1982, p. 109). 
  Phenotypic effects that a meme has on the behavior of a body may affect that 
meme’s chance of surviving. A scientific idea is an example of a meme, effect is its 
article or book in printed, obviously its chances of surviving and spreading through the 
world of scientific brains is enhanced by papers, namely, meme’s phenotypic effect. 
This phenotype-memetype distinction provides a base for explanation for non-replicator 
things. If a thing is not a replicator it is a vehicle for replicators. Here, Dawkins 
introduces another concept vehicle. “A vehicle is an entity in which replicators (genes 
and memes) travel about, an entity whose attributes are affected by the replicators inside 
it, an entity which may be seen as a compound tool of replicator propagation” (p. 112). 
For Dawkins a vehicle is an integrated and coherent instrument of replicator 
preservation. “A vehicle is any unit, discrete enough to seem worth naming, which 
houses a collection of replicators and which works as a unit for the preservation and 
propagation of those replicators” (p. 114). Thus, by this distinction he explains both 
ideas that grounds social domain and visible cultural behaviors and artifacts.  
 Finally, another article of Dawkins (1991) brings some inspirations to memetic 
approaches. In Viruses of the Mind, he explains religion as a mind virus, and other 
common social phenomenon can be regarded as viruses. Dawkins later develops an 
epidemiologic model for memes in Viruses of the Mind. There are parasites of DNA 
such as viruses, viroid, and plasmids.  
The only thing that distinguishes viral DNA from host DNA is its expected method 
of passing on to future generations. “Legitimate” host DNA is just DNA that 
aspires to pass into the next generation via the orthodox route of sperm or egg. 
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“Outlaw'' or parasitic DNA is just DNA that looks to a quicker, less cooperative 
route to the future, via a squeezed droplet or a smear of blood, rather than via a 
sperm or egg (Dawkins, 1991, p. 14).  
 Computer viruses also exist on the pre-established, programmed basis. Both 
viruses and worms relentlessly occupy with duplication. For Dawkins cultural items can 
be considered like virus infects from minds to mind and thus contaminate the whole 
society. Dawkins asserts that religion is a mind virus that infects the vast majority of 
people but those who are contaminated have deep inner conviction and cannot realize 
this suffering. However, in an extreme positivist manner Dawkins believe that science is 
not virus contamination but religion is a genuine example of virus infection. Apart this 
point this contagion model has profound influence on memetics  
 Actually there are many points that could be criticized in Dawkins’ account but 
since the purpose here is to criticize Susan Blackmore, so Dawkins’s approach do not 
examined here, this work indirectly criticizes him because Dawkins is one of the main 
sources for Blackmore. Here, he is mentioned as a forerunner of Blackmore and the 
founder of memetics. The other principal source of Blackmore is Daniel Dennet, an 
American philosopher of consciousness. His two books are deeply influential in 
memetics literature. First of these is Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. 
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1.3. Philosopher of Memetics: Daniel Dennett 
 Daniel Dennett contributes to Darwin’s theory and memetics with new insights in 
his book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. According to Dennett (1995), what is revolutionary 
in Darwin is his assault on essentialism. The taxonomy of living things Darwin inherited 
was itself a direct descendant, via Aristotle, of Plato's essentialism. In fact, the word 
"species" was at one point a standard translation of Plato's Greek word for Form or Idea, 
eidos. Dennett (1995) says: 
In Darwin's day species of organisms were deemed to be as timeless as the perfect 
triangles and circles of Euclidean geometry. Their individual members came and 
went, but the species itself remained unchanged and unchangeable. This was part 
of a philosophical heritage, but it was not an idle or ill-motivated dogma. The 
triumphs of modern science, from Copernicus and Kepler, Descartes and Newton, 
had all involved the application of precise mathematics to the material world, and 
this apparently requires abstracting away from the grubby accidental properties of 
things to find their secret mathematical essences (p. 36). 
 Darwin points out that species were not eternal and immutable; they had evolved 
over time. “But there was a powerful Platonic bias against it: essences were unchanging, 
and a thing could not change its essence, and new essences could not be born” (p. 38). 
Thus, Darwinian account rejects eternal essences and unchangeable forms, instead it 
proposes a framework in which the unsettled structure of living world gain its meaning. 
Dennett (1995) claims that Darwin’s brilliant idea is algorithm and says, “Darwin had 
discovered the power of an algorithm. An algorithm is a certain sort of formal process 
that can be counted on—logically—to yield a certain sort of result whenever it is ‘run’ 
or instantiated” (p. 50). 
According to Dennett an algorithm must have three main features:  
1) Substrate neutrality: The overall procedure based on a logical structure and the 
materials used in instantiation are in essential. An algorithm can operate in anywhere 
regardless of its material structure.  
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2) Underlying mindlessness: Each constituent element of algorithm and the transition 
between two steps must takes place without the aid of an intentional mind, even though 
the product of algorithms seems a brilliant result. Thus, the design has no intentional 
agent. 
3) Guaranteed results: An algorithm gives always certain result. It works 
deterministically; certain input must change into certain output without misstep. 
 For Dennett, Darwin’s natural selection is an algorithm. Although it initially had 
an exact substrate, that is, the organic world, then in the Descent of Man, Darwin 
expanded his theory to the evolution of culture, and supports the idea that material 
differences are inessential. Most importantly, the whole process of evolution is run by a 
blind mechanism, as Dennett (1995) puts it: “Darwin offers a skeptical world what we 
might call a get-rich-slow scheme, a scheme for creating Design out of Chaos without 
the aid of Mind”(p.  51). Dennet reformulates Darwin: 
Life on Earth has been generated over billions of years in a single branching tree—
the Tree of Life—by one algorithmic process or another… [This is] Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea:  the algorithmic level is the level that best accounts for the speed 
of the antelope, the wing of the eagle, the shape of the orchid, the diversity of 
species, and all the other occasions for wonder in the world of nature  (p.  51). 
 Dennett describes this dangerous idea as universal acid because of “it eating 
though everything we believed and all the ways we look at the world” (p. 63). If we 
apply evolutionary theory to the development of consciousness, we could see that it is an 
outcome of an algorithm that has no essence. In his book Consciousness Explained, he 
developed an evolutionary theory of consciousness, which embraces the meme theory. 
 Dennet develops a theory of consciousness that seeks to overcome mind-body 
distinction or what he calls Cartesian Theater, which means an idea that supposes there 
should be a metaphysical self or essence in mind that decides and supervises all complex 
particular phenomena. But for Dennett, consciousness evolved by blind natural 
selection, hence there should be no transcendental essence.  
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 According to Dennett’s account, firstly there emerged a replicator on the earth and 
this paved the way for constitution of multicellular organisms and visible bodies, then a 
coherent body needed to recognize itself and drive a line between the inside and the 
external world, but all these processes of recognition must ultimately be accomplished 
by myriad of blind mechanical routines. The recognition of inside and defending 
boundaries of body lead to misrecognition that there need always be a higher executive, 
yet, it is just a product of blind selection. For Dennet (1991) “in nature, handsome is as 
handsome does; origins do not matter” (p. 176). Obviously he keenly takes a stance 
against dualism and Cartesianism, as a consequence of this he puts forward that 
consciousness has no essential, primordial, transcendental feature, rather it is concocted 
by the cooperation of memes and genes. Dennett (1991) narrates how did hard-wired 
genetic construction of mind occur and explains that this hard-wired system is too 
sluggish to confront rapid changes of environment so genotypes yields better adapted 
phenotype that has variable or plastic character hence can change and learn during their 
lifetimes.  
The emergence of plasticity in nervous systems occurred at the same time as the 
development of learning and it provided two new media in which evolution could 
take place, at much greater speed than unaided genetic evolution via gene mutation 
and natural selection (p. 182). 
 Dennett (1991) says Mother Nature provides a hard-wired mechanism for brain 
and each human is born with these properties, however it is coded for determinate cases, 
during a lifetime we live with unpredictable chaotic cases, and evolution should produce 
postnatal design fixing. Dennett asks how could such a process of postnatal design 
fixing be accomplished? The answer is clear: by a process strongly analogous to the 
process that fixes prenatal design. According to him, the Baldwin Effect settles up the 
task of post-natal design fixing process. Baldwin (1896) maintains that mutations that 
increase the capacities of learning and imitation are undergirded by natural selection. 
When a member finds a way that could bring it some advantages in surviving, then other 
members would imitate this novelty. These kinds of variances learned from other 
members of species, eventually would manipulate the gene pool, by manipulating the 
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route of selection pressure in the environment. Thus, acquired skills can indirectly affect 
genes. This process in not Lamarckian, who put forward the retention of acquired skills. 
Because for Baldwin, acquired skills gained by the vicissitudes in environment are not 
inherited in gene pool, instead they only cause selective pressure. Dennett develops his 
explanation of the evolution of consciousness from the perspective of Baldwin. Briefly, 
“plasticity makes learning possible, cultural evolution and transmission of its product, is 
the second medium of evolution, and it depends on phenotypic plasticity in much the 
same way phenotypic depends on genetic variation because of Baldwin effect” (Dennet, 
1991, p. 193). And this new phase give rise to cultural evolution: 
 
Cultural evolution operates many orders of magnitude faster than genetic 
evolution, and this is part of its role in making our species special, but it has also 
turned us into creatures with an entirely different outlook on life from that of any 
other species (p.  339). 
 For Dennett (1991), the evolution of language served the function of eliciting and 
sharing useful information, and this “habits of auto-stimulation began to established as 
Good Tricks in the behavior of hominid population, then it quickly refined both learned 
behavioral habits of population and thanks to the Baldwin effect, genetic predispositions 
and further enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 197). So, the arrival of 
language was the crunch time for human evolution. Things were chance after this good 
trick (language). Once our brains had built the entrance and exit pathways for the vehicle 
of language, they are swiftly parasitized by entities that have evolved to thrive in such a 
niche: memes. 
 
 What is a meme for Dennett? It is a new replicator emerged in evolution. The 
story of genesis of the memes is as follows: There were prokaryotes prior to arrival of 
our familiar cells. These prokaryotes are more simple and solitary life forms in 
comparison to eukaryotes. In the beginning they were drifting on earth and reproduced 
themselves by means of replicative elements of DNA. Then in a certain time conditions 
were changed and a new kind of entity came into being and dominated the living bodies 
in order to leap up to a new phase in evolution. The arrival of eukaryote cells, which 
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could be organized in order to construct a higher organism, give rise to the beginning of 
multicellular life. Multi-cellular organism invaded the world’s space and shaped the 
world according to the most comfortable structure for their life, during the a few 
millions years. Millions of different creatures varied from these multi-cellular structures 
by endless differentiating.  It was the time when the story of memes could begin. 
Dennett (1991) narrates:  
 
One fine day, another invasion began, in a single species of multicellular 
organism, a sort of primate, which had developed a variety of structures and 
capacities these new invaders transformed the apes who were their unwitting 
hosts into something altogether new: witting hosts, who, thanks to their huge 
stock of newfangled invaders, could imagine the heretofore unimaginable, 
leaping through Design Space as nothing had ever done before.  These invaders 
were memes, and the radically new kind of entity and replicator created when a 
particular sort of animal is properly furnished by—or infested with— memes is 
what is commonly called a person (p. 341). 
 
 For Dennett these new replicators are ideas. But he uses the term ideas not like 
Locke who regarded ideas as the idea of red, or the idea of god, but a somehow complex 
entity,  an active memorable unit, which has no essence, that can reproduce itself and 
vary to make complex ideas “such as the ideas of arch, wheel, wearing clothes, vendetta, 
the Odyssey, calculus, chess or deconstructionism” (Dennett, 1995, p. 345). 
 These memes are one way or another identifiable entities, the smallest elements of 
culture or ideas that can replicate themselves in a highly reliable form and also 
sometimes vary in order to proliferate itself. Dennett formulates meme theory with a set 
of mottos:  
 1) A scholar is just a library's way of making another library  (Dennett, 1990, p. 
130). 
 This means that we always would like to imagine our selves as a creator of ideas 
like God. We are sure that we can change and direct our ideas and can judge them from 
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Olympian standpoint. However this is an illusion for Dennett, because our mind is a 
medium for replication of memes. Memes always try to replicate themselves regardless 
of the gene fitness or individual’s fitness; they have their own interest. For example, this 
text is a medium for memes, Dennett and I are vehicles for replication of meme memes. 
Also, pictures, books, films, sayings, tools and buildings are meme vehicle. 
A wagon with spooked wheels carries not only grain or freight from place to place; 
it carries the brilliant idea of a wagon with spooked wheels from mind to mind. A 
meme's existence depends on a physical embodiment in some medium; if all such 
physical embodiments are destroyed, that meme is extinguished (Dennett, 1991, p. 
204). 
 In such a way, some memes can contribute our fitness, some are neutral, and also 
some are dangerous for us. For example; calendars, music, Moby Dick are benign 
memes, some such as magazine shows and advertising are controversial, but some are 
highly dangerous such as computer viruses, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamofobia etc. But 
those memes would swiftly spread out of our control if conditions were met (Dennett, 
1990). 
2) “Idea X was believed by people because X was deemed true” is not acceptable by 
those who subscribe to memetics. The meme’s eye view purports an alternative 
perspective “Meme X spread among people because X was a good replicator” (p. 
132). 
 There is no essentialist attribution in a memetic standpoint, what constitutes so-
called good, beautiful, dangerous, and logical, etc. is determined by the frequency of 
memes spreading. They leap promiscuously from vehicle to vehicle, medium to 
medium. The power of a meme depends on its replication capacity rather than the 
longevity of the individual vehicle. Platonic memes via a series of copies is a striking 
case. Although the first papyrus that Plato’s ideas were written on perished in time, 
Platonic ideas remain.  This is crucial point. Because for Dennett (1995), memetic 
transmission is primarily a semantic, not a syntactic transmission that might be directly 
observable in "brain language" or natural language. “What is in common, of course, is 
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not a syntactic property or system of properties but a semantic property or system of 
properties: the story, not the text; the characters and their personalities, not their names 
and speeches” (p. 345). 
 If memes are essentially semantic in character, they must reside in the brain, but 
the brain has a limited capacity for memes, and this leads to competition among memes 
to gain a room in an individual’s brain and for entry into as many minds as possible. 
This contention is the major force in memosphere and drives memes to find good tricks 
to survive. For example, the memes for faith discourages critical judgments and 
preserves itself, also it displays frequency-dependent fitness: when rationalistic memes 
spread more than the faith memes, critical judgment memes will flourish, it can conceal 
itself in various guises, another trick for that meme called linked loci, which came from 
genetics, that is, two memes that can stick together and cooperate to survive can affect 
themselves and reproduce together. The memes for religion and the memes for art can 
replicate more rapidly than in the state where they stand separate (Dennett, 1991). So it 
has multiple tricks to survive and memes for disbelief have to find too many vigilant 
ways in order to get rid off belief. Another trick for memes that Dennett formulates as: 
3) Ignore everything that appears in X (Dennett, 1990, p. 133). 
 This is a meme filter. Fundamentalist believers often ignore everything that comes 
from the outside of religion but some times as in the case of Dawkins, the memes for 
faith is always ignored in all the writings of Dawkins, because of his faithlessness. So, 
there are basic rules for memes, and it is possible to say that memes are programmed 
with some mechanisms by natural selection. “Like a mindless virus, a meme's prospects 
depend on its design—not its ‘internal’ design, whatever that might be, but the design it 
shows the world, its phenotype, the way it affects things in its environment” (Dennett 
1995, p. 345). 
 If memes have their own agenda, and if we are nothing but a vehicle for the 
purposes of memes, hence there is no point in talking about “we” without memes. 
Dennett (1991) criticizes Dawkins for the reason that he still falls into the trap of 
Cartesianism, namely there are supposed to be genes and memes as well as us, who can 
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resist the tyranny of those blind replicators. Here, there is the most stirring idea on 
memes by Dennett, who is one of the most prominent philosophers of consciousness: If 
we sequester all the memes from the mind there would remain no genuine consciousness 
in the mind. Dennett (1991) states it as: 
The haven all memes depend on reaching is the human mind, but a human mind is 
itself an artifact created when memes restructure a human brain in order to make it 
a better habitat for memes. But if it is true that human minds are themselves to a 
very great degree the creations of memes, then we cannot sustain the polarity of 
vision we considered earlier; it cannot be "memes versus us," because earlier 
infestations of memes have already played a major role in determining who or 
what we are (p. 207). 
 Dennett overtly claims that human consciousness is the outcome of memes 
survival. There is no inner-self, no phenomenal consciousness, but rather what we call as 
consciousness or intentionality is just the somehow illusion of memes battle. To sum up, 
Dennett says that genetic evolution with environmental unpredictability gave rise to 
phenotypic plasticity on which memetic evolution progressed and eventually constructed 
human consciousness. Rising of memes at stage is highly new phenomenon 
(approximately 150,000 years ago, the end of most recent ice-age) in evolutionary 
history will take new forms; hence the status of man in the world could be changed. 
Once memes came into existence, the whole world history changed because memes 
design the human world either by working hand in hand with genes or by diverting 
genes into another direction. The world has passed a second phase in the course of 
evolution with the intervention of memes. 
 The two venerated Darwinist, Dawkins and Dennett were the initiators of meme 
theory. Richard Dawkins introduces the term, meme, in 1976, but it could manage to 
attract no considerable attention until, a well-known American philosopher Daniel 
Dennett applauded it. Dennett contributed to meme theory by integrating it into the 
evolution of the mind, whereas Dawkins integrated memes with biological area, Dennet 
placed memes into the domain of mind, which is believed as different from the 
biological existence. These two generated memetic, but Susan Blackmore, made it more 
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popular. It is fair to call Blackmore the Saint Paul of memetics, because she made 
memetics publicly knowable and readable. In this chapter the ideas of the predecessors 
of Blackmore were briefly presented; the following chapter will devoted to explain the 
general features of Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PRESENTER OF MEMETICS: SUSAN BLACKMORE 
 
 It can be claimed that Susan Blackmore is one of the most prolific writers of 
memetics, who has many papers and one book on in this area, she is termed in this work 
as “the presenter of memetics”. In Meme Machine she compiles almost the entire 
literature on memetic up until the year the book was published and confronts criticisms 
inside and outside of memetics. Thus, it is plausible to concentrate on Blackmore for the 
reasons that her approach is a synthesis of earlier memetic stances, she is a passionate 
advocate of memetics and also she entreats some of the philosophical challenges. So, let 
me start with giving a concise summary of what Blackmore says. 
 
2.1. Universal Darwinism: The Theory of Everything 
 
 Her main work is the book The Meme Machine. The aim of this book is crafting a 
theory of memetics, clearing doubts surrounding memetics, and also arguing that if one 
can learn looking at problems of culture and philosophy with a memetic view, one could 
realize that memetics can provide more reasonable answers than other such theories on 
culture. Indeed she explains diverse difficult problems such as origins of language, 
excessive talking, human instinct to talk and communicate, altruism, sexual behaviors, 
constitution of self, the power of religions, prevalence of superstition, the evolution of 
Internet, etc. She says: 
 
My aim in this book is to show that many aspects of human nature are explained 
far better by a theory of memetics than by any rival theory yet available. The 
theory starts only with one simple mechanism – the competition between memes 
to get into human brains and be passed on again. From this, it gives rise to 
explanations for such diverse phenomena as the evolution of the enormous human 
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brain, the origins of language, our tendency to talk and think too much, human 
altruism, and the evolution of the Internet (Blackmore, 1999, p. 9). 
 Blackmore (1999) evaluates her project in the scope of what she calls Universal 
Darwinism. This means a thing, which is subject to the processes of variation, selection 
and retention can be understood through Darwinian theory. For her, Darwin’s argument 
has three main features: variation, selection and retention (or heredity). If these 
conditions are met, Darwin’s theory begins to operate. Depending on Dennett’s idea of 
algorithm, she claims the logic of Universal Darwinism can operates everywhere 
regardless of matter. 
The substrate does not matter – only the logic of the procedure does, as Dennett 
points out his logic would apply equally to any system in which there was 
heredity, variation, and selection. This, again, is the idea of Universal Darwinism 
(p. 11). 
 For Blackmore, what makes Darwin’s theory so inspirational and beautiful is that 
there is no master plan, no end point, and no designer in Darwin’s account of nature. She 
accepts that there is a progress in evolution, but it is not toward the best or like a line 
ending with best. From the point of Blackmore, progress goes on towards a more 
complexity, and here complexity confers no value. A few billion years ago there was 
only a primeval soup from which whole complexity sprung up and we now live in a 
complex world full of creatures of all kinds. This means, there is a progress in 
complexity, but it does not refer to getting better.   
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2.2. Actors of Darwinian Scenario: Replicators 
 All that we see in the biosphere depends on the replicators (genes and memes) 
power. The only thing they do is get copies when they have the machinery needed for 
that copying. “They have no foresight, no plan, they just get copied, but in the process 
some do it better and some cannot, so in this way evolutionary design comes about” (p. 
13). What is a replicator? For something to count as a replicator it must sustain the 
evolutionary algorithm based on variation, selection and retention. For Blackmore 
(1991), the definition of meme is that: “memes are replicators stored in human brain (or 
books or inventions) and passed on by imitation” (p. 13). Are memes meeting the 
requirements of being replicator? Blackmore’s (1991) answer is yes, and she explains as: 
Memes certainly come with variation and when memes are passed on, the copying 
is not always perfect.  Here is memetic selection – some memes grab the attention, 
are faithfully remembered and passed on to other people, while others fail to get 
copied at all. Then, when memes are passed on there is retention of some of the 
ideas or behaviors in that meme – something of the original meme must be 
retained for us to call it imitation or copying or learning by example. The meme 
therefore fits perfectly into Dawkins’s idea of a replicator and into Dennett’s 
evolutionary algorithm (p. 13). 
 Memes are passed by imitation and the copying in imitation many times this can 
not occur perfectly, we can see various different forms of copies of one idea or behavior, 
so this causes variation. But as we saw in the case of Plato’s work, although there are a 
myriad of different copies and translations of Plato’s works, something comes from him 
to us, such as the doctrine of ideas, and in a degree it is possible to say that retention is a 
common feature in cultural transmission. Some ideas and beliefs succeed and others fail. 
The succession of memes depends on human sensory, memorial, and imitational 
capacity and also the tricks memes exploit, the ways they group together and the general 
processes of memetic evolution that favor some memes over others. So, it can be seen 
here a kind of selection in progress. Therefore memes are replicator like genes. Although 
genes and memes are analogous, they are not the same.  
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Genes are instructions for making proteins, stored in the cells of the body and 
passed on in reproduction. Their competition drives the evolution of the biological 
world. Memes are instructions for carrying out behavior, stored in brains (or other 
objects) and passed on by imitation. Their competition drives the evolution of the 
mind. Both genes and memes are replicators and must obey the general principles 
of evolutionary theory and in that sense are the same. Beyond that they may be, 
and indeed are, very different – they are related only by analogy (Blackmore, 
1999, p. 17). 
 Blackmore, in a line with other memeticists, asserts that culture can be treated in 
the scope of Universal Darwinism. There are many evolutionary theories on culture and 
civilization such as Herbert Spencer’s social Darwinism, Lewis Morgan’s evolutionary 
theory of society, Karl Marx’s evolutionary socio-economic theory, Sir Karl Popper’s 
three cosmic evolutionary stages, but most of them are not Darwinian, some other 
Darwinian theories such as sociobiology, evolutionary psychology come back to the 
biological advantages in their explanation and they count genes as the only driving 
force. A great deal of Blackmore’s book is devoted to explore why such genetic 
reductionist theories fail to explain complex and sometimes unreasonable human 
behaviors. 
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2.3. Genes or Memes? The Relationship of the Two Replicators 
 The novelty that memetics brings to evolutionary theory is the second replicators 
in their own right. 
The whole point of a memetic theory of cultural evolution is to treat memes as 
replicators in their own right. This means that memetic selection drives the 
evolution of ideas in the interests of replicating memes, not the genes. This is the 
big difference that separates memetics from most previous theories of cultural 
evolution (Blackmore, 1999, p. 24). 
 With a meme’s eye view we ask not how inventions benefit human happiness or 
human genes, but how they benefit themselves. For example, why did farming spread at 
all? Most of these theories answer this question as farming makes life easier, or it 
provides genetic advantage to those who practice it. However, memetics has quite 
different answer: farming spread because the farming memes are good replicators.  
 If there is no second replicator, then everything automatically must come back to 
genes or to biological advantages. Sociobiology, biology, and evolutionary psychology 
reduce every human phenomenon to biology, and do not clarify how culture supervenes 
on biology. Obviously, these three reductionist stances cannot manage to embrace all 
human world in its complexity, extremeness, and multiplicity. At that point memetics 
offers second replicator in order to stave off the obsession with biological advantage. 
 Lamarckianism believes that acquired skill from the environment is transferred to 
the other generations, thus Lamarckian explanations of culture depends on 
environmental changes of human behavior. Sociobiology developed by Edward O. 
Wilson (1980), which studies genetic and evolutionary basis of human behavior made 
great progress in explaining culture with genes. Wilson introduced the concept of the 
‘culturgen’ as “the basic unit of inheritance in cultural evolution” (Lumsden and Wilson 
1981, p. x). However, they always came back to the genes as the final arbiters. 
Ultimately, the genes will win out. As they put it – “the genes hold culture on a leash” 
(Blackmore, 1999, p. 33). However, according to memetics, “the genes may turn into a 
dog and the memes become the owner, each running like mad to serve their own selfish 
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replicator” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 33). 
 Each replicator works for its own agenda. Both are able to evolve successfully 
within their respective attribute spaces. To a large degree they co-evolved in 
evolutionary history, but sometimes this co-operation is broken in favor of memes. The 
effects of memes’ more rapid rate of evolution in comparison to those of genes compel 
genes to change. Memes sometimes have a significantly detrimental effect on the 
evolution of genes. “As the comparative rate of meme evolution increases, such that if 
genes cannot effectively select memes a high percentage of the time, they suffer from 
meme evolution as if they had almost no selective capability” (Holland & Blackmore, 
2000, p. 227). 
 Memes can create selection pressure on genes by changing selective environments. 
In that process, we can use Baldwin Effect, which explained above, claims new acquired 
skills provide a higher chance to those individuals who can imitate, hence those who are 
successful in learning get more change to survive in relation to the other.  
 However, unlike Dennet, Blackmore says the Baldwin Effect is not sufficient to 
explain the relation of genes and memes. She accepts that the Baldwin Effect may be 
explanatory in some cases, but, memes can operate without establishing a relationship 
with genes. To give Blackmore’s own example, suppose that there are a dozen different 
basket types around that compete with each other for imitation. Now it is important for 
any individual to choose the right basket to copy, but which is that?  If we look at this 
issue from genes’ point of view it probably has to be the biggest, strongest, or easiest 
one. But, from the memes’ point of view the answer may be the flashy one. The more 
flashy looking basket may be chosen for copying, so baskets that exploit the current 
copying tendencies spread at the expense of those that do not. (Blackmore, 2001) This 
process is not quite the same as traditional gene-culture evolution or the Baldwin effect. 
Blackmore (2001) explains: 
The baskets are not just aspects of culture that have appeared by accident and may 
or may not be maladaptive for the genes of their carriers. They are evolving 
systems in their own right, with replicators whose selfish interests play a role in 
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the outcome (p. 245). 
 Blackmore uses here Dennett’s question Cui Bono? which means for whose 
benefit? As it was explained, memes and genes struggle for their own benefit, in deed 
many times they cooperate, but sometimes they contradict and “memes hold genes an on 
a leash”. She puts it directly: 
This comes to the heart of the issue. For me, as for Dawkins and Dennett, memetic 
evolution means that people are different. Their ability to imitate creates a second 
replicator that acts in its own interests and can produce behavior that is 
memetically adaptive but biologically maladaptive (Blackmore, 1999, p. 35). 
 Well, who is this potent entity that can overwhelm even genes and make humans 
special among other creatures. What is a meme for Blackmore? 
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2.4. Imitation: Crucial Point for Defining Memes 
 Although there are controversies on what is a meme, Blackmore always sticks to 
the first definition of Dawkins mentioned above instruction for carrying out behavior, 
stored in brains (or other objects) and passed by imitation. (Dawkins, 1976, p. 192), and 
Oxford English Dictionary’s definition: “An element of a culture that may be considered 
to be passed on by non- genetic means, esp. imitation”. Blackmore (1999) explicitly 
defines  “a meme is that whatever it is that passed on by imitation” (p.  43). 
 As it can be understood imitation is what makes the meme replicator and gives it 
its replicator power. The crucial point to understand Blackmore’s memetic approach 
depends on perceiving what is imitation. For her, it can simply be put like this: 
“Imitation includes any kind of copying of ideas and behaviors from one person to 
another” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 43). The definition is evident, yet not easy to 
comprehend. Blackmore uses a geometrical method, that is, she starts with very simple 
definitions and deduce everything from these evident notions. Then, she elucidates her 
definition deeper and gives us some requirements to count something as an imitation. 
She counts three essential features to regard a thing as imitation, so an imitation 
necessarily involves: 
1) Decision about what to imitate or what counts as ‘the same or similar’ 
2) Complex transformation from one point of view to another 
3) The production of matching bodily actions (Blackmore, 1999, 43). 
 Thus, imitation is rare and special and all that is copied is not imitation. For 
example, perceptual experience itself is not transmissible; therefore it does not involve 
memes. In classical conditioning and operant conditioning, some aspect of the 
environment has been copied into the brain, but it stops with that brain and, cannot be 
passed on. Besides, in Skinnerian learning, parents shape their children’s behavior by the 
way they reinforce them, thus there is no decision about what to imitate and Skinnerian 
learning cannot be counted as memetics. Many experiences belong to us, which are 
transferable cannot be able treated in the scope of memetics. Our emotions also are 
private, thus, not suitable for imitation. Contagion also is not true imitation. Yawning, 
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coughing, laughing are contagious behaviors, but these acts are not imitation, because 
we have not learned how to do this act (Blackmore, 2011). Blackmore clarifies the 
definition of imitation by quoting Heyes: 
Imitation is learning something about the form of behavior through observing 
others, while social learning is learning about the environment through observing 
others (Heyes 1993, p. 1000). 
 Genuine imitation is unique to humans or as Blackmore puts it more strongly what 
make us human is imitation. She overtly claims “to be human is to imitate”. (Blackmore, 
2007, p.1) Nevertheless, it should be noted that there might be a competitor that can 
possibly unseat our unique position among beings. Because according to Blackmore a 
third replicator has truly arrived. She puts its name temes (technological-memes), that is, 
“it is digital information competing for space in giant servers and electronic networks, 
copied by extremely high fidelity electronic processes. If temes will become successful 
over memes and genes, this would change everything” (Blackmore, 2009, p. 137). 
Blackmore (2009b) claims that today some computer programs can copy the information 
dependent on human input, but in a near future the third replicator, which will replicate 
in digital mediums, would gain its own independence, and a third phase in evolution 
would be opened up. But let us return to our topic, second replicators: memes. The 
ability of imitation belongs to human kind and this ability provides human the capacity 
of extensive memetic transformation. Memetic capacity makes humans special among 
other creatures. What is the distinctive feature of human being is neither language nor 
self-consciousness, but it is in the essence the capacity of imitation, that is, the capacity 
of meme transmission. 
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2.5. What is Copying in Imitation?: Copy-the-product or copy-the 
instruction  
 The genes are coded in DNA and stored in pairs of chromosomes in every cell of 
one’s body. The total make up of genes in one individual is called his genotype. 
Correspondingly, the various characteristics of a final person, which depend on genes, 
are known as the phenotype. Genes do not design every detail of the final body, they 
only provide instruction for building proteins and these proteins supply a hard-wired 
mechanism, by means of neurons, for the brain, but individuals are made up of the 
numerous different environmental and social interactions. For example, genes give 
instruction for building proteins and they build neurons that provide a hard-wired system 
for your brain. But you learn playing chess, and this is not caused by genes. Playing 
chess is a phenotypic feature, which cannot affect your genes and hereditary character in 
biological sense. 
 However, when it comes to cultural evolution, the distinction between phenotype 
and genotype becomes blurred. In this case acquired skills are passed on, but Blackmore 
claims that transmitting acquired skills in cultural evolution does not mean that cultural 
evolution should be classified as Lamarckian. She explains this with an example: 
If I invent a brilliant new recipe for pumpkin soup, I can pass it on to you and you 
can pass it on to your granny and she can pass it on to her best friend. Also, this is 
not inheritance in the biological sense and the genes are not affected. So it is not 
Lamarckian (Blackmore, 1999, p. 43) 
 If you watch me while I am making the soup, the meme of soup or the recipe goes 
from my brain to my behavior in the kitchen and on to the next brain, and if you give 
this recipe to your granny it would transmit to another brain. There is no inheritance of 
acquired characteristic. It can be said that the meme in my brain is the equivalent of the 
genotype and my behavior in the kitchen is the equivalent of the phenotype. But if we do 
not see how one make this soup and just have a recipe, then situation become quite 
different. The written recipe is like the genotype, it contains the instructions for making 
the soup. The soup is like the phenotype. In this case the process is perfectly analogous 
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to the biological situation and is not Lamarckian. 
 Therefore, we should not ask, what is genotypic and what is phenotypic in cultural 
evolution, or what is memotype and phemotype, because it changes depending on the 
case. What seem like genotype in one-example turns into phenotype in other instance, 
because memes have no stable storage, unlike genes. So, Blackmore (1999) offers that 
we should take into account copy-the-product and copy-the-instruction distinction, 
instead of asking what is the genotype in cultural information and what is the phenotype. 
If you repeat all of my behaviors that I represent while I was making the soup, you will 
re-produce the product (soup), this is the copy-the-product, and if you observe my 
behaviors or learn it by recipe, you can reproduce the product (soup), this is copy-the-
instruction. Each case can be evaluated as imitation but the copy-the-product is likely to 
be better if he works from a recipe.  
 The distinction between reproduction and replication of behaviors is useful here. 
“You could say that in other forms of social learning the same behavior is apparently 
reproduced (such as washing sweet potatoes or pecking at milk bottle tops), but it is not 
replicated—that is, copied” (Blackmore, 2000, p. 27). This kind of copying is a direct 
copying, which does not allow any variation to flourishing evolutionary change. Another 
individual mirrors the same bodily behavior in a one-to-one mode. However, this mode 
of copying cannot meet the requirements of a replicator, so, they cannot be used in 
evolutionary processes.  
 Either by copying a product or by copying an instruction, a form of behavior is 
passed on by observing the others or learning from the others. Information that passed 
on by copying something is a meme. Blackmore (1999) explicitly puts that “when we 
copy each other something, however intangible, is passed on, and that something is 
meme” (p. 52). Understanding genuine imitation and seeing culture in this perspective 
means taking meme’s eye view. 
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2.6. Technical Problems with Memes 
 A meme’s eye view may explain a good deal of the elusiveness, but still there are 
some vexing problems for memes. First and foremost one can ask do memes really 
exist? What is the copying mechanism of memes and where are they stored? 
 Susan Blackmore, in a pragmatic manner, circumvents these hard problems, and 
justifies memetics by claiming it is so nascent to cope with these problems and reminds 
us how other successful theories can operate in history without answering these 
problems. She says: “Memes have not long history behind them. The new replicator is, 
as Dawkins puts is, “still drifting clumsily about in its primeval soup... the soup of 
human culture” (Blackmore, 2001, p. 248). For example, we can recall how far 
evolutionary theory got before DNA was not even heard of. The Origin of the Species 
published in 1859. It was not until the 1930s that genetics and natural selection were 
brought together, but the structure of DNA was discovered until 1950s. “In the first 
century of Darwinism an enormous amount was achieved in the understanding of 
evolution without anyone having any idea about chemical replication, the control of 
protein synthesis or what on earth DNA was doing” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 56). Thus, 
memetics can progress without deeply understanding where memes are coded and stored 
in the brain and what is its mechanism.  
 The other problem with memes is the fact that memes are out of trim in contrast to 
genes, which are stored in chromosomes in highly digitalized form. The answer of 
Blackmore to this objection is that digital systems can support evolution, however, there 
is no law that says that evolution has to be digitally based. Also, genes are too old but, 
memes relatively new in evolutionary scene, so that genes find its way to digitalization, 
and gradually memes are digitalizing too.  
Blackmore (1999) also handles the problem of specifying the unit of a meme. She again 
says there is no answer of this question and refers to other science’s progress. 
I have heard people dismiss the whole idea of memetics on the grounds that “you 
can’t even say what the unit of a meme is”. Well that is true, I cannot. And I do not 
think it is necessary. A replicator does not have to come neatly parceled up in 
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ready-labeled units. Since genes are our most familiar example we should look at 
the same issue for them. The intrinsic uncertainty about just what to count as a 
gene has not impeded progress in genetics and biology. It has not made people say, 
“We cannot decide what the unit of the gene is so let’s abandon genetics, biology 
and evolution” (p. 53-54). 
 Memetics is also accused of being Lamarckian, which depends on the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics. That is, “if you learn something or undergo some change 
during your lifetime, you can pass it on to your offspring. Lamarckism (in this sense) is 
not true of biological evolution, at least in sexually reproducing species” (Blackmore, 
1999, 58). As I had explained in the discussion of the copying mechanism above, in 
biology, permutation of genes in a gene string is called a genotype and various 
characteristics of a final person is known as a phenotype. Phenotypes depend on 
genotypes but it cannot completely determine every nook and cranny of phenotype. But 
phenotypes cannot impinge on genotypes. Environmental changes occur in the 
phenotypic sphere, thus they cannot pass on to other generations via biological methods. 
But, memes do not stick to biological generations and can jump about all over the place. 
Blackmore (1999) gives an example to disprove the accusations of Lamarckianism. 
If I invent a brilliant new recipe for pumpkin soup, I can pass it on to you and you 
can pass it on to your granny and she can pass it on to her best friend. Also, this is 
not inheritance in the biological sense and the genes are not affected. So it is not 
Lamarckian (p. 58). 
 This leads to Blackmore’s important distinction. She discriminates two form of 
copying: ‘copy-the-instructions’ and ‘copy-the-product’. In the biological world, sexual 
species work by copying-the-instructions. The genes are the instructions that are copied; 
the phenotype is the result and is not copied. Likewise, the recipe of soup is instruction 
and one cup of soup is a product. If you copy just the making one can of soup, you could 
not make it another time, and could not propagate soup memes, but if you imitate recipe 
then you can broadcast it others. “Copying product and instruction can be seen as a 
method of transmission of cultural information and two of them work without effecting 
genes, hence, the memetic transmission has nothing to do with Lamarckianism” (p. 58). 
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 According to Blackmore, This instruction-product distinction can solve a 
controversial theme among memeticists. Some of them regard ideas and mental 
phenomenon as genotype for memes and artifact as phenotypes, in contrast some others 
assert that artifacts and behaviors are true genotypes and their mental representations are 
genotype. The former stance can be called as mentalists and the latter behaviorists. For 
Blackmore “that is a redundant discussion, because if they appreciate the difference 
between ‘copy-the-instructions’ and ‘copy-the-product’, all dissidences would be 
solved” (p. 64). 
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2.7. The Problems To Which Memetics Offers Solutions 
 In the large part of her book, Blackmore tries to point out how memetics can 
explain some unexplained scientific and philosophical problems. As mentioned above, 
she circumvents to respond to some technical problems that memetics has to face, but 
she choose to show us how memetics can be a panacea for all our perennial problems. 
Interestingly, Susan Blackmore can solve these age-old issues in a few pages with her 
memes’ eye-view. Some of these miracles will be cited in following. 
2.7.1. Why we have big brains 
 Our brain is too big if it is compared with other primates. This extreme kind of 
bigness causes a problem for evolutionary explanation, because, in a certain time in 
evolutionary process our ancestor’s brain became three time bigger than other kin. 
Blackmore (1999) instantiates it as such: 
The modern human brain has a volume of about 1350 cubic centimeters. A 
common way of comparing brain sizes is to use the ‘encephalisation quotient’, 
which compares a given animal’s brain-to-body ratio with the average for a group 
of animals. Our encephalisation quotient compared with other primates is 3. Our 
brains are far too large for our bodies (p.  68). 
 The brain exploits a great deal of energy and evolution does not waste energy for 
no reason. As Pinker (1994) puts it “Why would evolution ever have selected for sheer 
bigness of brain, that bulbous, metabolically greedy organ?... Any selection on brain size 
itself would surely have favored the pinhead” (p. 363). Further, building a brain is too 
expensive and dangerous to produce. Moreover, some parts of brain are overdeveloped. 
As Blackmore (1999) displays: 
Although we are highly visual animals our visual cortex (at the very back of the 
brain) is relatively small while the prefrontal cortex, at the very front, is most 
enlarged. The frontal cortex is itself a kind of mystery. There is no clear answer to 
the question ‘What does the frontal cortex do?’ We cannot find out why our large 
brains evolved by appealing to the function of the part that was enlarged the most. 
Apart from the massive increase in the frontal lobes, the brain has been 
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reorganized in other ways. For example, there are two main cortical areas that are 
critical for language, Broca’s area, which is responsible for speech production, and 
Wernicke’s area, which is responsible for language understanding (p. 68). 
 There are some theories that seek to account for the mystery of big brains. They 
can be summarized: 
1) Some physical requirement for using technology lead us to have a big brain 
2) We need a cognitive map to find food and so brain evolved 
3) Machivellist intelligence: Humans have to understand the others feelings and plans 
in order to live socially and this is the cause of big brain’s evolution 
4) Social interactions stipulate always-ready energy and this requirement made brain 
larger. 
 Susan Blackmore (1999) offers a memetic solution. She suggests that selection 
pressure created by memes produced a massive increase in brain size. “The arrival of 
imitation or memes changes the environment in which genes were selected thanks to the 
Baldwin Effect and the direction of change was determined by the outcome of memetic 
selection” (p. 74). Memetic selection for big brains operates in these steps: 
1) Selection for imitation: imitation contributes to survival of individuals, good 
imitator would be also good at copying skill for survival; hence genes for 
being a good imitator will begin to spread in gene pool. 
2) Selection for imitating the imitators: if imitation provide benefits for survival, 
the best imitator gets a chance to live, that is selection supports to best 
imitators, thus individuals are compelled to imitate what is new. 
3) Selection for mating with the best imitators: if you mate with the best 
imitators, your offspring would be the best imitator, thus genes for being 
imitator again spread in gene-pool 
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4) Sexual selection for imitation: individuals would want to mate with good 
imitators because they are more successful 
 Thus, the main tasks of our larger brains are first, generally being a good imitator, 
secondly finding who are good imitators and embracing them. “Being good at imitation 
requires a big brain then the processes described above can explain it” (p. 80). 
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2.7.2. The Problem of the Origin of Language 
 The other problem Blackmore offers a memetic answer is the origin of language. 
Talking costs a great deal of our energy and it formats our body -exquisite control of 
breathing is needed and this meant changes in the muscles of the diaphragm and chest-, 
that may be disadvantageous for survival of humankind. Why, then, has evolution 
produced creatures that talk whenever they get the chance?  Possible answers of this 
question: 
1) A biological explanation:  cementing social bonds or exchanging useful 
information  
 
2) A sociobiological explanation: with the evolution of language, culture has 
somehow got temporarily out of hand; it is a deviation from genetic 
determinism 
3)  An evolutionary psychological explanation:  all this talking once had 
advantages for the survival of our ancestors, our body and physical structure 
was formed in accordance with talking, even though today, it doesn’t benefit 
our genes any more (Blackmore, 1999). 
 It is obvious that all three suggestions appeal to the genetic advantages, but 
memetic has totally different view. Blackmore  (1999) overtly puts it: “The reason we 
talk so much is not to benefit our genes, but to spread our memes” (p.  84). She offers a 
memetic explanation of so much talking: 
I shall argue that once imitation evolved and memes appeared, the memes changed 
the environment in which genes were selected and so forced them to provide better 
and better meme-spreading apparatus. In other words, the human language 
capacity has been meme-driven, and the function of language is to spread memes 
(p. 93). 
 Language provides a suitable medium for meme’s spreading. It increases memes’ 
replicative power, namely fidelity, fecundity, and longevity. Language certainly 
improves meme fecundity. How, then, could the fidelity of the copies of the sounds be 
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increased? By means of digitalization of sound via making discrete words instead of a 
continuum of sound, copying becomes more accurate. Any speech that is divided up into 
discrete, easily copyable sounds would have higher fidelity and hence outperform the 
others in the race to get copied. With regard to longevity, language makes ideas and 
sounds far more memorable by structuring the meanings of sounds. Language provides a 
good medium for memes and today all proliferous communicative technologies 
(telephones, internet, network systems, TV) is directed to the task of spreading memes in 
a twinkling. As it can be understood, Blackmore has a memetic solution to the mystery 
of the origin of language. Blackmore (1999) summarizes the memetic story of the 
genesis of language: 
Once imitation evolved, something like two and a half or three million years ago, a 
second replicator, the meme, was born. As people began to copy each other the 
highest-quality memes did the best – that is those with high fidelity, fecundity and 
longevity. The early speakers of this language not only copied the best speakers in 
their society but also mated with them, creating natural selection pressures on the 
genes to produce brains that were ever better and better at spreading the new 
memes. In this way, the memes and genes coevolved to produce just one species 
with the extraordinary properties of a large brain and language. The only essential 
step to starting this process was the beginning of imitation. The general principles 
of evolution are enough to account for the rest (p. 107). 
 
 
 
 
 !!
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2.7.3.The Problem of Diversity of Sexual Behavior In Modern Times !
 Human sexuality is another intriguing matter to fathom in its complexity. Our 
sexuality does not always maximize our genetic legacy and we no longer make sex in 
order to find fittest genes for our offspring. Blackmore says that sociobiology, biology 
and evolutionary psychology insist that our sexual behavior is genetic-driven and birth 
control or homosexuality is a mistake, a deviation because genes could not anticipate 
how we would use our intelligence. In contrast, Blackmore with memes eye view asserts 
that modern sexual behavior is meme-driven.  In fact, our basic desires and instincts 
were formed by genes, but generally memes drive our genetic desires. People would like 
to make sex according to ideas surrounding them, such as fantasies, medical directions, 
images, and rumors.  
 According to Blackmore (1999), memes may spread both vertically (across 
generations) and horizontally (among peers). The mode of transmission is important 
because it affects the relationship between genes and memes. When memes are 
transmitted vertically this means that genes and memes spread together, that is what 
benefits one also benefits the other. However, when it transmitted horizontally, “memes 
can travel quite independently of the genes” (p. 133). An idea passed from one person to 
another within one generation regardless of how untrue, unreasonable or dangerously 
addictive the habits are. Blackmore claims, “Only horizontal transmission makes memes 
really independent of genes and modern industrialized life is a world of horizontal 
transmission” (p. 133).  This horizontal transmission can explain why modern sexual 
behavior is out of the control of genes. Celibacy is a consequence of spreading of 
religious memes and it is truly harmful to genes. Birth control and adoption are other 
examples, which are controlled by memes to the detriment of genes, because the two 
example terminate genes’ spreading. 
  In modern life also family size decreases because of feminist memes propagate 
swiftly. A modern woman has to deal with a bombardment of memes. For example, an 
academic woman has to follow new books, new technologies of her field, and has to 
produce articles. This may take her a considerable part of her time, in which she could 
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have spread her genes. But, academic women would have a reputation among others and 
can affect more people, also she can talk and write her own memes, hence her memes 
would dominate the meme pool in the society, gradually the idea of becoming hard-
working women and having fewer children diffuse throughout the whole society and 
family size would shrink. The natural culmination of this childlessness might lead to 
extinction of humankind. Nevertheless, genes have given us a powerful desire to have 
and care for children, so that, “birth rates in modern meme-driven societies will stabilize 
at some level that balances the genetically created desire for children against the 
memetically created desire to spread memes more than genes” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 
142). 
 Interestingly, Blackmore follows above-mentioned track of thought and suggests 
that those people whose life allows them to spread more memes than others would be 
more sexually attractive than others. If one considers who seems sexually attractive or 
desirable today, it can be seen that those who has more capacity to meme transmission 
than ordinary people, namely, film stars, intellectuals, musicians, writers etc. They have 
a common quality that they are good imitators. Thus, today memes still design our 
sexual desires. In short, for Blackmore (1999), “if we examine modern sexual behavior, 
we see that sex is a wonderful world for the proliferation, control, and manipulation of 
memes” (p. 144).  
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2.7.4. The Problem of Darwinian Explanation of Altruism 
 There is also a vexing problem for Darwinism to which memetics offers a recipe. 
How can we explain the pure, disinterested altruism in accordance with natural 
selection, because “natural selection is ruthless and the cost of this kind of generosity 
could be very high indeed” (p. 153). Thus, according to the theory of selfish genes there 
should be no altruism, all gene machines fight for their own survival, and selfish memes 
must also do so. But disinterested altruism, which is seen as a transcendent dimension of 
human beings, is a very familiar phenomenon in most of the culture; this interesting 
issue afflicted the theory of evolution. 
 However, scientists try to give some possible explanations to the case of pure 
altruism. For biology and sociobiology, helping our kin means protection of our genes. 
Altruistic behaviors are also supported by society and they give to the altruist a 
reputation and a better chance in sexual selection. Nevertheless, people sometimes aid to 
those who have no relationship to them. A Turkish person can help to an Ethiopian who 
has no shared relative genes between them. Reputation is also controversial, because 
most of the time grantor says nothing about the benevolence. Giving blood is a good 
example of that, because in this case most of the time the donator cannot know for 
whom his blood is used. Also some people construct homes for dogs and cats, for 
nothing but the sake of charity. They have no shared genes, no reward, but they do this.  
 Apart from sociobiology, evolutionary psychology might argue that our emotional 
system was designed for hunter-gatherer’s way of life, in which every aid could turn you 
because of its small scale, but this open-handedness goes wrong in our technological 
society.  Contrary to above-mentioned accounts, Blackmore (1999) gives a memetic 
solution to altruism. 
The essential memetic point is this – if people are altruistic they become popular, 
because they are popular they are copied, and because they are copied their memes 
spread more widely than the memes of not-so-altruistic people, including the 
altruistic memes themselves. This provides a mechanism for spreading altruistic 
behavior (p.  155). 
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 Since it has risky costs, altruism seems no longer adaptable to evolutionary theory 
at first glance, the pressure for spreading altruistic memes manage to make altruism 
prevalent. So much so that memes for altruism are an important part of the meme 
transmission. An altruistic person would be more social than others, he would have more 
friends, others would like him, and he would have more influence in society; thus, his 
memes could be scattered to the community. Blackmore (1999) calls these altruist 
people a meme-fountain.  A certain kind of reputation makes meme transmission more 
easy, by which meme-fountains can pour their memes into meme pool. But in same 
cases, such as blood giving, or potlatch, in which no one can gain advantages, we see 
that individuals copy their tradition regardless of its content. “ Note also that potlatch 
depends upon imitation” (p. 159). 
 Blackmore knowingly undertakes risky tasks in her presentation and displays how 
untrue or useless ideas spreads even in our modern society. She courageously claims that 
memetics can help explaining the spread of even untrue, bizarre, or harmful ideas such 
as abduction by aliens, near death experiences, coming of doomsday according to 
Mayan calendars and so on so forth. These superstitions can be seen as examples of 
memeplex.  
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2.8. Memeplexes: Religion and the Problem of Self is Explained 
 When a group of memes cooperate in order to better survive, they constitute a 
memeplex. “In a purely informational sense a memeplex can be imagined as having a 
kind of boundary or filter that divides it from the outside world” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 
231). Memeplexes can be more successful than individual memes, because they would 
be harder to overcome, and their spreading chance increases because whenever one 
particular meme of this group is imitated, the other sorts of memeplex seep into meme 
pool. Blackmore, in agreement with Dawkins and Dennett, alleges that religions are 
perfect example of memeplexes. This memeplex uses lots of “good tricks” in order to 
survive. For example let me examine the success of Islam memetically with reference to 
Blackmore. The reasons why Islam became a triumphant memeplex might be count as 
such: 
1) Islam commends that Muslims should announce Islam, so Muslims work 
hard to spread their Islamic beliefs. Muslims willingly devote their time to 
maintaining and spreading the faith. 
2)  Islam insists on the protection of kinship and this pave the way for vertical 
transmission of memes. 
3)  Islam advises some useful rules for living such as cleanliness and hygiene 
that may protect people from disease. These useful functions helps to carry 
other memes along 
4)  Islam uses some “good tricks” to spread. Like many religions, Islam use God 
and Truth as virtually synonymous. 
5)  Beauty is another trick to help it to reproduce. 
6)  Islamic belief diffuses into logic, science, and philosophy in tradition and 
they carry that belief.  
7)  Islam advises altruism, and many believers are indeed good people who gain 
the admiration of society, so people are more inclined to imitate them. In this 
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way religious memes can spread with this honest behavior. 
8)  Another factor is marker scheme that is the principle of “Be good to those 
who act like you”.  For instance turban is a mark, and those who wear turban 
will help the other. Hence, people tend to act kindly in-group not outsiders. 
“This boosts the well-being of the group’s members and hence makes them 
more likely to be imitated, and so pass on the faith” (Blackmore, 1999,191). 
9)  Islam’s memes are very protected. Islam positively encourages the 
punishment to those who assault to Islamic society or overtly denouncing 
Islamic belief. 
10)  Great religious text are stored, and thus given improved longevity. Old-age 
belief and that of being a sound tradition support credibility of faith 
11)  Islam is more aggressive and negates other gods in contrast to some other 
Eastern religions, this kind of well-defined belief can protect itself more than 
amorphous ones. 
12)  Islam also uses political authority to bring other memes on their knees. 
13)  Genes for religious behavior would increase in society because of religious 
memes. Pious acts may help to find a good mate and so those genes inclined 
to be more pious will also spread. 
 Some other reasons can be rehearsed but it is enough to show that triumph of Islam 
can be explain memetically. As Blackmore (1999) recapitulates it: 
When we look at religions from a meme’s eye view we can understand why they 
have been so successful. They were just behaviors, ideas and stories that were 
copied from one person to another in the long history of human attempts to 
understand the world. They were successful because they happened to come 
together into mutually supportive gangs that included all the right tricks to keep 
them safely stored in millions of brains, books and buildings, and repeatedly 
passed on to more. They evoked strong emotions and strange experiences. They 
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provided myths to answer real questions and the myths were protected by 
testability, threats, and promises. They created and then reduced fear to create 
compliance, and they used the beauty, truth and altruism tricks to help their spread. 
That is why they are still with us, and why millions of people’s behavior is 
routinely controlled by ideas that are either false or completely untestable. No one 
designed these great faiths with all their clever tricks. Rather, they evolved 
gradually by memetic selection (pp. 192-193). 
 Blackmore falsifies Dawkins’s positivist position on the rift between religion and 
science, and claims that science has no superior position among other memeplexes. 
Science, like religion, is a mass of memeplexes. There are theories and hypotheses, 
methodologies and experimental paradigms, intellectual traditions and long-
standing false dichotomies. Science is not “The Ultimate Truth” any more than any 
other memeplex (p. 202). 
 At the end of her book, Blackmore make her most heady thesis, that is, the ideas 
such as self and substance which occupy pivotal position in philosophy, are just other 
kind of memeplexes. The matter of “self”, especially in current times, become a 
daunting task among thinkers, and many debates has been carried out around this elusive 
problem. Most prominent philosophers and neuro-scientists of our times such as Karl 
Popper, William James, Roger Penrose, Stuart Hameroff, Francis Crick, George 
Northoff, Antonio Damasio, Patricia Churchlan, Galen Strawson, V.S. Ramachandran so 
on, discussing on the concept of self and they have been developing many theories to 
overcome this mystery (Northoff, 2011). 
 There are a myriad of theories on the constitution of the sense of self. It is 
described as an outcome of interaction of synapses, or a state springs from operations in 
tiny microtubules inside the membranes of neurons at a quantum level, or identifying 
with whole brain, whole body or our memories and personality, or else as a pack of 
neurons, or as a social construction or effects of discourse, and so forth. However, the 
memetics approach offers a solution to this conundrum from very different perspective: 
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Memetics provides a new way of looking at the self. The self is a vast memeplex – 
perhaps the most insidious and pervasive memeplex of all. I shall call it the 
‘selfplex’. The selfplex permeates all our experience and all our thinking so that 
we are unable to see it clearly for what it is – a bunch of memes. It comes about 
because our brains provide the ideal machinery on which to construct it, and our 
society provides the selective environment in which it thrives (Blackmore, 1999, p. 
231). 
 Memes exploit the idea of self as a trick for Blackmore. In order to understand 
this, an example can be useful. For instance, the idea that “Kurds must have equal right 
with Turks in Turkey” is an abstract meme and has limited power to be successful. But, 
when it gets the form of “I believe Kurds deserves equal rights with Turks in Turkey”, it 
immediately bears the enormous weight of “self”. Here, the abstract idea that Kurds and 
Turks must have equal rights internalize, any argument against this idea would be 
considered as a threat for the existence of the bearer of that idea. The concept of self 
provides a safe shelter for memes, even if it seems bizarre to common sense. Once ideas 
can get the chance of personalization in a certain self, than it can simple be spread 
among individuals. Thus, according to Blackmore the idea of self is an outcome of the 
tricky play of selfish memes. 
Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears 
to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experiences is 
constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes 
survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and possessions, 
leading to the formation of a memeplex (or selfplex) (Blackmore, 2003, p. 19). 
 As it can be seen Blackmore considers the experience of self as an illusion. For 
her, this misconception of self is made by infinite plays of memes. She claims, “the self 
cannot be what it appears to be” (Blackmore, 1999b, p. 44). We believe there is an inner 
“me” who make my decisions and who lives my life, but if we look inside a brain, we 
can see that there is no central place into which all the impressions come from and from 
where the orders go out, rather there is a massive processing system dealing with 
numerous things at once. She also claims, depending on Dennett’s account, that brains 
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build multiple drafts of what is happening as information flows through its parallel 
networks and one of these drafts, and one of these drafts become the story of ourselves. 
Hence, the idea of self, has no essence, it is not permanent but ever changing. Thus, in 
reality there is no self, it is just a “benign user illusion” of the consciousness machine.  
 Blackmore boldly stresses that; consciousness itself cannot be reduced to memes. 
She rejects the claim of Dennett who says, “Human consciousness is itself a huge 
complex of memes” (Dennett, 1991, p. 210), because this implies that if a person were 
without memes they would not be consciousness. Blackmore gives example of 
meditation, by which all ideas and learned things faded away temporarily, in order to 
show there is a conscious state without memes. 
If this experience (like meditation) can justifiably be thought of as consciousness 
without memes, then there is something left when the memes are gone and Dennett 
is wrong that consciousness is the memes. It might then be better to say that the 
ordinary human illusion of consciousness is a “complex of memes” but that there 
are other kinds of consciousness (Blackmore, 2003, p. 26). 
 For Blackmore, unlike Dennett, memes do not constitute consciousness but rather, 
they distort consciousness into an illusion of self. Memes create the illusion of self for 
their own survival and replication, this leads to imagine a false sense that there supposes 
to be always an ‘I’ inside me. This imaginary sense of self causes the phenomena, what 
Dennett called Cartesian Dualism, that is there is actions, sayings, bodies and apart from 
that, there is ‘me’ inside my body which rules everything. For Blackmore, this 
imaginary distortion bedevils all our attempts to understand consciousness.  
 Thus, she suggests that memes can gain an advantage by becoming associated with 
a person’s concept of self. The self does nothing but is a sheltering haven for memes. 
Here, again Susan Blackmore did not elucidate the questions that: what is the 
mechanism (neural or something else) used by memes that create the a sense of self, or 
why some ideas can manage to be taken under the auspices of “self” and others can not, 
when and in which process did this sense of self emerged? For her, these are retarding 
questions that we should rapidly jump over. She also claims that human’s imagination 
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and creativity depends on memes. For her, the driving force behind human creativity is 
not consciousness, but the evolutionary algorithm. (Blackmore, 2007b) 
 Susan Blackmore’s ideas on memetics can be outlined as such. She has simple 
notions and clear logic, and can explain most of the hard problems by memes and 
imitation. Nevertheless, there are considerable criticisms and falsification targeting her 
memetic approach. Following chapter will be devoted to the critics of Susan 
Blackmore’s memetic approach that come from inside memetics. 
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CHAPTER 3:   
THE CRITICISMS OF SUSAN BLACKMORE’S MEMETIC 
APPROACH FROM WITHIN MEMETICS 
 
The theory of memetics, and in particular Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach, 
is criticized from different perspectives, as this could be possible for every new theory. 
As I mentioned above, this work consists of two parts: exposition of Susan Blackmore’s 
memetics account with its forerunners and some possible critics of this account. In this 
chapter, I will handle some of this criticism from within the field of memetics. By the 
phrases the field of memetics or memeticists, I want to refer to those scholars or 
researchers who recognize the existence of memes and anticipate that memes are useful 
tokens for explaining the cultural sphere or those who wrote either some theoretical 
work or empirical studies. Social scientists, biologists, and humanists in a variety of 
different perspectives and fields have been dealing with memetics. There are limited 
number of books focusing on memetics and widely known among them are Aron 
Lynch’s (1996) Thought Contagion, Richard Brodie’s (1996) Virus of the Mind, Susan 
Blackmore’s (1999) Meme Machine, Robert Aunger’s (2005) The Electric Meme, Kate 
Distin’s (2004) The Selfish Meme, and TimTyler’s (2011) new book of Memetics. These 
researchers can be called as memeticists, because they wrote books exclusively on the 
topic of memetics. There are other researchers from diverse fields who have an interest 
with this subject and wrote some articles or expressed some opinions on memetics in a 
part of their books and also some scholars who wrote articles on the Internet published 
in the Journal of Memetics. The field of memetics is composed of this collection of 
writings and what I mean by “inside memetics” is this kind of material. 
 
 Memeticists, who seek to construct a convincing theory of memes, by definition, 
accept the existence of memes, and takes them for granted so their basic concerns are 
how those memes work and interact each other. Their problem is the epistemological 
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and methodological uses of memes rather than memes’ ontological status. The matter of 
ontological reality of memes will be tackled in the fourth chapter and partially in the last 
section of this chapter. At stake here are the methodological and epistemological 
shortcomings of Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach and displaying alternative 
approaches. 
 
 Using a distinction that has already been used in memetics literature, that is the 
distinction of mentalists and behaviorists, can be used to explain and chunk the diverse 
criticisms. However this use may have some disadvantages due to the fact that adding 
some extra notions from psychology to memetics that is already overshadowed by 
genetics may lead to make memetics more confused and we would be overloaded with 
unsolved problems of different areas to memetics that has substantial problems in itself. 
So, it should be noted that the distinction would be used here in terms of operational 
convenience; there is no clichéd, well-defined distinction of mentalism and behaviorism. 
 
 A matter of life and death question for memetics is: do memes really exist and if 
so where are their loci? Obviously the first part of the question does not cause trouble 
for memeticists, although there are some different understandings (Lissack, 2004) the 
majority of them are sure about the ontological status of memes and recognize memes as 
a real material entity as genes. For them memes are neither a metaphor nor a tool for 
modeling cultural evolution but they are material entities. The real discussion takes place 
when it comes to the question of where are memes stored. The problem among 
memeticists is this: where is the genuine locus of memes? Once the answer of this 
question is satisfactorily given, then the whole direction of memetics research can be 
determined.  
 
 If memes’ locus were in observable behavior and artifacts, research must have to 
do with population genetics or modeling how a new behavior or a new invention spreads 
among populations and the rate of its popularity. If the object of concern were 
observable behaviors and artifacts, then the work would completely be redirected to an 
empirical research. However, if the mind were the homeland of memes and memes were 
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entities that transmitted brain-to-brain, in that case whole research field would be 
differentiated. We would start to seek memes in the mind or in synaptic clefts or in 
neurons and our research program would include cognitive science, neurobiology, and 
cybernetics. Although this is also a kind of empirical field of research, it is completely 
different from the previous one. 
 
 Adopting a mentalist or behaviorist position also determines what is to be 
empirically studied in memetics, that is to say whether memes can be taken as 
syntactical or semantical tokens. If the underlying mechanism of memetic evolution is 
mentalist memes become no longer syntactically classified information, rather they 
should be seen as semantically classified information. On the other hand, if we regard 
memes as artifacts, which can be studied by abstracting them from their underlying 
structures, then syntactical aspects of memes gain importance (Kaya, 2010). 
 
  Although this discord has a crucial importance for memetic investigation, Susan 
Blackmore, in line with Daniel Dennett, tries to find a midway between this dichotomy 
without properly solving the tension. They accept an original definition that memes 
reside in brains, but they also claim that artifacts can transmit memes as well. While 
choosing this stream, they offer no mechanism for how these two can reconcile. 
Especially Susan Blackmore literally brashly jumps out of these problems, rather then 
dealing with these kind of irksome matters, she attempts to explain in a rhetorical and 
pragmatic manner how memetics is a panacea for every issue. She tries to stave off these 
irksome issues by referring them to the future. Therefore she is subjected to both 
mentalist and behaviorist criticisms. For this reason, although many criticisms we will 
cite here are not taken directly Susan Blackmore’s memetics as their target, she is 
challenged by these criticisms. I will examine here some of the criticisms cited in 
memetic literature. Before rehearsing mentalist and behaviorist stances’ criticisms, it 
should be denoted that these stances derive from different definitions of meme. Since 
there are tremendously different definitions of memes it is reduced into two big 
categories. Almost everybody has a different definition of meme. Here we can 
enumerate some of them: 
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For Dawkins: 
 
A meme is the name of the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit 
of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation (Dawkins, 1976, p. 192). 
 
Lissack (2004) defines memes as “catalytic indexical” (p. 1), which means that the 
replicator status is attributed here to the environmental niches. 
 
The memes are their representatives, symbols, or semantic indexicals of these 
environmental niches (Lissack, 2004, p. 2). 
 
Odling-Smee and Laland take memes as niche constructions: 
 
We find compelling the psychological evidence for memes as packages of 
learned and socially transmitted information, stored as discrete units, chunked 
and aggregated into higher order knowledge structures, encoded as memory 
traces in interwoven complexes of neural tissue, and expressed in behavior 
(Odling-Smee & Laland, 2000, p. 121). 
 
Delius defines memes as synaptic patterns that code cultural traits;  
 
Constellation of activated and non-activated synapses within neural memory 
networks” (Delius, 1991). 
 
Wilkins describe it as: 
 
“The least unit of sociocultural information relative to a selection process that 
has favorable or unfavorable selection bias that exceeds its endogenous tendency 
to change” (Wilkins, 1998, p. 13). 
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Besides these, Aron Lynch (1991) defines memes as “memory abstractions or 
memory items” (p. 3); or more literally a meme is: 
 
A memory item, or portion of an organism's neurally-stored information, 
identified using the abstraction system of the observer, whose instantiation 
depended critically on causation by prior instantiation of the same memory item 
in one or more other organisms' nervous systems (Lynch, 1998, p. 9). 
 
Durham (1991, as quoted by Blackmore) treats memes as information packages, and he 
does not occupy with where they stored” (Blackmore, 2001, p. 231). 
 
According to Richard Brodie (1996)  
 
A meme is a unit of information in a mind whose existence influences events 
such that more copies of itself get created in other mind (p. 11). 
 
Henry Plotkin (1993) writes: 
 
Memes are roughly equivalent to ideas or representations, that is the internal end 
of knowledge relationship (p. 215). 
 
Robert Aunger (2002) defines it: 
 
A configuration in one node of a neuronal network that is able to induce the 
replication of its state in other nodes (p. 197). 
 
As can be seen some of them describe a meme with neurons and mental 
representations, others use symbols, sociocultural items, or behavior for defining 
memes. However, Blackmore take a moderationist stance without due justification. 
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Given the complexities of human life, information can be copied in myriad ways. 
We do a disservice to the basic concept of the meme if we try to restrict it to 
information residing only inside people’s head. The information in this article 
counts as memes when it is inside my head or yours, when it is in my computer, 
or on the journal pages, or when it is speeding across the world in wires or 
bouncing off satellites, because in any of these forms it is potentially available 
for copying and can, therefore, take part in an evolutionary process (Blackmore, 
2001, p. 233). 
 
However, without demonstrating the reality of a meme, showing it in an observable 
form, treating memes as a mental entity, make the theory a fancy theory, and memetics 
deprived of its scientific status. So, behaviorists rightly put down the theories that 
attribute memes to the brain or mind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 73!
3. 1. Behaviorist Criticisms 
 
 In one of his articles John Wilkins (1999) quotes Hilary Putnam’s famous quip 
“meanings just ain't in the head" (p. 1). This maxim can be seen as a brief manifestation 
of the behaviorist stance towards memetics. Because the distinction between mentalists 
and behaviorist is drawn between those who think memes are in the head and those who 
think they ain’t. 
 
 According to the behaviorist view, memes are a heterogeneous class of entities, 
such as formal manifestations of beliefs, behaviors, symbols, artifacts, and edifices, in 
short the observable things that can be examined empirically. As Gatherer (1998) boldly 
puts it, memes have no existence, if it is not the practice of the behavior, a manifestation 
of belief, a lifetime of the artifact, or the occurrence of the event. He confidently states,  
“The meme does not ‘go anywhere’ when it is not manifested. It is not stored in some 
neural data bank, some internal meme repository” (p. 11). 
 
Memeticists such as William Benzon (1996) and Derek Gatherer (1998) assert 
that only observable phenomena can be taken as the object of study. Besides them 
writers such as Aron Lynch (1996) and Richard Brodie (1996) who see memes as a virus 
and culture as a thought contagion can be classified as behaviorists. Although there are 
important differences between the former and the latter, and even Gatherer (1998) 
seriously criticized them, it is possible to say they are behaviorists, because their primary 
concern is about spreading of memes across population rather than the contents, or the 
state of memes in the head. The social contagion thesis is: 
 
Sociocultural phenomena can spread through, and leap between, populations 
more like outbreaks of measles or chicken pox than through a process of rational 
choice. The evidence shows that we inherit and transmit behaviors, emotions, 
beliefs and religions not through rational choice but contagion (Marsden, 1998, 
p. 2). 
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As it can be understood from the titles of the books of these writers such as 
Thought Contagion or Viruses of the Mind, they deem memes analogous to pathogens. 
In this epidemiological explanation memes are just viruses that infect brains and spread 
in the population. Their essential concern is the transformation of information among 
people. As Aunger (2000) states: “The main epidemiological question is: What factors 
influence the distribution or relative rate of spread of ‘mind viruses’ in a population? (p. 
8) 
 
The mentalist and behaviorist stances divorce in their understanding of memes. 
While mentalists see memes as a gene (a replicator residing in a certain store), 
behaviorists see memes as a germ (a scattering entity that resides in no single locus). 
Aunger (2000) again clearly summarizes the differences between these two: 
 
The two schools have distinct intellectual histories, disciplinary agendas, and 
popular perceptions. This is largely due to the fact that epidemiology has not 
traditionally been concerned with the issues that are important from a theoretical 
evolutionary point of view, being a rather more pragmatic science with the clinical 
goal of curing disease. Where diffusionism primarily focuses on the spatial 
dimension of reproduction—or the geographical spread of a phenomenon—
evolutionism focuses on the temporal dimension of reproduction—that is, on the 
continued existence and maintenance of a phenomenon (p. 9). 
 Using epidemiological terms may bring some advantages to memetic research. 
Epidemiological understanding of memes allows making research without any need of 
proving ontological status or the nature of what is exactly being spread. Marsden (1998) 
claims epidemiology studies the distribution and the pattern of the observable effects of 
infection. Likewise by taking social epidemiology as a model, memetics becomes an 
objective science. In epidemiology the spread of disease depends on a particular 
pathology and changes when this pathology varies. If memetics takes an epidemiological 
stance, it would get rid of the trouble of finding any particular selective mechanism for 
every social phenomenon. Moreover, because epidemiology may proceed independently 
of etiology, namely, the spread of an infection can be measured in a particular 
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population without knowing the reasons of the disease, an epidemiology-based memetics 
can proceed without waiting for any proof for the existence of memes. So, as Conte 
(2000) expresses it according to this hypothesis “the memes’ success depends upon the 
mechanism and the process of transmission, rather than upon their content” (p. 88) or as 
it is mentioned above, the matter is syntax rather than semantic. However as Wilson 
(1999) warns, “we must define cultural fitness independently of what evolves” (p. 206) 
otherwise we fall into tautology. Claiming successful memes are those who spread in a 
population and answering the question which memes will spread in a population as 
successful memes leads us to tautology. Without defining cultural fitness per se, 
epidemiologic explanation is doomed to failure. It can be seen that much of the evidence 
used by Blackmore for convincing readers are epidemiological and have shortcomings. 
 On the other hand, behaviorists like Gatherer put forward that thought contagion 
metaphors retards memetics progress. For him, memetics must depend on population 
memetics, break meme-host duality and also throw off studying the spread of beliefs that 
are not observable. He claims: 
 
If we can have no population memetics, some might feel that there is no point in 
having any memetics. However, memetics may still be scientifically applied in 
other ways, and may still make a contribution to the humanities. In particular, I 
shall attempt to argue that memetics may be best constituted as a science by 
adopting a behaviorist perspective. By behaviorist, I do not mean the rigid “neo-
behaviorist” tradition of Skinner, but in the broader sense of Watson. Under the 
terms of such a “soft” behaviorism, only observable behaviors and artifacts 
would be considered, and memetics would cease to concern itself with 
unobservable mental entities such as beliefs or thoughts (Gatherer, 1998, p. 3). 
 
Memes, for Gatherer, are not about mental contents or representation and neural 
configurations, rather they are about exhibition of the same mental states, or 
manifestation of the same idea, or performance of the same behavior. Beliefs and desires 
are only defined and examined by their manifestations. One should look at “meme 
products” in order to make memetics an earthly science. The behaviorist approach of 
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meme research “provides us with information about the cultural state of our group of 
100 individuals, but tells us nothing about what is going on inside their hands” 
(Gatherer, 1998, p. 6). On the other hand, mentalist meme research merely focuses on 
immeasurable and inferred events going on inside our head.  Given that memetics is a 
theory that attempts to explain culture, regarding first approach is more plausible for 
Gatherer (1998). 
 
  The population memetics approach that is offered by Gatherer in order to give 
memetics a scientific status is regarded as “the meme as coding for meme product which 
may or may not contribute to the fitness of the individual that carries it.” (Gatherer, 
1998, p. 5) By doing so, he tries to break the virus-host or meme-vehicle or memotype-
phemotype distinction that causes further troubles. Individuals here may be involved in 
the process of meme production, but memes are not resting latent in individuals like 
genes, namely, a meme does not require a carrier all the time. 
 
 Like Gatherer, Benzon (1996) thinks that memes are behaviors and artifacts that 
represents desires, beliefs, customs, pains etc. and that external representations can be 
seen replicators, because the only thing that is copying is manifested things, rather than 
mental abstractions. Words, numbers, notions, buildings, gadgets, tools etc. are 
observable objects that can be copied by others and so these have replicator status and 
consist of memetics’ field of interest. 
 
 Apart from these approaches, there is another school in memetic debate, which 
ascribes the replicator status to the environmental niches and what is called, as “memes 
are these niches’ representatives, symbols, or semantic indexicals” (Lissack, 2004, p. 1). 
Environmental or ecological niche means the place where an organism lives and the role 
that an organism has in its habitat. Memes regard as construction of adaptive niches and 
the definition of meme become an indexial token rather than a replicator, because the 
term meme is used here “as an indicator of success and change in environmental niches” 
(Lissack, 2004, p. 2). Leading figures in the perspective of niche construction, John 
Odling-Smee and Kevin N. Laland (2000) explain the basis of their approach by 
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claiming not starting from the concept of meme as replicator but from Dawkins’ other 
important insight “the extended phenotype. They say: 
 
A closer inspection reveals that countless organisms across the breadth of all 
known taxonomic groups significantly modify their local environments. To 
varying degrees, organisms choose their own habitats, mates, and resources and 
construct important components of their own, and their offspring’s local 
environments, such as nests, holes, burrows, pupal cases, paths, webs, dams, and 
chemical environments (Odling-Smee & Laland, 2000, p. 123). 
 
 As Richard Lewontin (1983) explains it, in his famous book Triple Helix, 
environment is not an inert medium for organisms but it is really a constitutive element 
in embodiment, also organisms change their environment, in short genes, organisms, and 
environment are interwoven dialectically. Also, the perspective of niche construction 
asserts that an organism not only is adept to environments but also constructs them. 
There are various ways for organisms to change and choose their habitats, for example 
constructing a beaver dam is a meme for a beaver. As such, “organisms modify their 
local environments through niche construction, and that selected and modified habitats 
and artifacts, persist, or are actively or electively ‘transmitted’ to descendants, as an 
ecological inheritance” (Odling-Smee & Laland, 2000, p. 126). For them our ancestors 
construct niches that include socio-cultural niches, which pave the way for better 
environment for communication and information transformation, and these processes 
provide a comfortable media for their offspring who have more advantages than others. 
So, humans have niche construction based memes, thus, every changing, choosing, 
effecting and modifying of the environment that would effect the fate of organism in 
evolutionary processes can be counted as a meme. 
 The niche construction perspective has some uses. Firstly it provides a theory for 
understanding the ideational, behavioral, and material component of culture and how 
these evolve interactively. Niche construction creates a selection pressure on genes, and 
ways of human niche constructions, such as information-gaining processes, languages, 
or art, modifies the environment in which genes and memes are selected. This is also 
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convenient for getting familiar with other science such as cultural evolution theories and 
genetics. Finally, it may free us from anthropocentric bias that deem the human as an 
exclusive creature among others, and it breaks the culture-nature dichotomy. 
As a result taking a kind of behaviorist stance provide us with these advantages: 
 
1) Neuroscience suggests that there is highly unlikely no replicating information 
structures in brains (Aunger, 2000). This fact brings mentalist memetics into 
discredit. 
2) Behaviorist perspective gives the way for being an empirical science for 
memetics rather than making endless speculation without showing reliable data 
that leads to the empirical doldrums experienced by memetics. 
3) Soft-behaviorism freed from the problem of defining what is the real meme 
underlying a concrete phenomena, or determining the vehicle and memes which 
has long plagued memeticists. It breaks meme-host/vehicle relationship since 
artifacts propagate independently of their producer. 
4) Releasing from a mental concept that has no clear meaning and can not be 
demonstrated, provides memetics a chance to grow faster, also this may make it 
familiar with other science and theories that has been seeking to account for 
culture, such as evolutionary psychology, population genetics, the theory of 
gene-culture coevolution and sociobiology. 
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3.2. Mentalist Criticisms 
 
Mentalist or meme-as-gene, stance claims that memes merely belong to brains. 
For them, behaviorist research programs make no contribution to understanding culture. 
If we would like to understand the essence of culture and the mechanisms of its 
reproduction, we must look at neurons, brains, or mental representations. They give 
importance to the psychological mechanisms and semantic contents rather than 
population thinking and syntactic structures. Triggered by neuroscience and new 
developments in consciousness studies, mentalist memetics offers some hope. But the 
troubles mentioned above bother mentalists. Given that Blackmore is a physiologist and 
deals with consciousness studies, she often uses mentalist notions in some cases but 
without justifying this use, like her use of behaviorists’ claims. 
 
Mentalists situate themselves to the opposite side of behaviorists. For example, 
Richardson and Boyd (1985) explicitly claim, “the essence of culture is encoded 
information rather than the behaviors that result from information” (p. 43). 
Henry Plotkin (2000) also maintains culture is a manifestation of the complex and 
multiple intelligences of humans, and the account of culture should not be reductionist 
and simple-minded. For him, this aim “will be done by appealing to psychological 
mechanisms as the basis for a pluralistic approach to the concept of memes” (p. 70). 
Another example of mentalist memetics is Castelfranchi (2001) who alleges: 
 
The agents’ mind are the most relevant selective environment for memes. To 
understand cultural evolution it is necessary to identify the cognitive principles 
of the success or selection of memes within mind. Memetics can only be 
cognitive; otherwise it is contradictory and non-explanatory (Castelfranchi, 2001, 
p. 2). 
 
For Castelfranchi, (2001) in order to attain a cognitive memetics, mental 
interoperations and internal representation must be placed at the center of memetic 
research. Agents and intelligences role in meme spreading must also explained with its 
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cognitive mechanism. He rejects also contagionists understanding, because “knowledge 
is not acquired by mere contagion, it is shared on the basis of adoption and passing” (p. 
15). Sharing knowledge or diffusing a behavior is a conscious goal of an agent, rather 
than unintended scattering of behaviors. So, our understanding of a meme must re-
conceptualize with such notions, norm adopting, intelligent agents, intentions, and 
complex modeling of mental processes. Cultural evolution is only explained by 
identifying cognitive principles for memes within mind.  
 
 Besides the ones immediately mentioned above, Rosaria Conte tries to lay the 
foundations of social cognitive memetic perspectives by using multi-agent based 
systems’ modeling. She says, “by this I mean the study of the cognitive requirements for 
intelligent but limited autonomous agents to engage in social (inter)action” (Conte, 
1999, p. 83). For Conte, memetics must be placed on a firm psychological base and 
cross-fertilization between agent theory, social theory and computational modeling. She 
boldly highlighted that memetics should necessarily restricted to intentional agents 
(Conte, 2000). The difference of Conte’s view stems from its bringing forth to the 
intelligent agent who has the capacity of decision-making. Individuals are not only just 
meme vehicles here, but they are also meme receivers and interpreters. For her, imitation 
has not crucial importance in memetic transformation, because without decision-
making-intelligent-agents and social interaction there would be no meme transmission. 
Hence, intentionality and subjectivity again came into the memetic agenda. Social 
cognitive approach depends on the capacity of receiving, sending, interpreting, and 
rejecting symbolic tokens by a limited autonomous agent. The central notion for 
evaluating memes into social interaction depends on norm recognition and norm-
conflicts; hence social, inter-subjective dimension of memes must be taking into account 
(Conte, 2000). In short, she highlights some important points by showing the 
requirement of agent notion in memetics, but she highly psychologizes memetics, also 
this kind of more subjective meme definition is not congenial with the aims of memetic 
project. 
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 Besides, philosopher Hans-Bernard Schmid (2004) debunks the basis depended 
on by the behaviorist approach. He says that physical manifestation of a sign can be 
different, while its underlying meaning, the meme stands unaffected. For example, the 
same sentence can be uttered either in Turkish or in English without substantially 
changing meaning. “Thus, the physicalist approach to the ontology of the meme reaches 
an impasse” (Schmid, 2004, p. 110). He also stresses the importance of intentionality in 
line with the above-mentioned writers, and claims that meaning is ontologically different 
from natural and artificial things. A sign has no meaning in itself without entering a 
relationship with somebody. In Searle’s terms signs in itself is ontologically objective, 
on the other hand meaning or memes are ontologically subjective or has a subjective 
mode of existence (Schmid, 2004). 
 
 Probably the most rigorous figure in mentalists approach is Robert Aunger. He 
wrote a book exclusively on memetics, The Electric Meme, in which he sought to give 
an empirical and convincing explanation of memes in the mind. He spends a laudable 
effort finding a real meme, which can rescue memetics from being just a speculation or 
science fiction, by means of bringing a vast information from diverse literature such as: 
biology, anthropology, quantum physics, computational science, medicine, 
epidemiology, and so on. Since his attempt is a good example of showing how to make 
science of memetics with due demonstrations and justification. This does not mean that 
Aunger’s claims are totally true, but his way of making memetics and his long 
questioning process on basic concepts, shows that Susan Blackmore is making the a 
rhetoric of memetics rather than making it a science. So, it is useful to explain his ideas 
here.  
 
Aunger (2002) starts his book with mentioning a kind of virus-like entity called 
prions, which is a kind of isolated protein that produces infected proteins and has the 
property of replicating itself. These entities are neither bacteria nor virus, they are 
contagious and infectious proteins, which are the outcome of the changes in normally 
produced proteins of the nervous systems’ cells. Hence, in the case of prions we see the 
example of an entity that has no external reality, but can be observed by its effects. 
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 According to Aunger, memetics has to specify the substrate of memes otherwise 
it cannot be a science. Memes must have a certain substrate, claims about substrate-
neutrality is not a convenient way to make a science of memetics. Memes’ locus is the 
brain and it is a material structure, rather than abstract knowledge. He says: 
 
Ideas are not immaterial. Even our thoughts and ideas are in the structure of gray 
matter and the form of electrical fluctuations in our brains. Changing ideas can 
require the expenditure of energy needed to rearrange the bits of matter. 
Information is a measure associated with a quality of matter. It may not be matter 
itself, but information is still a physical quantity (Aunger, 2002, 139). 
 
By saying so, he would like to make measurable memes in a mentalist paradigm. 
Once it is put, as knowledge and is material, namely, observable and measurable, then 
behaviorist criticisms would become invalid. 
 
He uses quantum mechanics for proving his idea that knowledge is material. In a 
phenomenon called “quantum teleportation” an object or information can be transmitted 
regardless of intermediate space. In this peculiar quantum state, two distinct and distant 
particles of matter can communicate without the aid of a mediator.  
 
Like Darwin’s question about variability in nature, Aunger wonders if there is 
such cases of information transferring in biological structures. By showing evidence 
from the discoveries of Linus Pauling, who is a quantum chemist and molecular 
biologist and also deeply influenced the twentieth century’s science, he says transferring 
of information about the state of structure between two molecules is possible. Pauling 
demonstrated that generally large molecules can transport information about its 
structure, through lock-and-key manipulations to the other matter and change the 
confirmation of this matter into its own shape (Aunger, 2002). So here’s how the new 
view sees information transfer. Information is communicated between molecules when 
the lock and key are differently shaped: “The lock fits into the key, and both are changed 
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in process. The message is the change in shape, not the new shape itself” (Aunger, 2002, 
150). 
 
Aunger uses the definition of information as Gregory Bateson (1972) once 
defined it: “what we mean by information—the elementary unit of information—is a 
difference which makes a difference” (p. 322). Here, biological information is not an 
entity, but as we have seen in the case of prions, it is a kind of knowledge of the 
difference that changes the configuration of other matter and made the latter same as the 
former. The information of difference made the other matter different, i.e. change its 
state. 
 Aunger also handles the approach of functional equivalence that is used by 
Blackmore. It is even possible to say that he provide the base for her notion of Universal 
Darwinism from which her whole theory has taken off. According to the functional 
equivalence idea, as long as two processes can exhibit the same input-output 
relationship, their intents and purpose can be seen as the same regardless of how  
different mechanism work inside them. The idea of substrate-neutrality comes from this 
principle. By applying it to the principle of replication it is concluded that the same 
meme can exist either in brain, on a hard-disc, or on a paper. 
 
However, Aunger (2002) accepts that this kind of equivalence may be good for 
computational sciences and Turing machines, but it is not applicable for replicators that 
have different dynamics. He gives a clear example, “genes in cells and genes on paper 
are not the same thing”, so replicators cannot be treated as functional devices. He writes, 
“If replication is always specific to one substrate, than information transfer can take 
place only within certain restricted kinds of circumstances. True replication involves 
what I will call ‘structural equivalence’ between the source and the copy”(p. 154). 
 
 Aunger persistently stresses the vital importance of discovering the underlying 
mechanism of how memes work. He criticizes Susan Blackmore, who does not deal with 
these hard problems and staves off these problems by referring to the future. According 
to Susan Blackmore mechanism would be found in the future it does not matter if we 
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recall how genetics could progress before the discovery of double helix model or how 
Darwinian theory could manage to work without supporting by mechanisms of 
molecular biology. Aunger finds these allegations naïve and says with sarcasm: 
 
The analogue to Darwin’s time is faulty. Things are not the same now as then. 
It’s rather like arguing that currently “underdeveloped” countries should go 
through the same process of development as occurred in the West the first time 
around, when the world was younger (Aunger, 2002, p. 162). 
 
Aunger also criticizes the behaviorist stance by bringing arguments about 
behaviors that do not exhibit the requirements of being a replicator. Firstly, like signs, 
behaviors cannot duplicate. Secondly, tracing the paths of a behavior does not identify 
distinct evolutionary linages. Thirdly, behaviorists’ obsession on observability is 
misguided; because “the fundamental question of evolution is how long-term dynamics 
play out and the fate of replicator linages” (p. 174). These evolutionary processes have 
long-term patterns that cannot be so readily observable. A requirement of a rough 
understanding of observability may cripple memetics. But there is another rigorous 
claim against mentalists that is the empirical impassibility of being mentalist 
memeticists. To respond to this challenge, Aunger embarks on a really elaborate 
proposal. The rest of his book is devoted to the possibility of observation of a meme 
inside the labyrinths of the brain.  
 
 He starts with showing a domain in which there is no gene expression at all. 
Changes in synaptic plasticity in which temporal and spatial rapid perspective changes 
occurred, no known mechanism of a gene is active. This independent condition of 
neuronal state provides our domain for searching memes. Aunger (2002) says: 
 
Here’s the decisive point: Short-term mechanisms for changing neuronal states 
will be under natural selection because they reappear in each generation of 
brains. The key factor isn’t what generates the mechanism in the first place but 
what happens to the information generated by that mechanism. A lineage of 
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memetic information can be created independently of gene-produced 
mechanisms for storing memories, even short-term ones (p. 193). 
 
Changing neuronal states that occur in milliseconds by the involvement of the 
effects of a different neuronal node may give us the wanted definition of meme. Here, 
Aunger suggests changing the direction of Darwinian research of culture’ from gene- 
Darwinism of Dawkins to the Darwinism of synapses that is offered by the eminent 
neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux (p. 194). 
 
Therefore, the replication of a meme must occur in the context of communication 
with neurons. States of neurons is changed in milliseconds and what is called, as meme 
is this changing, so he called it a “millisecond meme”. Electric potential in neurons can 
accumulate and spends rapidly, thus state of neuron can be changed and reconstructed in 
a tiny timescale. This kinds of understanding of memes is called by Aunger (2002) as 
neuromemetics: 
 
I therefore argue that the states of these nodes are memes. Like other replicators, 
memes are physical things. They are, in fact electrical things—propensities to 
fire-tied to the special kind of cells called neurons (but are not the neurons 
themselves) (p. 199). 
 
In that account the analogy is not made between memes and genes, rather it is 
between prion and computer viruses, which has proven replicator status, and memes. All 
these replicators work with same mechanism: “a pre-existing substrate that is changed 
by the replication process” (p. 199). Each of them has no real elements in themselves, 
but has potential power that can operate in certain substrate (for example viruses uses an 
existing silicon substrate of a hard-disc). 
 
Hence, meme is the name of an electrochemical state in brain’s neuronal 
network, as a readiness-to-fire. Memes are physical in respect to that they are electrical. 
A meme replication occurs “when an incoming stimulus serves as the super-molecular 
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equivalent of catalysts for reactions during which non-infectious neuronal nodes are 
transformed into infectious ones through a change in their “conformations” (p. 214). 
What is replicated in the brain is the physical structure, rather than the representations. 
Because, mental representations have functions of firing patterns, they are not the 
structure of neuronal network, and these representations always change. Mental 
representations are context-dependent. Hence, memes cannot travel from brain to brain. 
The meme, neuronal state of readiness to fire, need a catalyzer in order to become 
active. Signals, signs, symbols and other entities in external world play the role of meme 
trigger. They are memetic phenotypes and play the role of vector or transmitter for 
memes. Memetic transmission through signals occurs as such: 
 
When a potential host comes into contact with that vector (that is, reads the text 
or hears the message), the meme leaps out of this vehicle (gets decoded), 
becoming active again, and infects the person, who becomes a new host. Then 
the infection phase inside the new host brain starts up. Even later, the meme may 
get encoded again into a suitable vector (not necessarily of the same medium it 
was originally decoded from), and the whole cycle begins over again. So what I 
will call the “jumping meme” hypothesis is that memes themselves traverse the 
gap between brains, in some form (Aunger, 2002, p. 234). 
 
By means of this account of meme interaction Aunger accomplishes to give a 
logical explanation of memes’ spreading. Aunger elaborates many specific details of 
meme replication mechanisms in his book. But we can see with the work of Aunger 
(2002), one who attempts to talk about memes firstly must explain the mechanism, 
before explaining every hard problem like Blackmore.  
 
 In these two sections, I tried to display that there is no single, accepted notion of 
a meme and method of making memetics. Since memetics is a novel candidate to 
become a science, or what Tyler (2011) says proto-science, every notion of it is open to 
question, so before using them one must justify their use. Taking a behaviorist or 
mentalist stance does not matter; obviously the two sides have different starting points, 
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different epistemologies, biases, and methodologies. Susan Blackmore does not choose 
one of them, or does not unify them in a new more reliable synthesis or even does not 
reject them with due arguments. The notions and methods used in memetics that are not 
well defined and reliable may lead to debasement of memetics as Wilkins warns, rather 
than serving its growth. Wilkins (1999) warns: 
 
The debasement of memetics by quick and easy metaphors and popularized 
science to serve metaphysical agenda and political ideologies, with which we are 
all to familiar, is just the latest instance of serious evolutionary being perverted 
in that way, beginning with Spencer and the Edinburgh radicals of the 1840’s, 
through social Darwinism, “cultural evolution theories”, eugenics positive and 
negative and so forth (p. 6). 
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3.3. Critiques on the Way of Transmission, or Doubts About Imitation 
 
Susan Blackmore gives a pivotal role to imitation in her account of memetics as 
it is mentioned above. Blackmore (1999) says, “a meme is whatever it is that is passed 
on by imitation” (p. 43). A unit of imitation is equal to a unit of culture. If all of life 
depends on the replicators (memes and genes) power, and memes belong exclusively to 
the humans, then it becomes a necessity to explain all cultural facts with imitation. 
However, Blackmore claims that imitation is a specific mode of learning and rare, other 
possible kinds of transmission, such as social learning, imprinting, conditioning, direct 
teaching, or some of the mental representations that are not meme-based, only true 
imitation counts as a meme. If the two replicators rule all things, what role would other 
methods of transmission play in culture? If these are not memes what else can they be? 
There is much criticism about imitation, which Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach 
depends. So, criticizing imitation as the only way of transmission is criticizing Susan 
Blackmore’s approach. This section will discuss these critics. 
 
 David Hull (2002) sees the propensity of limiting memetics with only imitation 
is misguiding memetics. He says “limiting memetics to the study of imitation at the 
organismic level seems to narrow the subject matter of this science too drastically too 
soon” (p. 44). 
 
 Henry Plotkin (2000) also notes that imitation is only one of the form of various 
forms of social learning. For him, it is known, by recent studies, that, imitation is not 
peculiar to humans. He argues that imitation does play an important role in human 
culture, but it does not have a central role. For him, “people do more than imitate” 
(Plotkin, 2000b, p. 70). Plotkin put forward that there are different levels in cultural 
multiplicity. For example, the imitation of motor acts or the acquisition of a native 
language, or learning a way of baking cake has distinct developmental trajectories. All 
of them cannot be treated under the same understanding of imitation. Plotkin claims, 
defining a meme, as that which is passed on by imitation is an impoverishment of 
memetics, because of wanting to maintain copying fidelity. He makes four arguments 
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against this error. Firstly, if we accept Blackmore’s definition of imitation it makes 
memetics a one-dimensional account of culture, as is done by some of the natural 
scientists when they try to explain culture. This definition means an oversimplification 
of memetics. Secondly, there is a need for the mechanism of imitation if it has such kind 
of importance. Thirdly, the claim that imitation has high copying fidelity and more rapid 
than other form of information transmission is flawed because sometimes other process 
of transmission may be more rapid and accurate. For example, telling someone to eat at 
restaurant (teaching) is more plausible way of transmission than describing it with 
imitation. Finally, the expectation of high copying fidelity in the case of cultural 
evolution the same as in biological evolution is also an error. Some other biological 
systems, such as the vertebrate immune system, have a changing rate of copying fidelity. 
Hence, Plotkin stultifies one of the constitutive figures of imitation criteria, copying 
fidelity (Plotkin, 2000). 
 
 Plotkin makes an important contribution to the concept of imitation through the 
stratification of it. For him, a monolithic position of imitation prevents us from 
accounting for complexities of culture. Plotkin (2000) argues that two basic kinds of 
meme, deep memes and surface memes, must be distinguished. Deep-level memes, the 
higher order of knowledge, that are acquired by every child in every culture, are the 
products of the long process of enculturation and integration. Native language learning 
and social constructions are examples of deep level memes. On the other hand, surface 
memes, which depend on higher order memories and knowledge structures, refers to 
memory organizations and thematic organization points. Knowledge of making pumpkin 
soup is an example of surface level memes. We all share the same higher order 
structures concerning what shop or school is, but we have different surface memes about 
which school is the best or where a certain shop is (Plotkin, 2000). He says: 
 
Basing a science of memetics on the single mechanism of imitation will not 
deliver as an explanatory basis for cultural complexity, and will lay itself open to 
ridicule by social scientists. Nowhere is Occam’s Razor more misplaced than in a 
science of culture (p. 80). 
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Rosaria Conte (2000) also shares the same ideas with Plotkin. For here imitation 
is only one mechanism among other ways of transmission, which include, social 
learning, goal adaptation, social and norm-based influence and control, or conformity. 
She complains that imitation, in spite of its importance, is a “bad word” for behavioral 
science and no satisfactory model has been worked out so far. Conte sharply argues that 
Blackmore’s notion of imitation, as a way of information transmission is neither 
necessary nor sufficient. For her imitation is unnecessary because it is a behavioral 
notion, but what is imitated are instructions, rules, or standards rather than behavior per 
se. Also, Blackmore’s claim that contagious behaviors are not imitation which require 
novel behavior is insufficient because, there are counter examples. For example using a 
foreign accent unconsciously is an example of reproducing a novel behavior in novel 
context, but Blackmore sees this case as contagious behavior not a genuine meme 
(Conte, 2000). Conte denotes imitation cannot be isolated from sociality, so a mental 
mechanism that could explain imitation with its social aspects stipules several social 
cognitive capacities such as decision-making, goals, norms, or social beliefs. 
 
 Dan Sperber (2000) also points out similar points about the trouble with 
imitation. While Conte (2000) argues that behaviors cannot be copied, what is copied is 
instruction; Sperber claims that instructions cannot be imitated, they must be inferred. 
There must be a decoding and inference process in a certain verbal communication. In 
many cases of cultural interactions, the information provided by stimulus is 
complemented with information already available in system. So cultural transmission is 
not a self-acting, casual process, rather it requires the involvement of agents (Sperber, 
2000). Like Plotkin’s deep memes, Sperber gives the example of language acquisition. 
In acquiring a language a child internalizes grammar on the basis of linguistic 
interactions. But nowhere in this interaction present a grammar available for copying. 
He says: 
 
As Noam Chomsky has long argued, this requires a genetically determined 
preparedness to interpret the data in a domain-specific way and to generalize 
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from it to the grammar of the language, going well beyond the information even. 
Imitation in some sense may well play a role—though not a sufficient one—in 
the acquisition of the phonology of words, but not in the acquisition of their 
meaning. Meaning is not something that can be obeyed and copied. It can only 
be inferred (Sperber, 2000, p. 172). 
 
 So, Sperber accepts that imitation has a role in culture, but he claims explaining 
culture in all its facets through imitation is insufficient. This Chomskian challenge is a 
rigorous blow to Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach.  
 
 Besides, Robert Aunger (2002) also, in agreement with the above-mentioned 
memeticists, denotes that Blackmore’s notion of imitation is ill defined and insufficient. 
But in contrast, for memetics to be a science based on basic sciences and neuroscience 
rather than such kinds of ambiguous, unproven, sociological and psychological research 
area.   
 
 However, perhaps Kate Distin makes the strongest criticism to Blackmore’s 
imitation. Blackmore, following Dennet, who says artifacts are meme vehicles, uses the 
distinction of copy-the-product and copy-the-instruction to overcome the problem of 
determining the real meme and its outcome. But, Distin argues that this is not a genuine 
solution, since the mechanism of copy-the-product is not just an imitation. She says one 
cannot find relevant information to copy a thing at a glance. It is not possible to generate 
from an end product, information about which of its features is significant or relevant. If 
you are engineer and see a machine, you can know how to copy it, but if you were a 
layperson and see a machine, you cannot copy it. So, the engineer infers the information 
that is relevant. Copying the product is not a true imitation because it depends on 
inference. (Distin, 2004) She puts it:  
 
What Blackmore calls “copying-the- product” is not really a copying process at 
all, since here I acquire information by a process of inference from phenotypic 
effects to memetic content, using information that I already possess: any new 
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representations that I form as a result of this process do not come from anyone 
else. Blackmore’s distinction between copying-the-product and copying-the-
instructions therefore presents no challenge at all to a cultural distinction 
between replicator and effect. Rather, it is an alternative way of viewing the 
same phenomena, and one, which manages to obscure what, is really going on. 
The distinction between a meme and its effects remains valid and useful (Distin, 
2004, p. 95). 
 
Distin also examines Blackmore’s notion of memetic drive.  She says, again 
following Dennett, who are best at imitating are meme fountains. According to her, 
meme fountains would have certain advantages both in memetic and genetic selection, 
also “if there are genes for imitating the best imitator, these genes will spread in the gene 
pool” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 96). However, Distin finds the argument of genes for 
imitating the best imitator implausible, since in this case genes should control, how to 
imitate, what to imitate and whom to imitate, but it is not expected that genes can 
manage to do such things. Moreover, the notion of “the best imitator” is ambiguous. 
Who can determine who is the best imitator in a certain group? Different cultures will 
favor the innate abilities of different people. Who is the best imitator? Is it technicians or 
artist or intellectual? (Distin, 2004) Distin further claims that the approach of memetic 
drive is flawed since memetic changes usually are swifter than genetic changes, so it is 
implausible that memetic selection causes a selection pressure on genes, and there would 
be no such mechanism of genes that support imitation.  
 
 Other than this, Blackmore says imitation is the only form of social transmission 
that involves true replication. Cultural information can be passed on by imitation, 
because culture consists of memes and memes are units of imitation. Yet, Distin (2004) 
asks “What about the information that we gain from reading or being thought for 
instance?” (p. 101) Hence, inference plays a crucial role in imitation, which means that 
the processes in culture are almost always reproduction rather than replication. 
Information is not passed by blind replication but by the inference of agents. Thus, the 
opposition of reproduction and replication, inference and copying, agents and machines 
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stems from some misunderstandings of the ways of cultural transmission. Indeed, 
Blackmore’s imitation on which she constructs her own structure of memetics is highly 
problematic and may lead to a chain of mistakes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 94!
3. 4. Anthropocentric Bias  
 
 A related problem with the troubles of imitation is Susan Blackmore’s insistence 
on limiting meme studies exclusively to humans. For her, humans are a special kind 
among other creatures with their extra-ordinary capacity of imitation. This kind of 
conceit that distinguishes people from the universe and giving a special status to humans 
is a kind of general racism, which exalts only humans, insults all others, and sees almost 
every other tradition as flawed. Blackmore disapproves sociobiology, for example can 
be seen as attempt to break this bias. For Blackmore, true imitation is peculiar to only 
humans (Blackmore, 2001). She also states that to be human is to imitate (Blackmore, 
2007, p.1). However, there are many counter arguments on this issue. In the following 
section, some of these arguments will be provided. 
 
 Since there is currently poor evidence for imitation in non-human animals, the 
definition of imitation gives way to restrict memetics to the study of human behavior. 
However both the definition of imitation made by Blackmore is not unique to human 
kind and the notion of imitation is insufficient for explaining culture. Laland and 
Odling-Smee suggest that imitation is not a more reliable way than other forms of 
learning such as social learning or local enhancement. For Blackmore imitation is 
different than social learning because it results in the learning of a behavior pattern, not 
learning about the environment or reconstructed behavior by trial error. Laland & 
Odling-Smee (2000) claims that this position is misguided. As Heyes (1995) puts it 
“when imitation result in social learning, the motor pattern is not learned, rather 
topographically defined behavioral elements are learned” (p. 1422). It is also shown that 
imitation in apes and humans does not mean copying perfectly, in every form of 
imitation some type of reconstruction of behavior is inevitable. So, like imitation, other 
forms of social learning are capable of transferring memes (Laland & Odling-Smee, 
2000). Reader and Laland develop some arguments against Susan Blackmore’s 
insistence on imitation. They argues: 
 
Non-human animals may be poor imitators, but many are excellent social learners. 
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We argue that the meme concept can, and should, be applied to animal cultural 
transmission. We agree that evidence for non-human animals routinely imitating is 
weak, but argue that imitation need not, and should not, be the defining feature of 
a meme. Transmission fidelity, not the psychological process underlying 
transmission, is a determining feature of whether a meme can spread and replicate 
(Reader & Laland, 1999, p. 2). 
 They give some examples of social learning that transmit cultural tradition without 
imitation. For example, once a macaque (a kind of monkey that lives in Japan) discovers 
to wash its potato in a river rather than brushing it, other monkeys can learn this by 
observing it. This trait is passed on from generation to generation. Another example is 
the rats, which follow a certain diet. Rats generally prefer to eat foods that others have 
eaten rather than alternative novel diets. So, a short-term meme for eating certain foods 
spread in the population, rats can learn what to eat and what to avoid eating by observing 
others. Another well-known and informative example is milk bottle-top opening tits in 
Britain. These birds learn to peck the foil on milk-bottles and open them, then eat the 
cream under the foil. This behavior gradually spread throughout Britain and into 
Continental Europe. This pattern of behavior propagates by the process of local 
enhancement. Thus these examples show there are numerous different forms of behavior 
patterns that spread among animal populations. Animals have behavioral traditions 
depending on acquired information transformation and also these traditions change over 
time in consistent with memetic evolution (Reader & Laland, 1999). 
 Blackmore claims that imitation is not about the environment but about behavior 
pattern. She says, milk bottle opening tits’ behavior is not imitation, since “the tits 
already new how to peck; they only learned what to peck” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 49). But 
Susan Blackmore’s example, the making of pumpkin soup, has nothing more than the 
behavior of tits. According to Reader and Laland: 
“The cook is simply carrying out an existing motor pattern (that of making soup) 
with an ingredient novel to the soup-making context but familiar in other contexts. 
Exactly the same logic applies to the milk-bottle-top opening birds. They are not 
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learning to peck any more than the tennis apprentice is learning to run around or 
hold rackets: that motor pattern is already part of their repertoire. They are 
learning to peck a particular object (the milk-bottle), found in a particular location 
(on a doorstep), to generate a particular consequence (the cream reward). Imitation 
is not a criterion upon which the meme-carrying of animals and humans can be 
distinguished” (Reader & Laland, 1999, p. 3). 
 So, memetic transmission is not limited to mere imitation. Reader and Laland 
(1999) give three illustrative example of cultural transmission in non-human animals, in 
the apes, birds, and fish, and shows that meme theory can be applied to animals. Besides 
them, behavioral ecologist Lee Alan Dugatkin (2000) also claims that memes may 
influence the behaviors of animals as they drive human behaviors, because animals can 
imitate, too.  He gives some examples from blackbirds and apes to convince that animals 
also have ability of imitation.  
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3.5. Methodological Problems !
 Methodological issues are another serious problem with Susan Blackmore’s 
memetic approach and they criticize from various aspects. As above, there is no single 
work that is devoted to methodological shortcomings, but I gather some bits of critiques 
from various articles. Discontent with memetics stems from its lack of empirical 
evidence and the deficiency of a sound philosophy of science. 
 Robert Aunger (2000) remarks “memetics is a theory without a methodology, in 
imminent danger of dying from lack of novel interpretations and empirical work”(quoted 
by Dirlam, 2003 p. 2). Although memetics has enough time to prove empirical evidence 
and case studies that may made it a reliable science, practically there is no all round 
experiment applied to memetics until now. Given that Dawkins propounded the idea of 
meme in 1976, memetic is comparatively to slow to progress if it is compared with its 
peers such as neuroscience, and cybernetics. As Marsden (1998) points out: “memetics, 
now over two decades old but yet to be operationalized, may be characterized as a body 
of theory without evidence” (p. 2). Dirlam also assumes that the fundamental crisis of 
memetics stems from a dearth of empirical studies. Especially, when it is considered that 
governments, universities and foundations support empirical works, a science without a 
track record has few chances to find funds (Dirlam, 2005). Further Dan Sperber (2000) 
writes about this point to explain cultural complexity. He says: 
Memeticists have to give empirical evidence to support the claim that, in the 
micro-processes of cultural transmission, elements of culture inherit all or nearly 
all their relevant properties from other elements of culture that they replicate 
(Sperber, 2000, p. 173). 
 As it is known, Susan Blackmore offers solutions to many hard problems such as 
the roots of language, the mystery of big brains or the essence of the self. However her 
solutions have no tangible evidence, which turned her theories into fanciful fantasies. 
She dares to solve the mystery of the beginning of language an issue that even eminent 
linguists did not dare to explain, without having any data about the science of linguistics. 
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What is more, Blackmore as a psychologist who follows the development in the 
philosophy of mind and neurology, writes on the overgrowth of brain and the sense of 
self, but she does this again without any proof. As Poulschock notes that there is no way 
to measure the memes. Blackmore (2000) suggests that “scans of brain activity could 
test whether the human brain has evolved to imitate and spread memes”, but Poulschock 
(2001) objects to this for the reason that even if we accept that imitation produces most 
of the brain activity, there is no evidence that this activities has any effect on brain size, 
or we have no data about the act of imitation or whether memes leave any trace in the 
brain. Thus, on what basis one can says that memes underlies the mystery of big brains.  
 
 Another well-known psychologist, Gustav Jahoda complaints about the self-
assurance of memeticists, regardless of their deficiency of available proof. In his 
response to Blackmore, he expresses his sense of dissatisfaction about Blackmore’s 
explanation of self as distortion of consciousness and asserts that this is a kind of mind-
body dualism, which means that there should be a real consciousness under the guise of 
a distorted one. He puts it as follows: 
 
I can understand neither how memes can produce a false idea of self, nor how 
such a false idea “distorts ordinary human consciousness”. How do we know that 
our ‘ordinary consciousness’ is distorted? The answer given is that we can  get rid 
of the “false” self and arrive at a different, underlying, kind of “ghost in the 
machine” exorcized by Gilbert Ryle (Jahoda, 2002b, p. 3). 
 Bruce Edmonds (2002) also has three challenges to memeticists in order to refer to 
the necessity of empirical studies. For him, if memetics would not manage to give some 
usable result for academics, it would be faded away in near future. He boldly puts it by 
referring David Hull; "Stop talking about Memetics and start doing it" (Edmonds, 2002, 
p. 2). 
 His first challenge is about a conclusive case study. Memeticists should show at 
least one cultural phenomenon that has a replicator mechanism, which must be a testable 
physical thing and have inheritable replication pattern with a high rate of reliability. 
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Further it must demonstrate explicitly why this meme survives against others and this 
survival must be numerically epitomized in consistence with population genetics. 
Secondly, memetics have to tell us when a memetic analysis is more helpful than a more 
traditional one. A falsifiable theory, which would have to be understandable in terms of 
the credibility, appropriateness and clarity of its core mechanism and verifiable by 
observable phenomena is a requirement. Thirdly, there should be a simulation model 
that can exemplify memetic process. A meme’s change, its changing process and 
emergent memes must be designed in consistence in this simulation (Edmond, 2002). 
Edmond shows that memetics that seeks to attain scientific status must principally give a 
full-fledged empirical account. It can be explicitly inferred from these complaints 
memetics are in hot water with the lack of empirical evidence. 
 Susan Blackmore also ignores preceding works such as sociobiology or other 
explanations of culture. Apart from a few exceptions Blackmore displayed no awareness 
of those predecessors who discussed imitation in much the same way as she did. Jahoda 
gives some examples that give imitation as a pivotal role in their explanation such as 
Erasmus Darwin, William James, Gabriel Tarde, and James Burnett. Jahoda says 
memetics brings no new insight to the cultural development, because from the 18th 
century onward fundamental importance was attached to imitation by eminent thinkers 
(Jahoda, 2002). Nick Rose also argues that memeticists sometimes unnecessarily 
underestimate sociobiological explanations. She says  
Meme theory should only be applied where Occam's razor allows. A theory of 
cultural evolution should incorporate sociobiological findings, only calling  upon 
the addition of cultural mechanisms where they are necessary in order to 
accurately describe or explain behavioral phenomena. (Rose, 1998, p. 7) 
 Robert Aunger, (2000) on the other hand notes the importance of delimitating of 
the scope of memetics. In the other words it should refer to a possible research area, then 
the credibility of memetics should investigate this domain otherwise it is doomed to be a 
free-floating chitchat.  
 Boyd (2001) in addition, proposes that memetics could not be conducted on one 
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level, a stratification among different types of memetics is a necessity. In congruent with 
Plotkin’s distinction between deep memes and surface memes, Gary Boyd offers some 
changeable levels for memes, such as simple viral memes, conjugative-integrative-
identi-memplexes, liberative, and scientosophic memes. It is not the point whether these 
categorization is apt or not, but what is important here is that the theory of memes can 
not be treated on a single level, it needs a stratification or methodological distinction to 
facilitate its task. 
 Finally, and the most importantly, Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach does not 
dependent on any accepted philosophy of science, or does not brings a new philosophy. 
If memetics would like to be a candidate for a valid science, it should be based on a 
acceptable philosophy of science, or at least it has to reply to challenges from other 
philosophies. As Andrew Collier (1994) once puts it: 
 A good part of the answer to the question “Why philosophy?” is that the 
 alternative to philosophy is not no philosophy but bad philosophy. The 
 “unphilosophical” person has an unconscious philosophy, which they apply in 
 their practice- whether of science or politics or daily life (p. 17). 
 Hence, Susan Blackmore as well unconsciously sticks to a hidden philosophy, and 
this section examines which philosophy of science is relevant to her position. Each 
position that would be examined here has different shortcomings.  
 Hiram Caton (2000), in his review, argues that Blackmore’s position as a kind of 
behaviorism. He says, in 1920’s behaviorists sought to reduce all human acts to the 
input-output mechanisms and what Blackmore has done is a “dumbed-down” 
behaviorism. Memes as stimuli enter in the brain, parasitize (conditioning in behaviorist 
terms) it and are emitted as responses. For Caton, this account is dumber than 
behaviorism, because a behaviorist has a well-defined objects domain, but memeticists 
are even deprived of this. Memetics’ dream of eliminating subjectivity can be seen as a 
kind of behaviorism and, as Caton (2000) states is laconically “subjectivity is robotized 
by genes and lobotomized memes” (p. 273). Nevertheless, memetics cannot be easily put 
away as a kind of naive behaviorism despite its apparent behaviorism.  
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 From another standpoint, Popper’s idea of falsifiability can be applied to the 
memetics of Blackmore. However as Pigliucci draws our attention, the only way to tell 
which memes are going to be successful is explained by waiting and seeing what 
happened. Although Blackmore gives us certain criteria for projecting the success of a 
meme (i.e., longevity, fecundity and fidelity), these can not make her free from falling 
into the trap of tautology and teleology. Poulschock (2001) reveals how Blackmore falls 
into a vicious circle: 
1) The fittest memes survived and reproduced. 
2) Why did these memes survive and reproduce over and against other memes? 
3) They possessed more adaptive and profitable memetic traits than memes that 
didn’t survive and reproduce. 
4) How do we know that these traits were the most profitable and adaptive? 
5) The memes that possessed these traits survived and reproduced (Poulschock, 
2001, p. 72). 
 As it can be explicitly seen Blackmore’s way of thinking does not provide 
falsifiable criteria by which we can asses its power of explanation and its competence of 
explaining arising fact in consistence with the current model. Blackmore sometimes 
forecasts some future situations, such as coming of temes (the third replicator exists in 
digital world) or future of motherhood, but these predictions does not depend on a 
scientific explanation. Probably this is an intrinsic feature of Darwinian thinking that 
cannot predict future facts. If Darwinian thinking is a dependable science and has certain 
account of the current state of humans, it should be able to project future to some extent. 
However, Darwinism is not essentially about future but about past, that is, it reconstructs 
the past in favor of current successful kinds. For example, current ecological changes 
would likely effect human life and probably we would produce new organs or our 
physical appearance would change, but from this moment we cannot manage to 
determine what effect the future would bring by Darwinian theory. Bergson’s attempts 
to incorporate into Darwinism a sense of unpredictability with his notion of élan vital 
(creative vital impetus) come from these problems of teleology. Poulschock (2001) 
accuses memetics as using teleological language and while claiming it is doing science, 
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it actually is metaphysical. He says: 
Memetics is a Darwinian dysteleological theory of culture and mind that is  often 
forced to use teleological language to describe what it claims to be non-
teleological processes and events (Poulschock, 2001, p. 73).  
 Blackmore is not aware of the difference between methodological naturalism and 
metaphysical naturalism, according to Poulschock. Explaining all scientific problems by 
referring to natural causes and events is methodological naturalism, on the other hand 
metaphysical or philosophical naturalism claims that all things and mental states, 
emotions, and beliefs are reducible to nature, natural elements consist everything. 
Claiming that “we are non-free or non-rational agents” is not dependent on natural 
methods, that is observable by experiments, or inferred from an empirical case that is 
designed by naturalistic methods, instead this is a pre-empirical belief that involves 
explanation or a bald metaphysical statement. Poulschock straightly says: “Blackmore’s 
universe pre-empirically supposes metaphysical naturalism, she befuddles her 
philosophy with science” (Poulschock, 2001, p. 73). 
 Taking into account Blackmore’s claims on the mind and the self, eliminative 
materialism can be ascribed to her ideas. Rooted in Holbach’s hard determinism and 
Hume’s idea of self, eliminative materialism, which was developed by eminent 
philosophers such as Feyereband, Rorty, Quine, and Churchland etc. According to this 
naturalist philosophy “our ordinary, common-sense understanding of mind is deeply 
wrong and that some or all the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually 
exist. Namely, they say there are no mental states just brain states” (Ramsey, 2011). 
 Thus, it can be said that Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach is not a literally 
scientific work; rather it is a kind of philosophy, or an elaborately concealed group of 
metaphysical beliefs. It has no sound methodology, no clear concept, and no genuine 
insights. This approach falls short in terms of being epistemological and methodological. 
She has not developed a new insight about where we should seek a meme, either in the 
brain or in an artifact, also what is the real character of memes, either semantic or 
syntactic. Her concept of imitation on which she constructs her theory is ambiguous and 
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debatable. Claiming that to be human is to imitate is just a metaphysical bias, which 
today cannot be supported. And last but not least, while she would like to make science, 
she frequently transgresses the limits of science, and in the end we see that with the 
arrival of temes, Blackmore reaches a kind of eschatological religion-like discourse. All 
these problems are caused by her lack of clear concepts and a dependable methodology. 
Instead of solving these problems of memetics, she choose the way in which every 
problem that faces humanity throughout history can be solved with just so stories in a 
twinkling. Although, Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach is criticized within the 
scope of memetics, as it is asserted here, the theory can also be criticized from the 
outside of memetics. The following chapter will be devoted to these criticisms. 
 
 
 
 !!!
! 104!
 
CHAPTER 4:  
CRITIQUES OF SUSAN BLACKMORE’S MEMETIC APPROACH 
FROM OUTSIDE OF MEMETICS: Four Possible Critiques 
 
 In the previous chapter main criticisms of Susan Blackmore from within 
memetics were given. In this chapter, we will connect the subject of memetics to the 
concerns of cultural studies, such as anthropology, the problem of culture, rhetoric, 
analogy, modernization, ideology, and essentialism. There are great deal of problems in 
Susan Blackmore’s account and each of them can be handled immediately. Her naïve 
explanation of the notion of self, her explanation of origin and evolution of language, 
her claims on the future role of women in society etc. can be questioned from various 
point of view in social sciences. These are really important issues per se, but either 
because of the scope of this work, or because of incompetency in all this areas, the 
criticism is restricted to the theoretical points, not the technical or applied problems. 
Thus, it will first handle the idea of memetics, namely, explication of culture, secondly, 
memetics initial axioms, thirdly, its hidden ideological assumptions and the tradition in 
which it operates, and related to this memetics’ philosophical tradition. All of these 
issues are not related to the one by one problems that Susan Blackmore offers, but 
general theoretical criticism of this memetic approach. Below, we start with the issue of 
culture.  
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4.1. Anthropological Criticism: The matter of culture 
 
Anthropologist Adam Kuper (2000) starts his article with a challenging question: “If 
memes are the answer what is the question? (p. 175). Indeed, memetics contend to 
explain the essence and the evolution of “culture”, without defining what culture is. 
There is no a common description for this indecisive notion, heated debates have been 
taking place in the entire literature of anthropology for two centuries. Memetics is 
social-science-blind; anthropologists have frequently made most of its claims.   
  It can be possible to claim that the definition of culture that memetics espouse is 
the 19th century’s description of culture, which was put forward ad the sunset of 
anthropology. For Dawkins and Blackmore, culture is a universal trait that every human 
society has because culture is a mental capacity that every human has. This definition 
sounds like what British anthropologist Edward Burnet Taylor says about the meaning 
of culture. Taylor (1871) describe what he means by culture in his famous book 
Primitive Culture: 
 
Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society (p. 1). 
 
The key point here is that this description is not like Matthew Arnold’s (1869) 
definition of culture, which is a distinguishing feature of an elite class. Instead, it is a 
shared property of all humans, a universal character. An opposition between biological 
inheritance and “acquired habits by man as a member of society” is established. 
Culture’s essence is lies in its being unnatural, being a product of man. Culture is a 
general specialty that is peculiar to humans by which humankind differentiates itself 
from the state of nature. In addition to that, Taylor counts “diverse units of culture that 
are organized into an integrating ‘complex whole,’ abstracted from the conglomerate of 
these units” (Kronfeldner, 2011, p. 77). Hence, for Taylor, culture consists of ideational 
units (knowledge, beliefs, art, science, customs, and that kind of mental contents) that 
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can make a big whole, known as culture. Kuper (200) point out the resemblance between 
Dawkins’ and Taylor’s perceptions of culture: 
 
[Dawkins] His closest affinity is perhaps with a particular faction of English 
Victorian “evolutionists”, which was led by E. B. Taylor. In this tradition, human 
culture is constituted largely by knowledge of nature, by the (consequent) ability 
to control nature, and by the progressive implementation of moral rules that 
suppress our own animal nature. This common culture is in the process of 
development (p. 177). 
 
However, Arnold, Taylor or Morgan’s initial description of culture as 
cumulative, shared mental contents that every human can reach was attacked by other 
anthropologists. Franz Boas and his successors such as Alfred Kroeber, Ruth Benedict, 
Edward Sapir, and Margaret Mead took objection to this nascent description. For Boas, 
every culture can be understood only in a specific context rather than in a broad 
evolutionary progression from savage to the civilized, which is a unique destiny of all 
cultures. Thus, law-like generalizations for all cultures are unacceptable, so one must 
focus on the differences to capture an insight for a particular culture, rather than seeking 
the similarities to construct general laws. Cultural patterns do not reflect earlier stages of 
human development; these can only be explicate for addressing cultural uniqueness itself 
rather than general human progression, or individual education. 
 
To Boas’s pupil Alfred Kroeber, these patterns are not a random heap of 
ideational bits, but the patterns are coherent arrangements or a system of internal 
relationship that reflects a community’s understanding of the world. “For Kroeber, that 
organizing force was culture—non-genetic, shared, anonymous, and patterned 
knowledge. Culture is that it is learned, shared, patterned, and meaningful. The 
configurations of culture are produced by the history of a particular set of cultural 
values” (Moore, 2009, p. 71). 
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  Another well-known anthropologist of the Boasian school is Ruth Benedict.  For 
her, culture is a pattern based on fundamental values, which is different in every 
community. Shared values that are acquainted by living in a society and tempering or 
training with its practices determine the essence of a culture. Those who adopt these 
values are acceptable and those who do not are deviant. A specific value or behavior is 
appropriated according to these patterns. The configuration make links between facts 
and event and beliefs and attitudes, these produce patterns in tandem (Moore, 2009). 
 
 Edward Sapir also concurs that culture is a pattern, but different from the above-
mentioned people, the pattern is language, which dynamically links individuals and 
culture. Individuals are not passive receivers of pre-established, unchanged values; 
culture is consistently re-built by individuals in public discourse through debate and 
disagreement that depends on utterances and language. Margaret Mead also searches 
these patterns in the human development process. Culture is the determining force in 
development of individuals form their infancy to adulthood. In every step cultural 
patterns designate the attitudes of individuals (Moore, 2009). 
 
 While American cultural anthropology seeks to reveal shared mental content of a 
certain unique culture, contrary to that, British social anthropology follows a different 
trajectory. This school tends to explain culture, depending on Durkheim, with a utility-
based account. Ushered in by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, British social 
anthropology asserts that culture functioned to meet the necessities of individual basic 
instincts and to produce and maintain society. Instead of searching shared values and 
ideational patterns, social anthropologists focus on groups, class and institutions that co-
operate to sustain the society as a whole.  
 
 For example, according to Marcel Mauss, the practice of gift, reciprocal gift 
exchange is a fundamental algorithm for diverse societies. A gift is not only about 
commodities but also anything that has a value such as puberty, girls, ceremonial 
funerals, childbirth, death, ruin etc. Individuals and groups constantly exchange 
everything between them; Mauss calls this as “total prestation” that underlies oldest 
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economic system and social interaction as well as modern rules and customs. This is a 
common pattern for all cultures, he says:  
 
We may then consider that the spirit of gift- exchange is characteristic of 
societies which have passed the phase of “total prestation” (between clan and 
clan, family and family) but have not yet reached the stage of pure individual 
contract, the money market, sale proper, fixed price, and weighed and coined 
money (Mauss, 1967, p. 45). 
For Malinowski, every culture must satisfy the natural needs of society; every 
cultural achievement refers directly or symbolically to the satisfaction of biological 
necessities. For him, “culture is utilitarian, adaptive, and functionally integrated, and the 
explanation of culture involves the delineation of function” (Moore, 2009, p. 142). 
 Radcliffe-Brown, a main figure in social anthropology, who is inspired by 
Durkheim and Comte, investigates cross-culturally general laws that regulate structure 
and function. He follows Durkheim, so he believes that social institutions are key figures 
for maintaining cultural order, these institutions are analogous to the organs of body. He 
also uses Malinowski’s tradition and tries to show how customs are functional to the 
stability of society.  
 As it can be seen there are two rival camps. In American version of culture, for 
Boas and his school, culture is a kind of a consistent whole in which every item is 
arranged in order to meet psychological need for adopting patterned worldview. On the 
other hand, the so called “British social structural approach” asserts that culture does not 
consist of ideational units, but mental attitudes and beliefs that function to promote the 
survival of society. Mental patterns reflect the practices and co-operation in social life 
that are indispensible to make society coherent and ordered. Both approaches agree that 
culture is not an outcome of transmission of isolated units. For the American version, a 
bit of information only has meaning in the context of a specific culture, so it becomes an 
inseparable part of patterned whole. On the other hand, the British school acknowledges 
culture is not diffusion of bits, or a set of propositions, rather, a conscious inferred from 
action and process in social interaction (Bloch, 2000). “For the American cultural 
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anthropologists, explanation involved showing the relationship between values and 
cultural behavior. For the British social anthropologists, explanation required analyzing 
the different segments of society and the institutions that articulate them” (Moore, 2009, 
p. 177).  
 
 Apart from these two camps, after 1960s symbolic aspect of culture is stressed 
by eminent anthropologists such as Levi Strauss, Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, and 
Mary Douglas. According to Turner the central feature of culture is symbols that are 
only understood by investigation of cultural practices. Levi-Strauss points out the 
underlying logic of myths and other symbolic cultural practices. Clifford Geertz (1973) 
puts forward that understanding a culture is always dependent on interpretation that 
stipulates engaging in an act (a ritual or a festival) of a local context in which that act 
gets its meaning. He stresses the semiotic aspects of culture that can be seen as a web of 
significance. The science of culture must be dependent on the interpretation of signs and 
“analysis, then, is sorting out the structures of signification and determining their social 
ground and import” (p. 9), rather than collecting data or seeking general laws. Geertz 
calls this second type of making ethnography as “thick description”. By highlighting 
semiotic, interpretive aspects, he means technology and infrastructure, patterns, super-
organic whole, or general laws have no priority in cultural investigation. 
Though ideational, it does not exist in someone's head; though unphysical, it is 
not an occult entity…. Once human behavior is seen as (most of the time; there 
are true twitches) symbolic action the question as to whether culture is patterned 
conduct or a frame of mind, or even the two somehow mixed together, loses 
sense (p. 10). 
Hence, Geertz rejects the pervious visions, and stresses that cultural science should 
depend on meaning and the interpretation of signs.  
 Eric Wolf also agrees that culture cannot be understood from the perspective of 
static ideational units, or integrated wholes, or functional parts. He argues that every 
culture has different groups and classes with varying degree of access to power. “Wolf 
argued that an anthropological perspective that saw cultures as ahistorical, stable, and 
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uniform was inherently flawed” (Moore, 2009, p. 293).  
 As it is shown there is no clear-cut, agreed definition of culture in anthropology. 
These different explanations date back to the old discussion known as civilization-Kultur 
distinction. Civilization refers to universalistic-humanist French Enlightenment’s 
understanding for which culture is a cosmopolite property of humanity that progresses 
evolutionarily and creates perfection of the soul. Kultur refers to romantic, nationalistic 
understanding, which conceive that culture is the sum of characteristics of a nation, 
Volksgeist (Özlem, 2008). Here culture refers to national identity, each Volk has its own 
Giest. In the first tradition, “civilization was represented as a progressive, cumulative 
human achievement. The progress of civilization could be measured by the advance of 
reason in its cosmic battle against raw nature, instinct, and unthinking tradition” 
(Kupper, 2000, p. 176). The Enlightenment’s concept of culture is universal and 
progressive which materialize in science and technology and rationality of government. 
On the contrary, the counter-Enlightenment Romantic Movement, the tradition of 
culture (Geisteswissenschaften), distinguishes itself from the French concept of 
civilization, and Anglo-Saxon notion of “social sciences” as well. The quarrel between 
social science (Anglo-Saxon) and the humanities (German) can be translated as 
positivism and historicity or hermeneutics. The former sees science as a model to 
designate the complexity of social phenomena and seeks general law-like regularities for 
culture or human affairs. The latter argues that the investigation of nature and of culture 
is highly different, thus the science of culture be autonomous. Vico was the first who 
argues there should be a new science that will focus on cultural affairs independent of 
known sciences. However, the tradition of Kultur begins to appear with Dilthey, who 
made a discrimination between  natural sciences and humanities, whereas the task of 
natural sciences is explaining natural facts, human sciences must understand human 
relations. According to Dilthey’s historicism, human sciences are always dependent on 
the time in which a specific culture exists. For the historicism, the aim is not to attain a 
general truth that can be applied to all human knowledge, because culture is a unique 
form of human society life styles, it comes out as different life patterns for different 
societies. Historicism seeks to point out societies unique life patterns for every historical 
period in their singularity and individuality, rather than pursuing a general, abstract 
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notion of culture. These singular wholes, for Herder, are not following a line of 
progressive linear schema that can only understand through theoretical reason as it was 
supposed by evolutionist-Enlightenment vision, but rather, it can only be understood 
through historical reason. Culture and even natural science can be seen as a product of 
practical-social relations (Özlem, 2000). 
 To sum up, there are various theories to explain the concept of culture in 
anthropology and in philosophy, but memetics literature does not mention any of them. 
Memetics never refers to the linguistic aspects, in which culture appears and develops, to 
consistency or holistic aspect, to utility or functions of cultural phenomenon, to power 
relations in human affairs, or to interpretive aspects or signs by which culture 
materialize. Memetics and especially Susan Blackmore’s aspect never attempts to face 
any of there theories in a suitable manner. It can be claimed that Susan Blackmore’s 
memetic approach is anthropology-blind as well as blind to the fact that its findings are 
already discussed in the literature of social sciences.  
 Memetics, following Comte and positivist positions that take natural sciences as 
a model for social sciences, is based itself on biology or genetics. It regards genetics as a 
sound, proven science to explain biological phenomena, by mirroring it, memetics can 
explain the cultural sphere. Since, genes can be treated as identifiable, discrete units 
(even this is also not debatable), it is supposed that memetics can treat culture by 
dividing it into discrete units. As Mary Midgley (2003) remarks culture is not a heap of 
atomic units: 
The trouble is that thought and culture are not the sort of thing that can have 
distinct units. They do not have a granular structure for the same reason that 
ocean currents do not have one – namely, because they are not stuffs but patterns 
(p. 57) 
Susan Blackmore also accepts there is no clear definite units for memetics but 
still she accepts that culture is an integration of memes. Apart from that the term meme 
is attributed to practically all-social phenomena and really resembles to what semiology 
called a sign. Indeed the term meme is highly similar to the term sign that is used in 
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semiotics. However, there is no reference to semiotics in Blackmore’s account, but at 
least it should be noted by which aspects memetics differentiates itself from semiology. 
Memetics has to face semiology and it must demonstrate which novelty it brings that 
semiology has not reached.  
 Nobody can deny that something independent of biological existence is 
transferred in social transmission. Memes are those units, which are transmitted by 
imitation, i.e., social transmission. These are not about personal emotions, social 
learning, in short, untransferable things. However, culture is imbued with those things, 
which have no clear, identifiable meaning and those things we can learn without 
imitating somebody or learning from a certain source. Language acquisition is a good 
example. Infants can internalize the words and grammar through linguistic interaction. 
But nowhere in this interaction the rules of grammar is presented, these rules are 
unconsciously inferred from others use of language. We also did not learn the words one 
by one by imitating or observing somebody and in every utterance we get together some 
words that are acceptable in the scope of language, which is most of the time unique to 
us. We utter a new sentence; we can generate millions of different versions of sentences 
that did not exist before without imitating somebody. This is what Noam Chomsky calls 
generative aspect of language. Dan Sperber (2000) uses it to criticize memetics: 
As Noam Chomsky has long argued and as has become, if not universally, at 
least generally accepted today, this requires a genetically determined 
preparedness to interpret the data in a domain-specific way and to generalize 
from it to the grammar of the language, going well beyond the information even. 
Imitation in some sense may well play a role—though not a sufficient one—in 
the acquisition of the phonology of words, but not in the acquisition of their 
meaning. Meaning is not something that can be obeyed and copied (p. 172).  
The grammar and underlying mechanism of language is not copied by imitation, 
even if Susan Blackmore uses the distinction copy-the-product and copy-the-instruction 
distinction with the example of the recipe of pumpkin soup, the concept of copy-the-
product is not sufficient to explain language acquisition. Because, there is no clear 
instruction in the course of language acquisition like a recipe for food, instructions must 
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be inferred from other’s use of language and this also includes a subject’s intervention.  
 Hence, as in the case of Chomskian linguistic, something can be copied or 
internalized without imitating another; even imitation is used here in a broad sense. 
Moreover a considerable part of culture consists of not only information packages but 
also something that cannot be actualized to express. Deleuze (1969/1990) handles this 
topic in the case of the distinction between meaning and sense.  Something in 
communication is expressed that is not an expression or a proposition, neither 
manifestation, nor demonstration, a kind of non-entity, incorporeal, unlimited, unfixed 
turns out Deleuze calls sense. It is an “irreducible entity, at the surface of thing, a pure 
event which inheres or subsists in the proposition” (p. 19). Meaning is corporeal 
actualized form of sense. But sense has virtual existence; it has neither physical nor 
mental existence. Some phrases in public language have no meaning but those who live 
in that society can understand some sense. The feeling of disgust is an example of sense. 
In Western culture eating an insect is regarded as disgusting, but we have never seen 
somebody who eats an insect and this leads him to pain, or nobody warns us not to eat 
an insect, we infer that from something intangible, however a Chinese person can eat an 
insect with pleasure. Thus, there are no certain expressed prohibition, certain behavior or 
concept that can lead us not to eat an insect; this sense of disgust is a part of culture. If 
Susan Blackmore is right, culture is made up by memes, how could we identify this 
personal sense – personal but interestingly shared with the other member of society- 
which is a part of culture? A great deal of culture has a virtual existence, has only sense 
but no expressible meaning. Hence, imitation as a tool for explaining culture is only 
partially useful.  
As a conclusion, in this section it is asserted that there is no common, agreed, 
single definition of culture. The definition memeticists and Blackmore espouse is a very 
simple definition that was actually put forward at the beginning of anthropology and 
there are too many criticisms of these definitions. Blackmore accepts the Enlightenment 
concepts of culture, as a common property of humans that disenthrall us from the state 
of nature, but in the German tradition culture is seen as a feature that does not drive a 
line between human and nature, but between two nations, a historical existence of a 
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nation. Blackmore is anthropology-blind and has no certain definition of culture. Her 
explanations never mention those critical concepts such as symbol, pattern, function, 
power or language. She simply sees culture as a means to transform ideas. She attempts 
to solve the essence of culture without a identifying what culture is.  
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4.2. Metaphysical criticism: The Problem of Analogy 
 
An important problem associated with the matter of culture is memetics’ analogies. 
Like all cultural evolutionists, memeticists start with the possibility of understanding 
culture through nature. However this presumption has some problems and this section 
will be devoted to the problems caused by the analogical reasoning of memeticists.  
 
The father of memetics Richard Dawkins (1976), launched his project with a 
metaphysical presumption, which is often overlooked. He claims, “Cultural evolution is 
analogous to the natural evolution”(p. 169). This claim does not depend on empirical 
observation or any observable fact; rather it is a metaphysical claim. This claim at the 
very starting point of memetics can be reduced to its scientific value in a brute sense and 
casts doubt on Dawkins’ strident positivism. Although every incipient science 
necessarily depends on one way or another to an analogy, it is claimed here these 
analogies can be used only operationally rather than axiomatically. Analogy can be used 
in various way in scientific investigation, for example simulation of a lakes flow in 
computer environment can be taken as a kind of analogy or when using the phrase “the 
electric current” the motion of the electricity resembled water, or explaining society as 
an imitation of human body. These kinds of analogies, which are explored as 
metaphorical, explanatory or instrumental purposes, are acceptable in the scope of 
modern science. Nevertheless, when one says God is analogous to human, because he 
created human in his own image, this claim is a metaphysical claim that cannot be 
proven in the domain of science, it transgresses the limit of science. Ironically, although 
Richard Dawkins sees himself as pure scientist who is supposedly free from all residues 
of the darkness of the middle Ages and condemns religion at every turn, he used 
methods frequently used in theology and rhetoric. 
 
Analogy mostly used in logic, theology, and metaphysic in medieval theories, the 
concept routinely discussed in commentaries on the logic of Aristotle and especially 
used for metaphysics and rhetoric.  There are three types of analogies in Greek thought, 
in terms of proportionality, attribution and likeness. When one says that a point is related 
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to a line, or a sea is related to ocean, namely a property that exists in smaller portion 
might exist in a greater portion. This is called analogy of proportionality. If one 
resembles two things one of which is primary and the other is secondary, this called 
analogy of attribution. For example, flowing is said to be analogical term when said of a 
river and traffic, because while a river flows in primary sense, the phrase flowing that is 
attributed to traffic is used secondarily in the meaning of not stagnant. The third type, 
analogy of likeness is used for the relation between God and creatures. Creatures are 
called good for the reason that their goodness imitates or reflects the goodness of God. 
This also often called analogy of imitation or participation (Ashworth, 2009). 
 
This Greek categorization of analogy adopted to Islamic philosophy by the Arabic 
philosophers Al Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes in order to solve the problems caused 
by Qur’an’s verses that metaphorically and symbolically describe God as speaking, 
sitting or having some feelings. They used “analogy of being (of reality between God 
and world and among created realities); analogy of meaning (of words and concepts); 
and analogical thinking (of conception by proportionalities)” (Ross, 2005, p. 139). The 
concept of analogy is also handled by Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Cardinal 
Catejan (Ashworth, 2009). 
 
The most discussed types of analogy in medieval times are the analogy of attribution 
and in the case of ontology the analogy of participation. Richard Dawkins’ analogy 
between nature and culture can be seen as analogy of attribution, because he sees nature 
as primary and culture as secondary as we see in the Enlightenment conception of culture 
that assumes there were nature and humans with their extraordinary capacity freed 
themselves from being obliged to the strict order of nature. But as it is shown this kind of 
analogy was particularly used for the purposes of theology or rhetoric. Taking this as an 
assumption of memetics, it is possible to say it passes beyond the limits of science; which 
is explicitly a metaphysical (non-scientific) bias. 
 
Analogical reasoning was also the vital characteristic of the pre-modern way of 
gaining knowledge on things. As Michael Foucault (1966/2005) presents, in his book 
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The Order of The Things, the episteme of the sixteenth centuries depends on four types 
of similitude: convenience, emulation, analogy and sympathy. For him analogy 
superimposes convenience and emulation, “like the latter, it makes possible the 
marvelous confrontation of resemblances across space; but it also speaks, like the 
former, of adjacencies, of bonds and joints” (p. 23). Analogy has limitless power that 
can possibly get together almost everything. Foucault states it: 
 
…It can extend, from a single given point, to an endless number of relationships. For 
example, the relation of the stars to the sky in which they shine may also be found: 
between plants and the earth, between living beings and the globe they inhabit, 
between minerals such as diamonds and the rocks in which they are buried, between 
sense organs and the face they animate, between skin moles and the body of which 
they are the secret marks... An analogy may also be turned around upon itself 
without thereby rendering itself open to dispute. This reversibility and this 
polyvalency endow analogy with a universal field of application. Through it, all the 
figures in the whole universe can be drawn together (p. 24) 
The unrestricted power of resemblance or analogy was devaluated by the arrival 
of modern way of thinking. Representation is replaced by analogy and reflection 
displaced by measurement, order, and categorization. Hence, Dawkins’ analogy is 
corresponding to the pre-modern, allegedly unscientific thinking.  
 
 Like her forerunner, Susan Blackmore accepts this presumption and by adopting 
it to the Dennett’s idea of algorithm, she constructs a syllogism.  Her idea of “universal 
Darwinism” is grounded on this syllogism. This conditioned syllogism can be 
formulated as such: 
Major Promise: If one thing has the properties of variation, selection and retention, it 
must be examined in Darwinian paradigm. 
Minor Promise: Culture has the properties of variation, selection and retention 
 
Conclusion:  Hence, culture must be examined in Darwinian paradigm. 
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A conditioned or hypothetical syllogism can be judged according to its formal structure 
and the content of its promises. In this example there is no problem in terms of formal 
logic, but it has some problems about its content of promises. It is similar to this 
example: 
 
If he drank the poison, he would die  
He died  
 
Hence, he drank the poison 
   
           Here, the conclusion is invalid because the drinking of poison did not entail the 
death. In the first premise, the consequence (he would die) is more general and does not 
necessitate the antecedent (poison). He could die in a different way; hence the 
conclusion is invalid. Blackmore makes a similar mistake. The syllogism is formally 
valid, but the antecedent and consequent do not necessitate each other, thus the 
conclusion is undependable. This is called the fallacy of inferring a solid conclusion 
from contingent or uncertain arguments (Emiroğlu, 1993). 
 
    Blackmore’s two promises have doubtful arguments, so a certain conclusion 
cannot be inferred from this syllogism. Everything that has changeability cannot be 
counted as Darwinian. Darwinism can also be described in various ways; there is no 
single accepted definition for formulating Darwinism in a nutshell. For example, 
according to eminent Darwinist Ernst Mayr (1994) the essence of Darwinism is 
“population thinking” rather than the properties of variation, selection and retention. 
Moreover a worldwide known evolutionist Stephen J. Gould (1997) insists that cultural 
evolution is not Darwinian but Lamarckian, that is, it depends on inheritance of acquired 
characteristic. Further, what is meant by variation, selection (which kind of selection), 
and retention is ambiguous as well. Hence, Darwinism does not necessarily entail these 
three properties. 
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As to the minor premise, it is evident that some kind of variation occurs in culture, 
also something is retained, and something fades way, but the problem is that whether 
these notions, variation, selection and retention, which are exploited to explain natural 
selection are the same as used in cultural evolution. This point is also doubtful. 
According to Gould (1992) variation used in natural evolution is not the same as cultural 
evolution because the latter can be faster in magnitude than the former, retention is not 
the same as Darwin’s natural evolution because cultural evolution is in Lamarckian 
form, and finally their typologies of change are completely different.  
 
Thus, Blackmore’s two promises are not solid and the conclusion from them might 
not be dependable. These kinds of logical fallacies caused from contents examined by 
Aristotle in his book Sophistic Refutations. For Aristotle, one of the most common 
fallacies sophists made is using contentious arguments. They used these arguments for 
confusing and then convincing the audiences. Blackmore (1999) uses this kind of 
rhetorical tricks, instead of strengthening her arguments, she invites us to taking meme’s 
eye view, because once you take this view, then whole project of memetics become 
acceptable. We should firstly have faith in memes, and then world starts to appear 
different way. 
 
 Memetics’ unproven analogies and invalid syllogism decrease its scientific value. 
Maria Kronfeldner’s (2011) work on Darwinian analogical reasoning from nature to 
culture, she detects three types of mistakenly used analogy as origination analogy, 
ontological analogy and egoism analogy. She uses three criteria to judge the 
appropriateness of these analogies. Firstly, an analogy has to be descriptively adequate; 
namely, it must lead to a correct description of the phenomenon at issue; secondly it had 
to have explanatory force, that is, it should contribute to an explanation of phenomena 
rather than being tautological, and finally, it should have heuristic value, it must add to 
something to our already available explanation. She applies these criteria to the above-
mentioned analogies. 
First of them is origination analogy. It refers to:  
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The origin of certain features of ideas is analogous to the origin of the certain 
features of organisms. The origination analogy therefore refers to general pattern 
of how certain changes arise whether this pattern is analogous to God-like 
creation, to a Lamarckian kind of evolution or Darwinian (Kronfeldner, 2011, p. 
9). 
This is about the selection process, which is the third requirement of being 
Darwinian according to Blackmore, that is to say whether the selection process occurred 
in a Darwinian manner, God-like creation, or a Lamarckian fashion. To put it in another 
way, the problem is whether selection in cultural evolution is blind selection or not. For 
Kronfeldner distinguishing the types of variation is necessary to understand the selection 
processes. The first of them is random variation, which refers to variation without any 
foresight or direction. But this blind variation cannot be attributed to cultural change, 
because no sane person can say Shakespeare haphazardly wrote his sonnets without any 
directed education, interacting with an intellectual circle, or some political purposes. The 
second selection pattern is unjustified variation, which claims that Popper’s falsification 
theory is analogous to nature. Ideas are selected according to a process of error 
elimination. But we know that there are various untouched superstitions retained in 
modern times that are not discarded by the process of falsification. The third one is 
undirected selection, which refers to the rising of novelty without benefit of wisdom 
(Kronfeldner, 2011). Hence, Blackmore’s minor promise, which assumes that culture 
has the property of variation, is casted doubt and is made ambiguous by this uncertainty.  
 
 Kronfeldner (2011) purports that the second disanalogy used by memeticists is 
the ontological analogy, which is about the entities involved in natural evolution and 
cultural change. She explains it as follows: 
 
The ontological analogy includes the claim that those kinds of entities that are 
the building blocks of culture share basic features with those entities that are the 
material basis of biological evolution. The entities that are discussed today are 
not complex artifacts as analogous to organisms, but ideas, values, or instances 
of behavior as analogous to genes (p. 75). 
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This analogy depends on heredity or retention, another criteria purported by 
Dawkins and Blackmore for counting something as Darwinian. The vital feature of 
genes is their persistence through time by the process of replication. Memes can do the 
same because they are replicators. Thus, this analogy includes cultural units as 
replicators. However the two arguments, first, there are such ideational units of cultural 
heredity and, second, they are replicators, are contestable. 
 
 As it was shown in the first section, culture cannot be treated as the compilation 
of the divided, isolated ideational units. Memes are not entities in themselves, but their 
existence depends on human inference, because it is about meaning. Unlike unchanged 
Dawkinsian genes, memes are context-dependent entities. As Schmid (2004) puts it:  
 
There is no equivalent to the primordial DNA (that is ontologically objective) in 
memetic evolution. Because it is ultimately about meaning, memetics is always 
and inevitably about ‘us’, i.e. the forms of life that make it possible to bestow 
things such as certain sequences of sounds with meaning (p. 112). 
 
There is also not always one-to-one matching between a behavior and the 
meaning of meme. Blink of an eye can be evaluated as sincerity, deception, or courting 
in different contexts. Thus, although some types of distinct biological units of heredity 
can be found, we cannot an logical determinable distinct units of culture.  
 
 In addition to that, unlike genes that reside in an exclusive area in chromosomes 
called DNA, Blackmore’s memes have the problem of material identification that was 
discussed in chapter 3. Even if the existence of memes as ideational units of culture is 
accepted, they cannot be counted as a replicator because of its high rate of changeability. 
As Attran (2001) states: 
 
Unlike genetic transmission and replication, high fidelity transmission of cultural 
information is the exception rather than the rule. Constant and rapid “mutation” 
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of information during cultural transmission results in endlessly varied 
proliferation of information that nevertheless continues to meet modular input 
conditions (p. 370). 
In order to escape this problem, memeticists claim there are changes in memetic 
transmission, but there is something that remains unchanged, what are changed are some 
externalities of memes or its phenotypic expression. 
 According to the Kronfeldner (2011) ontological analogy made by memeticists is 
“explanatorily and heuristically trivial by first buying a definition of culture everyone 
uses already wrapping it in evolutionary language, and then selling it as an explanation” 
(p. 106). The definition of a replicator in strict sense is not completely attributed to 
memes and they have no material realization unlike genes; thus, memetics ontological 
analogy is explanatorily trivial. Memes are an adaptation of certain kind of 
anthropological definition of culture; adding nothing new except a science-fiction 
language. Blackmore’s definition of memes, that is, something transmitted by imitation, 
is no news, because everybody accepts that there should be something similar in cultural 
transmission. Moreover, Blackmore’s notion of imitation as a means of cultural 
transmission in wider sense resembles what social psychologists have found about social 
learning. Thus, the analogy of ontology is heuristically trivial as well. So, ontological 
analogy fails to meet the criteria cited by Kronfeldner.  
 The last but not least type of analogy is called by Kronfeldner (2011) egoism 
analogy: it refers to gene-based selection conceived for explaining natural evolution. 
Similarly a meme-based selection is developed for explanation of cultural evolution. A 
gene-centered worldview, as it was explained in chapter 1, claims genes are the basic 
units of selection by which everything in biological evolution can be explained. The 
survival of genes is the main aim of biological domain and creatures are merely vehicles 
for these all mighty genes. This theory is mirrored in memetics, that is memes are the 
basic unit of selection in cultural evolution and all that we see around us as cultural is 
merely phenotypic effects of these selfish memes. “This idea does not only comprise 
that there are memes, it includes that memes and not minds explain culture”(p. 9). 
According to this analogy, the survival of the memes is the core of the cultural evolution 
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regardless of the selective environment. However, as it is explained in the previous 
chapter, the concept of survival of the fittest leads to tautology by saying “such a 
statement that the successful ones are the successful ones” (p. 116). Without a selfish 
cultural unit, all the explanations of memetics become heuristically trivial because they 
add nothing new to the traditional theories of cultural transmission. As Kronfeldner 
(2011) point out: 
Since humans are necessarily the selective environments of memes, memes 
cannot spread independently of their human carriers. Memes cannot be selfish 
since they do not possess a fitness that is independent of their human carriers. 
Without taking the relation between memes and their selective environment into 
account, the claim that diffusion can be explained by the differential survival-of-
the-fittest-meme becomes tautological… Memeticists tend to misconstrue the 
role individual play in culture and they fight against the straw man of a too rigid 
rationalistic picture of human decision-making. Since humans create, transmit 
and select memes, they are the primary causal agents of cultural change (p. 136). 
Thus, memeticists principally depend on analogies that are peculiar to pre-
modern thinking, as Foucault has shown. Since these metaphysical analogies are not 
empirically proven and have no scientific value in a strict sense. But making these kinds 
of metaphysical analogies might spring from some ideological concern. Getting two 
different categories together cannot be seen as merely a detached intellectual activity; 
rather it reflects certain discursive prejudices. Some of the probable discursive biases 
will be handled in the following section.  
 
4.3. Discursive criticism: The Ideology of Third Culture  !
As John Maddox (quoted from Gruenwald (2005)) states “Science, like art, is not 
a copy of nature but a re-creation of her. We are made nature by the act of discovery, in 
the poem or in the theorem” (p. 141). Making axiomatic analogies is such kind of 
bricolage. The need to establish analogy between two different things arises from a 
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certain hierarchy of values and worldviews. Things are juxtaposed according to a 
number of pre-existent, deep-seated values embedded in society. Analogies of memetics, 
then, mirrored some disguised values and biases some of which will be displayed in this 
section. 
First of all memetics can be seen as a new version of “Social Darwinism “ 
ushered in by Spencer and August Comte at the very beginning of the discipline of 
sociology. Overextending the Darwinian theory of evolution to the cultural sphere and 
transferring some insight acquired from biology directly to the cultural domain by 
establishing an analogy between society and organisms. However, particularly the 
application of the concept of survival-of-the-fittest used in biology to the societies and 
history made possible to intellectually legitimize some notorious doctrines such as 
racism, imperialism, colonialism, etc.  
Although there are some nuances between memetics and social Darwinism, 
memetics is a new attempt to naturalize culture or an understanding of culture by means 
of inscribing biological methods to the humanities. Assertive scientists sometimes 
embark on offering some visions to the implacable problems of social sciences and also 
sometimes those social theories emulate the established sciences to be accepted as a 
science in their domain of investigation. The trust in the power of sciences allows 
memetics to create a theory of culture based on biology. Since, relying on the success of 
his gene-selectionism, Dawkins attempted to solve the concept of culture and cultural 
transmission that have been discussed for a long time in anthropology. This obvious 
remnant of positivist attitude is not new; as Poulschock (2001) puts it, “memetics is 
another colonization of the social sciences following the tradition inherent in social 
Darwinism, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology” (p. 69). 
Secondly, memetics, especially in the works of Blackmore’s forerunners 
Dawkins and Dennett, is keen on denouncing the role of religion and the notion of God 
that are condemned as The Viruses of Mind or a good trick of mind. Blackmore also, at 
the end of his book leads us to a kind of Zen Atheism. The theory of Darwin is no longer 
just a scientific theory to explain natural phenomena in this authors mind, rather it 
becomes a world view, a panacea for every problem, a metanarrative, a new messianic 
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challenge that would annihilate all the ancient misbeliefs that crippled our vision by the 
destructive power of “universal acid”; and also would bring us salvation and tranquility 
by the power of ‘universal Darwinism’ that may solve all conflicts in a single vision. 
Memetics aspires to perform the role of the religion and ideologies by preaching some 
type of atheism Alister McGrath (2010) puts these writers name as “atheist apologetics”. 
These apologetics, like a zealous missionary willing to cast doubt on the faith of God 
and “restating the legitimate role of the sciences in the face of the rival claims of the 
humanities or religions” (p. 334). They also fight against the attacks of postmodern 
attempts, such as historicism, hermeneutic, deconstruction, which discredited the aims of 
sciences for explaining nature totally in its reality, by generating some universal, 
archetypical, timeless, principles such as the selfish genes, Darwinian algorithm, 
Universal Darwinism etc. that capable of being applied throughout the universe. 
McGrath (2010) explains this world view as: 
Darwinism is here understood more in terms of an ideology, a worldview, 
extending beyond the limited domain of the biological to embrace the cultural 
and intellectual realms. Nature, many now argue, is religiously ambivalent, 
making the manner of its interpretation of critical importance (p. 350). 
Evolutionary biologist and geneticist Richard Lewontin (1993) also criticizes 
these kinds of the encroachments of genetics and biology. He resembles today’s science 
to ancient institutions that make the world legitimate.  For him there are three basic 
types of these institutions that serve as justification and control the stability of society:  
First the institution as a whole must appear to drive from sources outside of 
ordinary human social struggle. It must not seem to be the creation of political, 
economic and social forces, but to descend into society from a supra-human 
source. Second, the ideas, pronouncement, rules and results of the institution’s 
activity must have validity and a transcendent truth that goes beyond any 
possibility of human compromise or human error. Its explanations and 
pronouncements must seem to be true in an absolute sense and to drive somehow 
from an absolute source. They must be true for all times and all place. And 
finally the institutions must have a certain mystical and veiled quality so that its 
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innermost operation is not completely transparent to everyone. It must have an 
esoteric language, which needs to be explained to the ordinary person by those 
who are especially knowledgeable and who can intervene between everyday life 
and mysterious sources of understanding and knowledge (p. 7). 
Indeed, Darwinism, and particularly memetics, has these three church-like 
qualities. They seem completely apolitical, they seem as they just interpret the solid 
consequences of the data of natural sciences by means of undeniably evident theories, 
which are absolute, universal, essential forms capturing the meaning of our world in its 
all facets. Dawkins, Dennett and Blackmore also are informed about the advances of 
current sophisticated sciences such as genetics, cybernetics, and consciousness studies, 
then they are the mediator between ordinary people and the reality, and thus they 
become a commentator of the unchangeable, universal truth that underlies every 
mystery. Hence, in this kind of Darwin reading the differences between religion or 
ideology and science becomes blurred.  
 Memetics and other Darwinian theories of culture have not only the features of 
religions, but also certain characteristics of ideology of modernism. First of all the 
categorical discrimination between inside and outside, or internal and external can be 
seen as the heritage of Descartes. Modern biology, through this memetics, presumes that 
there should be an internal domain, which is unchangeable, self-consistent and essential, 
and an external area, which is changeable, secondary, and inert, just as a medium. One 
of the consequences of this view is that a result or an affair could only be caused by a 
particular effect or factor. For example, a tiny bacillus called, Koch bacillus, which is an 
agent that comes from outside to disorder the routine functioning of the body, is the 
exact cause of tuberculosis. However, as Lewontin shows that there is no ineffective, 
stable nature or environment, organisms and their environment constantly affect and 
reconstruct each other, namely, medium is the massage. Another consequences of the 
Cartesian analytic world view is that all seemingly holistic things can be reduced to 
single particles as we learned from Newtonian differential equations. This atomistic 
thinking diffuses our entire conception of the life and world such as “the body consists 
of genes”, “the society consists of individuals”, “the mind consists of departments”, or 
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“culture consists of information bits”. As Lewontin (1993) states: 
So, the ideology of modern science, including modern biology, makes sense the 
atom or individual the causal source of all the properties of larger collections. It 
prescribes a way of studying the world, which is to cut up into the individual bits. 
It breaks the world down into independent autonomous domains, the internal and 
the external (p. 13). 
There is clearly truth in the belief that the world can be broken up into 
independent parts. But that is not a universal direction for the study of all nature. 
A lot of nature, as we shall see, can not broken up into independent part to be 
studied in isolation, and its pure ideology to suppose that it can (p. 15). 
As explained in first and second chapters, memeticists generally divide the world 
as internal, hidden causes, memes and genes, and their place, brain or artifacts and body, 
is just an ineffective medium that just helps their survival. Nature and culture can be cut 
up into two main atom-like entities, genes and memes, which are the explanation of 
everything. A problem in external or phenotypic world must be caused by internal 
genotypic or memotypic domain, and rectifying those particular units can only solve that 
problem. However, as explained in first chapter and here, neither culture, nor nature can 
be treated as something formed by amalgamation of independent, individual bits.  
Thirdly, the theory of memetics operates in a certain political economy, and 
either consciously or unconsciously, legitimizes the existence of the status quo. First of 
all, memetics reflects, like other Darwinians, basic laissez-faire economy or ideas of 
Manchester School of Economics that followed Darwin, which and depend on the 
“magic power of competition” (Schmid, 2000, p. 10). Selfish genes are always running 
after their own interest and have to compete with each other in order to get better a 
chance to survive, and the same is true of selfish memes too. They only associate if 
interest groups could get some advantage from that; otherwise they always seek to 
eliminate each other. Memes always behave like an imperialist who tries to get more 
room in mind for its expansion and like a crude capitalist, who resorts all trick to 
eliminate his rivals. Thus, memetics reflects some feature of the capitalist doctrine.  
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But, what is the memetics inconspicuous operation to legitimize the existent 
order and to cover inequalities. According to memetics and Susan Blackmore, all man-
made occasions are the result of competition of memes, regardless of its bearers. This is 
what the immediately mentioned discrimination of inside and outside, master cause and 
it bearer. If the Internet and the press are invented and sustained only for the sake of 
memes survival, then the media bosses are just fortunate bearers of the meme 
transformation memes. If the ideas compete each other to survive regardless of their 
content, then extremist Islamism can be discarded by making lots of propaganda. In this 
way it can be said that memetics unconsciously cover the social inequalities to legitimize 
sustaining of the neo-liberal system. This is so clear that it is even cited in a journal of 
biology. Geoffrey Miller (2000) says: 
The major problem is that meme theories tend to ignore the powerful institutions 
that dominate modern culture. This often leads meme theorists to misdescribe 
marketing and advertising phenomena as cultural evolution effects. Meme theory 
risks leading people into naïve passivity in the face of manipulative marketing by 
corporation churches and states (p. 436). 
Throwing aside the subject leads memetics to reduce all the phenomena to the 
unconscious, not-obligated particular entities, thus nobody can be accused for a bad 
states of affairs. This is also ridiculous from the standpoint of morality. What can we say 
according to memetics if one killed the other, who is the responsible here, the memes for 
killing or the bearer of it? Are television and the Internet sites the only broadcast for 
meme spreading or can they work for the memes of the most powerful? As Zizek (2002) 
expresses: 
What is obfuscated in such direct naturalization of the lets say World Wide Web 
or market is the set of power relations – of political decisions, of institutional 
conditions which necessary the organism like the Internet to thrive (p. 214). 
 
There is a political economy which drives the evolution of communication 
devices: financial institutions, military institutions and entertainment institutions have 
their own built-in motives for pushing a given set of memes on a culture, on a 
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population, on a global economy that is overlooked by Blackmore and memeticists.  
 Finally, and probably most importantly, memetics is a part of currently arising 
ideology its name coined by John Brockman (1995)  The Third Culture. This name was 
given in reference to C. P. Snow’s famous article The Two Cultures. British scientists 
and novelist C. P. Snow in his influential Rede Lecture put forwards the idea that 
Western intellectual life, despite of it enormous success, was split into two unconnected 
parts as literary intellectuals and scientists.  Snow (1961) describes it:  
Literary intellectuals at one pole - at the other scientists, and as the most 
representative physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension – sometimes hostility, and dislike, but most of all lack of 
understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other … Non-
scientist tend to think of scientist as brash and boastful, non-scientists have a 
rooted impression that the scientist are shallowly optimistic, unaware of man’s 
condition. On the other hand, the scientists believe that literary intellectuals 
totally lacking in foresight (p. 4-5) 
As clearly depicted in the quotation, in the 1960s literary intellectuals and 
scientists had sharply different interests, sometimes it is even possible to find a scientist 
who has never read a verse of Shakespeare, and  “the majority of the cleverest people in 
the western world have about physic as much insight into it as their Neolithic ancestors 
would have had” (p. 16). This warning had a deep impact on Western intellectual life, 
but, despite all the endeavors trying to combine the two cultures, an effective 
communication could not occur. Today, generally social scientists still see scientific 
formulas as hieroglyphics. The event of Social Text is a clear example to this lack of 
understanding. 
The strong belief in science was decreased by a sequence of events like the 
destruction of atom bomb, and multiple attacks from intellectuals who supported the 
claim of the demise of metanarratives.  After decades of power loss, currently a new 
intellectual movement has been arising since the 1990s when the failure of Marxism was 
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declared by the fall of Berlin Wall. After that time, the credibility of science is starting 
to gather its old strength through a new medium. The name of this new medium or “new 
cultural elite in science” (Vesna, 2001, p. 122) is called “The Third Culture.”  The 
founder of the Edge Foundation, John Brockman (1995) describes this approach as 
follows: 
The third culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical 
world who, through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the 
traditional intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, 
redefining who and what we are (p. 7). 
 
He asserts that traditional intellectuals who have studied the topic like Freud, 
Marx, and modernism are not sufficient today and American intellectual life has shifted 
from gradually marginalized traditional intellectuals to new popular scientists. 
Traditional intellectuals lost their power, “journalist wrote up and professors wrote 
down” (p. 17).  New scientists either do not need intellectuals to interpret their 
complicated work and to infer some ideas for our life, or they are not those who are 
closed in their lab and dealing with some odd issues detached from common sense; 
instead, they are still cope with elusive, complicated topics but they start to interpret and 
write down their own works. “Today, third-culture thinkers tend to avoid the middleman 
and endeavor to express their deepest thoughts in a manner accessible to the intelligent 
reading public… “’Science’ has today become ‘public culture’” (p. 18). They are 
dealing with the topic that can affect the life of everybody such as genetics, 
neuroscience, dark matter, time travel and so on. “They try to give these fundamental 
questions: ‘Where did the universe come from? Where did life come from? Where did 
mind come from?’ Emerging out of the Third culture is a new natural philosophy” (p. 
20). They become a new authority that can obtain the most formidable ontological and 
epistemological problems with their high knowledge on hard sciences. The members of 
this new movement come from diverse areas; Brockman counts some of these eminent 
scientists and thinkers:  
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Who are the third-culture intellectuals? The list includes the individuals featured 
in this book, whose work and ideas give meaning to the term: the physicists Paul 
Davies, J. Doyne Farmer, Murray Gell-Mann, Alan Guth, Roger Penrose, Martin 
Rees, and Lee Smolin; the evolutionary biologists Richard Dawkins, Niles 
Eldredge, Stephen Jay Gould, Steve Jones, and George C. Williams; the 
philosopher Daniel C. Dennett; the biologists Brian Goodwin, Stuart Kauffman, 
Lynn Margulis, and Francisco J. Varela; the computer scientists W. Daniel Hillis, 
Christopher G. Langton, Marvin Minsky, and Roger Schank; the psychologists 
Nicholas (p. 19-20). 
 
     The number of these figures can be increased, but their common feature is their 
popularity. Their books sell millions of copies across the world. The other common 
feature is that they specialize in some topic that only a few people in the world can 
understand; yet they express their findings in a way that an average intelligent person 
can understand. Moreover, all of these thinkers cope with the age-old ontological 
problems such as the essence or meaning of life, the essence of time and space, man’s 
place in the universe, the reasons that underlie our purpose and emotions. Slovaj Zizek 
(2002) singles out three features of this new trend: 
1. As a rule, we are not dealing with scientists themselves, but with authors who 
address a large public, whose success exceeds by a long way the public appeal of 
Cultural Studies. 
2. As in the case of Cultural Studies, we are dealing with a hegemonized field, but 
with a rhizomatic multitude connected through “family resemblances”, within 
which authors are often engaged in violent polemics, but interdisciplinary 
connections also flourish  
3. In general, authors who are active in this domain are sustained by a kind of 
missionary zeal, by a shared awareness that they are all participating in a unique 
shift in the global paradigm of knowledge (p. 212). 
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      Susan Blackmore is a good example of this ideology. She is trained in 
psychology, also dealing with consciousness studies. Her products are not highly 
scientific works but popular works. She works in a highly interdisciplinary manner. 
Finally she zealously works for convincing others of her unifying standpoint, i.e. 
Universal Darwinism that leads to paradigm shift.  
 
 The problem of self has been discussed, especially after the Second World War 
period, in philosophy, sociology and literary theory. Post-modern thinkers put down 
self-consisting identities and modern cogito. The idea of self is re-evaluated by what 
Zizek says “Buddhism cognitivizm (Hubert Dreyfus, Francesco Varela, Fritjof Capra, 
Susan Blackmore), who asserts that the idea of self is a delusion and “I am nothing but a 
bundle of elusive and heterogeneous (mental) events”(Zizek, 2002, p. 206). Blackmore 
shares this stance and argues that the idea of self is mere an illusion that stems from 
memes battle of survival.  
 Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach with its totalizing concept of Universal 
Darwinism, assertion on meaning of life, ideas and believes, and her attempt to 
naturalization of culture for certain purposes, is a part of The Third Culture ideology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 133!
4.4. Philosophical Criticism: The Specter of Plato 
 As was mentioned in the first chapter, philosopher Daniel Dennett suggests that 
what is revolutionary in Darwin’s account is its attack on Platonic essentialism. Whereas 
Plato and Aristotle believe species exist as a form, which is unchangeable and 
permanent, Darwin put forward the idea that species are not eternal things that exists in 
accordance with an order, but rather they are changeable units and come into being 
haphazardly. Claiming species have no essence is indeed a revolutionary strike to 
essentialism. For Dennet and Blackmore, memetics as a Darwinian theory of culture 
sustains this revolutionary assault. 
 Indeed, memetics, at first glance, seems highly anti-essentialist and compatible 
with current attacks on Platonism made in contemporary philosophy. But as Whitehead 
(1978) notes, “European philosophical tradition are that is consists of a series of 
footnotes to Plato” (p. 39). This does not mean all thinkers use Plato’s system or works 
on his concepts but “his personal endowments, his wide opportunities for experience at a 
great period of civilization” (p. 39). Extirpating Plato from our minds is not a simple 
task. Plato often haunts our ideas and we cannot help ourselves to get rid of his heritage. 
 At first blush, memetics seems congruent with Deleuzian and Derridian attempts 
to overturn Platonism. Platonism is an abstract idealism “dedicated to the reification of 
transcendent, supersensible forms. It is dualistic, privileging soul over body, essence 
over existence, form over matter”(Corrigan & Turner, 2007, p. 1). It depends on the 
distinction between intelligible and phenomenal, and soul and body. It is a “posting two 
world separated by an abyss. In this picture, the sensible world is envisaged as a 
misleading snare of illusion, which should be dismissed as illusory by reference to the 
other world of transcendental reality” (Lane, 2001, p. 55). Platonism essentially claims 
this sensible world is not what it appears to be but there are different causes that underlie 
these phenomenal things, namely there is a real world beyond our senses, which is 
superior and deserves attention and a sensible world in which we live in through 
everyday life. Deleuze and Derrida seek to break this dichotomy by blurring the 
relationship of the original and its copy. Deleuze develops the notion of “simulacra” to 
make the hierarchy of the relation between the original and copy upside down. In Plato’s 
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thought, distinction between the authentic and the fake is made by evaluating something 
to its ascending to the eidos or Ideas. “The participants are put in the hierarchy of 
resemblance, the higher being the most similar to the original identity of eidos” 
(Koyuncu, 2008, p. 15).  For Deleuze the distinction in which Plato’s thought operates is 
not between model and the copy but between the copy and the simulacra. 
Copies are defined by their ascension towards the ideal insofar as they have an 
internal resemblance to the original identity of the eidos. Simulacra, on the other 
hand, are constituted upon a disparity, which is defined by a descent from the 
truth of ideals. Thus, the world of the idea does not serve only to constitute an 
opposition to the world of appearances, but more importantly, in doing so, it 
guarantees the justification of another distinction between the true images and 
false ones (Koyuncu, 2008, p. 16). 
This Deleuzian affirmation of simulacra in which the position of the original and 
the copy is indistinguishable means the affirmation of differences rather than sameness 
is the essential feature of ideas. For Deleuze there is not a hidden original thing or a 
model behind the appearances, which one can reach it by transgressing the disguises or 
the illusion of repetition or copies. Deleuze reverses the Platonic position by devaluating 
the positive meaning of the original or the essence and avoiding the economy of one and 
many by displacing it with multiplicity.  
 Derrida also attacks Platonism in his book Dissemination. Plato focuses on the 
notion of pharmakon,  to study the relationship between the original and the supplement, 
or the principal and the secondary. In Phaedrus writing is presented as pharmakon, an 
aid or a cure and also a poison for memory. Writing presented as dead knowledge 
whereas speech is living knowledge, writing is less truthful and reliable than speech. The 
dead writing is a copy, a degraded version of living speech, which depends on the 
presence of speaker. Derrida blurred the hierarchy of writing and speech through the 
notion of imitation: 
A perfect imitation is no longer an imitation. If one eliminates the tiny difference 
tha
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would render the imitator absolutely different: the imitator would become 
another being no longer referring to the imitated. The imitator would become 
another being no longer referring to the imitated. The imitation does not 
correspond to its essence, is not what it is –imitation- unless it is in some way at 
fault or reader default. It is bad by nature. It is only good insofar as it is bad. 
Since (de)fault is inscribe within it has no nature: nothing is properly its own. 
Ambivalent, playing with itself by hollowing itself out good and evil at once- 
undecidably mimēsis is akin to the pharmakon (Derrida, 1981, p. 139). 
Thus, for Derrida, pharmakon and mimesis are notions in which the superiority 
of the original or substantial over the copy or additional becomes blurred. This operation 
of disorienting casts doubt on Platonic distinctions. Thus Derrida and Deleuze tried to 
break the hegemony of the single, central truth underlying everything. Does not 
memetics say so? Memetics claims that there is no true, dependable, certain idea rather; 
all ideas and beliefs are the copy of the copies like simulacrum. Memetics attacks the 
priority and anteriority of a truth by cherishing the imitation as the basic mechanism of 
the social world. Ideas are not things over appearances or are not those that reflect the 
order of nature and are not representations of things, but rather they are pions of the 
infinite inner-play of cultural evolution. Memetics ideas have no essence, they are 
always already copies, their order is not a pre-existing, intended structure, rather it is just 
a product of the random relationship of multiple, contingent factors, which have no 
center, no designing authority. In this sense, memetics seems compatible with the 
postmodern attempts of overturning the Platonic system and its dichotomies.  
However, although many similarities can be found between the assaults of post-
structuralism and deconstructionism to Platonism and memetics’ suggestions, memetics 
has essential features of Platonism in its essence. While memetics seems to be a 
revolutionary idea against Platonism, it reproduces Plato’s ideas and invokes the specter 
of Plato in the guise of evolutionary theory. There are really considerable parallelisms 
between Plato’s account and memetic explanations. Memetics’ invocation of Plato will 
be shown here in three main points. 
 First of all, Plato is known for his discovery of the theory of ideas, and genes and 
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memes used by memetics is similar to this theory. For Plato, “The world that appears to 
our senses is in some way defective and filled with error, but there is a more real and 
perfect realm, populated by entities (called ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’) that are eternal, 
changeless” (Kraut, 2011 p. 2). In Timaeus, Plato explicitly develops his theory of ideas, 
as Annas (2003) says: 
 
[For Plato] the real world is not, as we uncritically take it to be, the world around 
us that our senses report to us; the real world is rather what we grasp in thought 
when exercising our minds in abstract philosophical argument, in particular 
arguments which lead to what Plato calls Forms (p. 77). 
 
 Plato’s ideas (form, pattern, style) are such things like absolute goodness or 
absolute beauty that are not to be found in the realm of sense experience, which 
philosophers must pursue them by pure reason. Abstract reasoning can only apprehend 
reality. Ideas like Just or Good that cause all the individual cases of just and good in 
phenomenal world, exist as entities inaccessible to our senses. What we see in this world 
are the objects that are similar to the ideas, in their imperfect manifestation. The reality 
of what we acknowledge as beautiful in the sense-experience is evaluated according to 
its ascendance to the real entity, the idea of Beauty. These ideas are eternal and 
unchanging. “They are not subjected to becoming or perishing. Each is always the same 
in itself” (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 69). True knowledge is the knowledge of these stable 
forms that partake in the sensible world and exist independent of this world. “Each form 
is what explains, is even cause of, those particular things at the phenomenal level that 
share its name and ‘participate’ in or ‘resemble’ it” (Rowe, 105). But, we can only reach 
adequate explanation of things only by knowing the ideas. 
 
 How can we obtain these eternal entities to find the real causes of the events and 
redeem ourselves from the illusion of sense, doxata? In order to reach a dependable 
knowledge Plato distinguishes four types of state of mind, only two of which lead us to 
the truth. First of them is eikasia, which means that apprehension of images and illusion. 
Second is pistis means belief about the visible world. These two ways of knowing are 
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doxata that is not leading us to the knowledge of reality. The other two ways is the real 
type of thinking dianoia and noesis. Diaonia is “both the process of reasoning used in 
mathematics and the state of knowledge resulting from it” (Melling, 1987, p. 106). It is 
deductive reasoning used in mathematics. But, the supreme kind of thinking is noesis, 
which means that “pure abstract dialectical reasoning which moves from hypothesis to 
first principles, about eternal intelligible realities”(Melling, 1987, p. 106). Noetic 
reasoning can lead us to the essence of things, to the realm of ideas.  “But the weakness 
and needs of body distracts us from the perception of reality. The body’s needs and its 
weakness distracts us, pleasure and pain exercise an obsessive influence on us which 
distorts our perception of reality” (Melling, 1987, p. 66). To Plato, one must abandon 
ordinary deeds and give importance to reckoning ideas to reach the reality of everything.  
 
 Now, let us remember what memetics says. For Blackmore’s memetics all that we 
see in this world depends on the replicators: memes and genes. These phenomenal 
bodies and the notion of self as it appears to us are doxa, an illusion, in Platonic terms it 
corresponds to eikasia and pistis. The reality lies beyond our sensory experiences, it can 
only be reached by abstract reasoning. Genes and memes exist under the veil (aletheia) 
of illusions. Bodies are not real, they are just products of genes, which are unchanging, 
ever lasting, not perishing, the cause of everything in the living world and it is present 
(parousia) in every living being. What seems to us as ideas, beliefs, and selves are not 
real, but in reality there is a realm of memes, under the guise of self and ideas, which 
shape our sociality. In memetics, reality is divided up into two camps: the sensible world 
and the intelligible world. The latter is essential, unchanging and the former is accidental 
and perishing, just the bearer of the forms (genes). Our everyday experience is imbued 
with illusion, we espouse some ideas, we kill ourselves for some ideals, we devote 
ourselves to some certain individuals, but these are not real, they are the gene machines 
and the meme machines. And here is the core idea of Platonism, if we disport ourselves 
from these illusion and take memes eye-view, then the universe would seem to us 
different than what it appears to be. Ideas, bodies, species are just the reflections of 
memes and genes, which are eternal and can survive in variety of different bodies. A 
gene for altruism remains always as a genes for altruism, the same as itself. Similarly, a 
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meme for altruism, although variation is an essential figure in meme transmission and it 
is always proliferated by differentiating, remains the same, and variants of this meme 
can be determined to its sameness to the memes for altruism. Thus, the status of memes 
and genes in the memetic account is highly familiar to the position of ideas in Platonic 
account. Kronfield (2011) noticed this hidden essentialism, the politics of identity that 
operate at the bosom of Blackmore’s memetics. She explains: 
 
It is important to realize that this “essentialism” is similar to the essentialism that 
is hidden in the modern concept of hard inheritance. Acquired changes are mere 
temporary, arbitrary, or even “imperfect” realizations of the gene. These 
phenotypic realizations change according to the context, but the gene stays the 
same – except, of course, when mutations occur. If memes are analogous to genes, 
and if there is something (i.e., the interpretation of the meme) that changes from 
context to context, whereas the meme stays the same, then memes have a context-
dependent phenotypic “expression.” If there is no such context-independent 
material realization of the essential Darwinism-meme, then this means that memes 
do not have a DNA, as genes have a DNA that stays the same in different 
organisms, despite different phenotypic realizations. Thus is the meme a purely 
abstract entity without a clear material identification? (Kronfeldner, 2011, p. 79). 
 
Aunger also realizes the danger of essentialism in the account of Blackmore’s 
memetics. If we cannot manage to show the physical materiality of memes, then 
memetics would become a Platonic theory in which replicator resides in the domain of 
Forms and interactors live among us. What is transmitted in inheritance of genes is not 
the physical gene, i.e., not phosphate, sugar or hydrogen bond, but information about a 
character. Evolution conserves not the atoms but the necessary information of genes. “A 
gene is just a kind of ‘cybernetic abstraction,’ a message that is transmitted in a kind of 
magical way from generation to generation” (Aunger, 2002, p. 138). Aunger realizes 
that the memes defined as a substrate neutral entity would become a Platonic idea. 
Because of this danger, he devoted his book to show the locus of memes to prove the 
materiality of memes. However Blackmore is unaware of this danger, even philosopher 
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Dennett was not aware of this hidden essentialism. What is funny, Dawkins, alien to all 
these dangers, puts forwards his theory  in accordance with Platonism. He says: 
Plato would enjoy it: what passes down the line is an ideal essence of junk, of 
which each actual junk is an imperfect approximation” (Dawkins 1999: xii). 
Dawkins overtly confesses the Platonic essence of his own theory, so there is no 
need to say more on the similarity between meme theory and the theory of ideas. But, 
Platonism in memetics is not limited to this similarity. The second similarity is the 
distinction between the soul and the body, and  techna and physis, which are essential 
for Plato’s thought. Techna means the human capacity to convert nature for his own 
purposes. “It includes science art craft, navigation, commerce and activities involved in 
legal procedure. The most important techna in modern society is publicity and 
advertisement”(Moravscik, 1992, p. 12). In Gorgias, the techna of rhetoric is 
condemned in contrast to the genuine knowledge of the first principle episteme. Human 
artistic skill is the secondary form of natural order. Harvey (2009) says: 
In the Philebus, the relationship between human artistic production and the 
activities responsible for order in nature is one of microcosm to macrocosm, and 
Socrates’ comparison between the fire “in us” and the cosmic fire (hoion pur esti 
men pou par’ hêmin esti d’ en tô[i] panti; 29b9–10) shows that the principle 
operative at the micro level is importantly related to its macro level counterpart, 
the reason in the possession of Zeus (p. 19). 
  Natural order and human skill are similar but they are at different levels. Techna 
is dependent on human activity (praxis) and productivity (poiesis) and it is a teachable 
merit. Likewise, genes are responsible for natural order and memes are responsible for 
technai, the human skills and crafts that are transmittable. The distinction between 
physis and techna, nature and nurture survive in memetics in the form of the distinction 
between genes and memes. Further the soul-body opposition is a key feature in 
Platonism. “Indeed, he is often regarded as a paradigm of dualism, the position that soul 
and body (in modern versions mind and body) are radically different kinds of entity” 
(Annas, 2003, p. 65). Reasoning and self-motion is essential properties of soul for Plato. 
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Whereas bodies are temporal, the soul is immortal. The soul is the ruler and the director 
of bodies, the organizing principle of the bodies, the soul (psyche) is the life principle of 
living things and Platonists believe the soul is arrested inside the bodies and the task of 
the philosopher is reliving souls of bodies.  However, in the Phaedrus we find that the 
soul is said to be immortal because “it is always in motion (or change), and its motion 
never fails because it moves itself, while everything else is moved by it” (Annas, 2003, 
p. 73). Non-living things are moved by the effect of an outside thing, but living things 
and souls are self-mover, they do not need to any other driving factors. Plato always 
gives priority to the soul over body in Phaedrus. He says: 
 
Every soul is immortal since the ever-moving is immortal. Anything, which 
moves something else or is moved by something else ceases to live when that 
motion ceases when that motion ceases. Only the self-moved never ceases to 
move, since it cannot be separated from itself; it is, on the contrary, the fount 
and origin (arche) of motion in other things, which are moved (245-c) (Plato, 
1997, p. 523- 524) 
 
Genes and memes are also immortal; they rule bodies and culture. They are self-
mover: selfish genes and selfish memes move where ever they want. Natural selection as 
an organizing principle does not matter here, because genes and memes can do 
something contrary to the natural selection. Natural selection does not give them the 
power to move rather it is a principle to control their rate of spreading. Replicators can 
move independently, they have such kind of mystical power. Genes and memes also can 
be separated from bodies and minds, the latter can be perished but the former can always 
live. Genes appropriate in Dawkinsian theory as life principal like psyche and memes are 
the psyche of cultural life. Bodies, ideas, and artifacts are the vehicle of these souls, they 
are just temporal bearers of these soul-like replicator. Thus, again we can see there is an 
on-going similarity between Platonism and memetics. 
 Moreover, macro-cosmos has an organizing principle as living bodies have a 
soul. As Rowe suggests, “Platonism is a unified field theory” (Rowe, 2003, p. 108) just 
like Darwinism, which is termed by Blackmore as “Universal Darwinism”. Plato 
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explains the structure of the universe in his famous book Timaeus. For him, Demiurgos, 
a divine Craftsman, designated the universe in accordance with the idea of Good, and 
dependent on a certain system. “Forms function as patterns for the Craftsman as he 
makes our world” (Annas, 2003, p. 84). Things, species, and the four primary elements 
design based on mathematical patterns of Forms. Timaeus has often been evaluated as 
“the mathematization of the world’s underlying structure” (Annas, 2003, p. 90). 
Universal Darwinism claims there is an abstract algorithm that designs the world 
according to a superior Form, that is, blind selection. Evolution, which can be seen as 
Blackmore’s Demiurgos, designates the world based on blind selection in a certain 
algorithm. Although there are considerable differences between the two accounts, a good 
many resemblances can be also seen.  
 Susan Blackmore’s memetics has two essential feature of Platonism, that is, 
intelligible-sensible distinction and soul-body distinction, as well as the explanation of 
whole as an abstract form. Moreover memetics has another property of Platonic heritage. 
One of the most important notions in Platonism is mimesis- imitation, which is central 
for Blackmore as well. In the Platonic explanation, the relationship between ideas and 
the sensible world takes place in three different models. Meteksis (partake in), Parousia 
(presence) and Mimesis (imitation) (Arslan, 2010). Imitation plays a central role in 
Plato’s explanation. In third book of Republic, Plato focuses on the topic of imitation 
and defined it as making oneself like another either in utterance or in external 
characteristics. Here, “the meaning of mimesis is restricted to representation or 
impersonation, and especially to representation in dramatic form and in literature” 
(Philip, 1961, p. 456). Plato sees this mimesis as representation and impersonation as 
degraded, but his move from that to “the mimesis as learning by imitation of behavior. 
This aspect comes up during the discussion of proper schooling for the guardians of the 
state” (Haskins, 2000, p. 9). Plato distinguished two kinds of imitation: imitation for 
making useful things as craftsmen’s do is imitation with knowledge which is acceptable, 
but other kind of imitation is versatile imitation (Mimetike) which means imitation of 
everything to produce images and representation (eidola) that are used in tragedy, 
poetry, painting etc. (Belfiore, 1984). Imitation reappears as an issue in the tenth book of 
Republic, here; Plato extends the meaning of imitation and divides it into levels. A 
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divine Craftsman according to a model creates the forms, which produce the truth. 
Craftsmen of artifacts made their products by imitating the Forms; finally a painter is 
imitating what has already been imitated.  A painter makes copies of a copy, then Plato 
condemn this kind of imitation, which lead us to the phantasma and eidolon removing us 
from the truth. The term mimesis is surrounding other crucial concepts of Plato “like 
image (eidolon), play (paidia), drug or antidote (pharmakon)” (Melberg, 1995, p. 12). 
Thus, imitation is a central Platonic term, which is also central to Susan Blackmore’s 
memetic approach. Although two of them use the term in different context, the concept 
of imitation bears the seal of Plato.  
 Hence, it is possible to say that, memetics while at first glance seems to attack 
essentialism and Platonic heritage, when we probe a little further, we can see that 
memetics resurrects the soul of Plato in a twenty first’s century context. Let alone 
pulling down Platonism, it is claimed that memetics is Darwinizing Plato. We can say:  
A specter is haunting memetics -- the specter of Plato. 
 In this chapter, it is pointed out that memetics has some problems with social 
sciences and philosophy. First of all, the problem of culture, to which memetics offers a 
solution, is ambiguous. By briefly reviewing the history of anthropology and philosophy 
of culture, we show that there is no single well-defined notion of culture in social 
sciences; and memetics definition of culture is an outdated one, which was used at the 
beginning of anthropology. Secondly, memetics is dependent on analogies, but it is 
claimed here, analogy can also be used in an operational and explanatory manner, rather 
than in an axiomatical fashion. If one uses analogy axiomatically then this work would 
become a rhetoric, rather than science. Further, analogies made by Blackmore and other 
memeticists are both explanatory and heuristically trivial. Thirdly, the ideological 
operation in the discourse of memetics is explored. It is claimed memetics, apart from 
working in atomistic modernist ideology and sustaining Comteian attempts of 
colonialization of social sciences, can be seen as a part of currently raising the Third 
Culture. With her trust in science and her daring to solve the impalpable problems of 
humanity in essayist fashion, Susan Blackmore is a good example of a member of the 
Third Culture. The relationship between the Third Culture and cultural studies is also 
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discussed. Finally, allegedly memeticists destroy Platonism and its essentialism; 
contrary to these ideas we claim that memetics reincarnate Plato in Darwinian theory. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Sigmund Freud once wrote about three major wounding blows to human 
arrogance throughout history. Freud (1916/) claims that two major blows attack the 
naïve narcissistic self love of men. The first one is the Copernican Revolution, which 
taught us we stand not at the center of the universe, but in a tiny fragment of an 
immensely vast universe.  The second blow came from biology. Darwin’s theory 
showed human beings are just a descent line in the evolutionary process and have a close 
relationship with the animal kingdom. This theory, then, destroyed humans allegedly 
privileged position in universe. Finally he counts his discovery of the notion of ego as a 
most wounding blow, because psychoanalysis displayed human will; decisions are not 
most of the time free, but obscured by the unconscious. Can one add memetics as the 
fourth blow to this list? Indeed, memetics tries to show our ideas, beliefs, artifacts, in 
short the entire domain that seems to be unique to human beings are just the outcome of 
the survival of memes that takes place out of our control. In this respect, does it not seem 
like Freudian unconsciousness?  Memes can be seen as atomized units of unconscious, 
genes as id, and memeplexes as super-ego. If so, then why has memetics failed to 
influence us as rigorously as the above-mentioned theories? 
 
 In this dissertation, I examined the suggestions and shortcomings of memetics as 
a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution. Evolutionists have developed various different 
models in order to shed light on human beings’ extraordinary capacity for acquiring 
knowledge and transmitting such knowledge, in a word, the mystery of culture. Why is 
this complicated cultural heritage only developed through humans, who are in a 
biological domain? Although, all creatures consist of the same basic materials, humans 
have obviously a different trajectory in history. Humans’ capacity for using language 
and some useful information is for survival gave rise to the formation of culture. When 
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one embarks on the explanation of this phenomenon without resorting to any given or 
supernatural factor, it is necessary to resort to the theory of evolution, because the object 
of study, i.e. culture has been partially changing but also partially can be transferred to 
other generations without variation. This fact immediately conjures up the applicability 
of Darwinian theory of natural evolution to cultural evolution. As mentioned above, 
most known among them are sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which focus on 
the benefic of culture in terms of genetics and basic biological needs. In fact, these 
disciplines bring considerable insight to evolutionary theory, also some eminent scientist 
such as Cavalli-Sforza, Durham, Lumsden and Wilson, and Richardson and Boyd, who 
seek to develop a gene-culture co-evolution models with complex mathematical 
functions and their dual-inheritance models takes the importance of culture into account, 
not just seeing culture as a product of natural evolution.  
 
 However, memetics emerged with a new claim that there is a unit of culture 
analogous to genes, which as unit can replicate independent of biological needs. As 
presented in second chapter, this claim was first introduced by eminent scientist Richard 
Dawkins, and then put together into a structure and mechanism of the mind by Daniel 
Dennett. These two accounts are presented as the background of Susan Blackmore’s 
memetics. Then, Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach is outlined. In the first two 
chapters.  
 In the second half of the dissertation, I focus on the shortcomings of mentioned 
approach. In the fourth chapter, some of the criticisms of Susan Blackmore from inside 
of memetics are summarized. By the phrase “inside memetics” I mean those 
academicians, who published works in the field of meme theory. The first two sections 
of this chapter, I discussed Susan Blackmore’s indefiniteness on the issue of the location 
of memes. Blackmore did not answer the question where memes are stored. She simply 
leaps over this problem and regards it as a nonessential issue. However, it is claimed this 
question can determine the entire trajectory of memetic researches. Its answer would 
become an epistemological starting point for studies and experiments. As presented in 
two distinct poles, taking mentalist or behaviorist position can lead memetics to different 
aims and conclusions. For the behaviorist camp, since one cannot show the locus of 
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memes in the brain, memetic investigations should limit itself with the observable 
artifacts, and should seek to explore the frequency rate of a meme in the population. 
Doing this would rescue the concept of meme from being just a metaphor and lacking 
from experimental research. On the contrary, according to the mentalist camp, meme 
theory can only be asserted if the neuronal or mental correspondence of memes would 
be shown. The location of memes must be in brain, and the entire research program of 
memetics must focus on neuroscience or brain studies. As shown, these two camps are 
considerably different, so a new theory that does not choose any of them must give 
adequate justification. If one would like to transgress these two limited positions, one 
should necessarily give adequate arguments that can either reconcile the two camps into 
a higher synthesis or create an original method. However, Blackmore does not choose 
any of these positions regardless of sufficient explanation. She simply circumvents this 
problem by referring to the development of other reliable sciences. She says genetics 
could develop prior to the Watson-Crick model; as such memetics might develop 
without defining the structure and location of memes. But this rhetorical justification is 
not sufficient to stave off the epistemological problems of Blackmore’s account. Further, 
for Blackmore, the essential character of what she calls Universal Darwinism is its 
substrate neutrality. Darwinian theory is applicable regardless of medium; it can operate 
either in nature or in culture. Memes are also neutral in terms of substrate and thereby 
the theory of memetics can be improved without determining any certain space for 
memes. Robert Aunger terms this theory functional equivalence. According to the 
functional equivalence insight, as long as two processes can exhibit the same input-
output relationship, their intents and purpose can be seen as the same regardless of how 
the different mechanism work inside them. But a sequence of genes on a computer disc, 
in a cell, or on a paper would have very different meanings. This sequence can only 
work in cell; in the other media it has no meaning. Hence, we cannot simply put aside 
the problem of medium because many times context determined the meaning of the text, 
or the medium affects the message. For preventing this simplicity Aunger seeks to 
conceive a theory of memes that is limited to the brains. He attempts to find a meme in 
the neuronal nexus and put forward the notion of neuronal meme or millisecond meme. 
Aunger’s account did not succeed per se, the reason for review of this account is to 
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display that memetics can be considered more scientifically and a memeticists can cope 
with the substrate problem in order to reach a dependable consequence. Unfortunately, 
Susan Blackmore does not want to lose time with these issues, she craves for presenting 
how memetics can be a panacea for all the problems of humanity.  
  
 Apart from this epistemological imperfection, the notion of imitation is also 
debatable. Susan Blackmore (1999) places this concept at the center of her account. She 
defines “a meme is that whatever it is that passed on by imitation” (p.  43). So much so 
that, she claims to be human is to imitate. For Blackmore, meme theory, and also culture 
as well, is exclusively about imitation. The only way for cultural transmission is 
imitation. As presented in the third section, imitation is insufficient to account for all the 
social transmissions. Taking into account the acquisition of language, it can be can seen 
that the grammar and rules of a language are not acquired by observing or imitating 
somebody else. Infants internalized the structure language without copying their parents. 
Thus, some elements of cultural transmission go beyond the scope of imitation. 
Accordingly, psychologists such as Rosarie Conte and Henry Plotkin claim that although 
imitation plays a considerable role in the cultural evolution, it cannot be regarded as the 
only mechanism, other ways of transmission such as social learning, local enhancement 
must be embraced by memetics. Conte also claims that memetics should take into 
account agents. Since determining what part of a behavior is necessary to imitate and 
who is the best for imitation requires always the decision of an autonomous intelligent 
agent. Susan Blackmore excludes the idea of self and autonomous agents   from her 
account, but this made it self-contradictory. David Hull also puts forward that the levels 
of memetics must be stratified. Deep memes such as the use of language, walking, or 
driving a car, and shallow memes such doing origami, using some tools should be 
distinguished. But, Susan Blackmore puts all these differences in the same ballpark. 
Kate Distin also explores some inner contradictions of Blackmore’s notion of imitation. 
Thus, it is claimed that imitation as the central point of Blackmore’s approach is ill 
defined, self-contradictory and insufficient to account for cultural evolution. 
 Besides, Blackmore claims extraordinary capacity of imitation makes humans 
special in nature. She asserts that true imitation is peculiar to humankind. This paper 
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discussed these ontological claims under the title of anthropocentric bias. Here, she does 
not talk as a scientist; rather she recounts common prejudices on the narcissism of the 
human species. As Laland and Odling-Smee adduce there are forms of imitation in 
nature equal to what Blackmore defines as imitation. They bring proof from zoology. 
For example the preference of certain diet among successive generations in rats, or milk 
bottle-top opening tits in Britain, potato washing macaque monkeys are examples of 
imitation in the animal kingdom. Thus, it is claimed that Susan Blackmore does not use 
scientifically proven fact, but many times she uses metaphysical claims. Corresponding 
to this issue, in the final section of this chapter, this work handles some methodological 
issues in Blackmore’s account. It is suggested that Susan Blackmore’s memetics has no 
dependable philosophy of science and no generally accepted methods. She also in many 
cases befuddles science with metaphysics. She puts forward the idea of self is illusion 
without depending on any scientific experiment. She says the increase of the brain size is 
caused by memes, but she put forward this with a “just so” story. Susan Blackmore’s 
memetics is imbued with those kinds of “just so” stories that are not dependent on 
objective scientific data. She also makes some ontological assertion about the essence of 
human being, the reality of mind, the future of the evolution, which do not depend on 
experimental analysis, so what we read on Blackmore’s pages are not the science of 
memetics, but fantasies, biases and hopes. Her account has no methodology of science 
and also has no empirical support. These make her account unreliable. Thus, in the 
fourth chapter, some criticisms about Blackmore from within memetics are discussed. 
 In the fifth chapter, Blackmore’s approach is evaluated in terms of the concerns of 
cultural studies such as anthropology, power relations, rhetoric, narration, philosophy of 
science, ideology, and so on. Although, Susan Blackmore’s approach can be questioned 
by social scientists in various respect on the details, this work just handles some initial 
theoretical issues. In the first section, the matter of culture, for which memetics offers 
interesting solutions is in focus. Different visions on the notion of culture throughout the 
history of anthropology are presented. It is presented that there is no a single, commonly 
accepted, clear-cut definition of culture in anthropology. What memeticists espouse is an 
ideational definition of culture. This definition acknowledges culture has some 
properties of societies such as ideas, religions, institutions, art, music, customs etc. and 
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has a general capacity of human shared by all societies that evolve through cumulative 
progress. There are two major approaches to culture, i.e. the German romantic tradition 
notion of Kultur and the Enlightenment’s notion of civilization. While in the German 
tradition culture is a form of consciousness that discerns one nation from another, 
Anglo-Saxon tradition regards culture as a general shared property of humans that 
separates human beings from nature. Obviously memetics accepts the second conception 
of nature. However this is a very simple definition, which was made at the very 
beginning of the discipline of anthropology and set aside important details. Memeticists’ 
social science- blindness leads them to overlook these important definitional problems. 
We can see that Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach has no definition of culture, and 
while she explains some cultural phenomena she never refers to any important notion of 
anthropology such as language, sign, function, class etc. Further, I discussed whether 
culture could be treated through atomized units. I claim that most part of the culture 
cannot be compartmentalized and also a great deal of the parts of culture consists of 
senses that are not transferable units. I give the example of eating insect to show that this 
is a cultural sense that we do not learn from anybody. Thus, this paper confers that 
memetics reinvents the wheel because of its ignorance about the discussions in 
anthropology. 
 Memetics is also dependent on some basic analogies and certain syllogisms. At the 
very beginning of the memetic project, Richard Dawkins argues cultural evolution is 
analogous to natural evolution. This resemblance is a pre-experimental unproven claim. 
It is claimed that analogy can only be used in science in operationally or explanatory 
manner, but not axiomatically. Axiomatic use of analogies makes memetics like 
rhetoric. By referring to the Middle Age use of analogy and Foucault’s assessment of 
analogy as a way of thinking of the pre-modern world, in this work it is claimed that 
analogical thinking is not suitable for science. Blackmore also constructs a syllogism for 
her notion of Universal Darwinism. She says if a phenomenon has the properties of 
variation, selection and retention, it must be examined in a Darwinian paradigm, given 
culture has the properties of changing, selection and heredity, and hence, culture must be 
examined in Darwinian paradigm. This work asserts this is a conditioned syllogism, 
which is formally valid, but is invalid in terms of content. There is no relation of 
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necessity between the premises. Firstly, how can we claim Darwinism mean the 
necessity of variation, selection, and retention when there are different interpretations of 
Darwinism, such as population thinking? Also, selection that is purported to take place 
in the cultural domain is the same with selection in nature, namely, blind selection. This 
paper claims there is not only one version of selection; there can be blind selection, 
guided selection or unjustified selection. Which kind of selection operates in the cultural 
domain is ambiguous. Blackmore also uses the analogy between natural units and 
cultural units, and claims culture consists of distinguishable units. These units are also 
selfish similar to selfish genes. Kronfeldner evaluates these two analogies; she claims 
that these three kinds of analogy used in memetics are scientifically unworthy, because 
they are explanatorily and heuristically trivial.  
 When it comes to ideological analysis of memetics, this work claim that memetics 
reflects certain modes of thinking and works in a certain economic-political climate. 
First of all, memetic writers including Blackmore use both memetics and genetics to 
serve their beliefs. They zealously struggle against religious beliefs, so I call them 
atheist apologetics. Blackmore’s and other memeticists trusts in science, their use of 
science as a model to explain society can be seen as a continuation of Comteian 
positivist attempts to create a social science similar to natural sciences. Besides, as 
Lewontin suggests atomistic thinking of culture reflects those approaches of modernity, 
which see individual as the basis of society. These individuals are selfish, 
individualistic; compete to win the struggle for survival one-way or the other. These 
properties are reflecting modern Western values that give rise to considerable troubles 
such as colonialism and racism. The meme theory also claims that memes are 
responsible for everything in the human world, so it justifies all social inequalities, all 
dominations and power relations. Thus, it is claimed here claim Susan Blackmore’s 
memetics expresses some basic values and prejudices of modern Western society in her 
theory. I also suggest that memetics can be seen as a member of the rising ideology of 
the Third Culture. John Brockman introduces this notion in reference to those new 
scientists who gain popularity throughout the world and moderate the beliefs and 
attitudes of contemporary society. According to Brockman, the public intellectual is 
outmoded today; some of the new scientists can express their ideas fluently and also deal 
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with the core issues of humanity such as the meaning of life, the future of universe, the 
reasons of our behaviors etc. However, the Third Culture is an updated version of 
positivism and will eventually fail to capture these problems, which exist beyond the 
scope of science.  
  Last but not least, this work also deal with a well-known claim that 
Darwinism pull down essentialism and Platonic heritage. Both Dennett and Blackmore 
advocate this assertion. Indeed, what memetics try to do is very similar to what post 
modernist such as Derrida’ and Deleuze’s attempts to overturn Platonism, and identity 
politics. Memetics put forwards that ideas are not represent the reality, or they has no 
essence, they are just copies of the copy. It looks like Deleuzian simulacra. But ıf we 
probe a little further, the close relation between memetics and Platonism can be seen. 
Memetics has certain features of Platonism. First of all, it divides reality into two pole, 
the appearances (phenotypic expression) and replicator (genotype or memotype). 
Replicators are always remains the same and reproduce in every different expression in 
the world of sensibility. They are permanent and unchangeable. They are the hidden 
cause of the all apparent reality. It is obvious that the role given to Ideas in Platonic 
account is similar to role given to replicators in memetic explanations. Also, memetics 
has sharp episteme-doxa and techne-physis distinctions. There is human world, technai 
and a natural world. These domains are ruled by different powers. Replicators like 
platonic soul are eternal and unchangeable and use bodies as a tool for themselves. 
Imitation is also a key Platonic figure, which also stand at the center of Blackmore’s 
account. What is transferred when the replication of a meme and genes is not material 
things such as atoms, hydrogen, or sugars but rather a kind of instruction? The 
relationship between the structure and function is still indefinite. Thus, it is claimed in 
this chapter, memetics’ claims about pulling down of Platonism and essentialism are not 
acceptable. Memetics regenerates Plato trough contemporary science or to put in another 
way it Darwinizes Plato, let alone gets rid of it.  
 As a conclusion, this works suggests that memetics can be seen as a good example 
of cultural evolutionist model that does not reduce culture to nature. However, it 
introduces an ambiguous concept, the meme: the unit of culture; by doing so reinvents 
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nature-culture dichotomy. Susan Blackmore’s memetic approach has a number of 
theoretical and methodological shortcomings. Further, her incompetence about social 
sciences makes her account simplistic. Use of unscientific analogies, pre-experimental 
claims that go beyond the limits of science, and some basic biases of Western culture 
have made her account of cultural evolution a kind of rhetorical work seeking to 
convince people as to its usefulness. The memetic project that takes biological sciences 
as a model for humanities can be seen as another attempt of colonialization of social 
sceinces by natural sciences. It is the latest fashion of positivism, but like previous 
attempt, it is doomed to failure.  
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